Tuesday, April 5, 2016

The Filioque: Part I


The Filioque

    The term Filioque is a Latin word meaning, "and the Son." It is the ablative form of Filius, meaning, “Son,” combined with the suffix –que, meaning “and.” It was first introduced into the Creed locally at the Third Council of Toledo (589), and gradually gained acceptance in the West. It was finally defined as dogma at the Second Council of Lyons (1272-1274), and later at the Council of Florence (1431–1449).

    The theology behind the filioque was aptly elucidated by Adrian Fortescue in his book, "The Orthodox Eastern Church". He says,

    “It will be as well to begin by explaining what the "procession of the Holy Ghost" means. God the Father is the sources of the Divine nature. The other Divine Persons receive this same nature from Him. God the Son receives it by generation: He is born of the Father before all ages. Therefore he is always called the Son and he is distinguished from God the Father by this relationship of birth or generation, Filiatio. The Holy Ghost receives the same Divine nature from the Father (and also from the Son) but not by generation: otherwise he, too, would be a Son of God. The Divine nature is communicated to Him by another relation, to which we know nothing analogous, and for which we therefore have no proper name. For this reason the words Spiratio or Procession are used; and we say that whereas the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity is born, the Third Person proceeds from the Father. God the Son proceeds from the Father too, but for His procession we have and use the special name generation. The theological difference then is whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, or from the Father alone. But the issue is not quite so simple as that. Catholics say that he proceeds from both Persons as from one principle.

    The Orthodox in the first place admit that the temporal mission of the Holy Ghost (His office as source of grace among men and angels) comes from both Father and Son. On this point our Lord's words are to clear: "But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, he shall give testimony of me." (John 15:26). Some of them at any rate are disposed to admit that the Holy Ghost receives the Divine essence from (or, as they prefer to say, through) God the Son. The Latin Church through her schoolmen, as far as it concerns this point it is this: All creatures are made up of two principles called actus and potentia. The actus is the principle of perfection, the potentia receives and by receiving limits that perfection. Throughout nature these two principles are seen, always in couples. Potentia alone would have no perfection, could not be. Actus alone would be unlimited perfection. So all creatures that have a limited nature and limited perfection are made up of double principles. All creatures are composite. God alone has no potentia, He is pure actus, unlimited, infinite perfection. God alone is simple. Therefore in God all things are really the same, they are all identified with His one simple, infinite essence. Goodness, might, wisdom, love, all perfection in us are received into a potentia and are really distinct from our essence which limits them, in God are not received into anything; they are His essence.

    We have love, power, wisdom. God is love, power, wisdom. So we come to the first great axiom about God: In God all things are the same; an infinite being is necessarily a simple one. In Deo omnia suni unum. Revelation tells us that there are, however, real distinction in God and three really distinct Persons. The schoolmen now consider the difference between two categories of things -- absolute things and relation. Absolute things are perfection; they concern the being in whom they are. Goodness makes a being good, and so on. Relation are not perfection; they concern, not the being in whom they inhere, but something else. Their whole nature is not to add anything in themselves, but only to connote the state of their subject with regard to something else.

    If I say, for instance, "This man is white," I say something about his own quality. If I say: "This man is equal to that one," I say nothing positive or absolute about him. I only establish how he stands with regard to the other one. I have stated no entity in him, but only his relation to another. Now in God all absolute and positive things are identified with the Divine nature. But the opposite extremes of a relation cannot metaphysically be identified with each other, or there would be not relation. If, then, there are relations in God, these mutual relations must establish real distinction. We should never have thought such relations possible, but Revelation has taught us that they exist. There is the relation of Paternity and "Filiatio," and the relation of active and passive "Spiratio."

    These relations are also identified with the Divine essence, but they necessarily involve real distinction between themselves. If there is real Paternity and "Filiatio," there must be a really distinct Father and Son. The distinction between God the Father and God the Son is constituted solely and entirely by this relation. In all absolute things they are identified. Their wisdom, power, goodness, are the same thing; these qualities are simply the one Divine essence. (Essence, nature, and substance in scholastic language mean the same thing.)

    Therefore the Father would be the same Person as the Son, but for the relation between them. The Persons are constituted by the relations. Were there no relation, God would be one Person; the three relations constitutes three Persons. (The right way to say this is that the Persons are subsistent relations.)

    So we come to the great axiom about the Blessed Trinity: "In God all things are one, except where there intercedes the opposition of a relation"---Omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Now exactly the same principle applies also to the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost is God, is identified with every perfection of the simple essence of God. He cannot be distinguished from the other Persons by anything absolute or positive (otherwise He would either have something they have not, or lack something they have, and there would be a limitation in God). He is distinguished from God the Father only by the mutual relation of "Spiratio," or Procession. He proceeds from the Father, and so is distinguished from Him. If He did not, he would be the same Person as the Father. And He proceeds also from the Son. If He did not, there would be no relation between them, and so, again, he would be identified with God the Son. The only way in which there can be three really distinct Persons in the Blessed Trinity is that there is a real relation between each of them --- Paternity between the first and second, Procession between first and third, and Procession also between second and third. So, from the point of view of scholastic theology, the thesis of Latin schoolmen is unanswerable: "The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son; indeed, if He did no proceed from the Son, he would not be distinct from Him. Wherefore the error of the Greeks in this matter fundamentally overturns the truth of the Trinity."

    The decree of Florence which for us defines the Catholic faith and which the Easterns then also signed, but afterwards repudiated, it: "The Holy Ghost is eternally from the Father and the Son, and He has His essences and His subsistent being both from the Father and the Son, and He proceeds from both eternally as from one principle and by one spiration. And we declare that what the holy doctors and Fathers say, namely, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, comes to mean the same thing, that the Son also is the cause, according to the Greeks, or the principle, according to the Latins, of the subsistence of the Holy Ghost."

    It will be seen how the council, while inevitably maintaining the essential Catholic faith, was scrupulously conciliatory and tolerant towards the Easterners in every point that possibly could be conceded. And this faith of Florence is established, not only by such passages of Scriptures as declare that the Holy Ghost is the "Spirit of the Son (Galatians 4:6; Romans 8:9) just as He is the "Spirit of the Father" (Matthew 10:20), that He "receives from our Lord" (John 16:13-15), that He is "sent by Christ" (John 15:26; 16:7), but also by a long chain of Fathers both Latin and Greek. As an example for the Latin Fathers St. Augustine may stand: "Why then should we not believe that the Holy Ghost proceeds also from the Son, since He is the Spirit of the Son? If He did not proceed from Him, (Christ) after His resurrection would not have breathed on His apostles saying: Receive the Holy Ghost. What then did that breathing mean but that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him too?" And for the Greeks St. Athanasius says: "We are taught by Holy Scripture that He (the Holy Ghost) is the Spiration of the Son of God, and we call the Son of God the source of the Holy Ghost."

    In an agreed statement of the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation, it stated:

    "The Filioque controversy is first of all a controversy over words. As a number of recent authors have pointed out, part of the theological disagreement between our communions seems to be rooted in subtle but significant differences in the way key terms have been used to refer to the Spirit’s divine origin. The original text of the Creed of 381, in speaking of the Holy Spirit, characterizes him in terms of John 15.26, as the one “who proceeds (ekporeuetai) from the Father”: probably influenced by the usage of Gregory the Theologian (Or. 31.8), the Council chose to restrict itself to the Johannine language, slightly altering the Gospel text (changing to pneuma…ho para tou Patros ekporeuetai to: to pneuma to hagion… to ek tou Patros ekporeuomenon) in order to emphasize that the “coming forth” of the Spirit begins “within” the Father’s own eternal hypostatic role as source of the divine Being, and so is best spoken of as a kind of “movement out of (ek)” him. The underlying connotation of ekporeuesthai (“proceed,” “issue forth”) and its related noun, ekporeusis (“procession”), seems to have been that of a “passage outwards” from within some point of origin. Since the time of the Cappadocian Fathers, at least, Greek theology almost always restricts the theological use of this term to the coming-forth of the Spirit from the Father, giving it the status of a technical term for the relationship of those two divine persons. In contrast, other Greek words, such as proienai, “go forward,” are frequently used by the Eastern Fathers to refer to the Spirit’s saving “mission” in history from the Father and the risen Lord."

    The Latin word procedere, on the other hand, with its related noun processio, suggests simply “movement forwards,” without the added implication of the starting-point of that movement; thus it is used to translate a number of other Greek theological terms, including proienai, and is explicitly taken by Thomas Aquinas to be a general term denoting “origin of any kind” (Summa Theologiae I, q. 36, a.2), including – in a Trinitarian context - the Son’s generation as well as the breathing-forth of the Spirit and his mission in time. As a result, both the primordial origin of the Spirit in the eternal Father and his “coming forth” from the risen Lord tend to be designated, in Latin, by the same word, procedere, while Greek theology normally uses two different terms. Although the difference between the Greek and the Latin tradi­tions of under­standing the eternal origin of the Spirit is more than simply a verbal one, much of the ori­gi­nal concern in the Greek Church over the insertion of the word Filioque into the Latin translation of the Creed of 381 may well have been due – as Maximus the Confessor explained (Letter to Marinus: PG 91.133-136) - to a misunderstanding on both sides of the different ranges of meaning implied in the Greek and Latin terms for “procession”.”

    Although the Orthodox object to the word "proceeds", they don’t do so in its substance, since they admit that the Father sends the Holy Spirit through the Son, and "ekporeuomai" in its ordinary sense means to "journey forth," which is the inverse of "sending", in Greek no less than Latin. However, the problem is that the Greek verb has the preposition "ek" built in, so if you predicated it of the Son, it would imply that the Holy Spirit proceeds "out of" the Son, which He does, but only by virtue of proceeding out of the Father, not in the sense of the Son being a second unoriginated origin.

    Their doctrine is distinguished from ours only by introducing subtle distinctions such as "eternal manifestation" (an improvement over Photius' claim that the "sending" of the Spirit was confined to the temporal order). Gregory Palamas explained Gregory II's teaching in terms of his essence/energies distinction, saying that the Spirit is manifested/revealed to the saints in divine energeia, but not as the Essence (God-in-Himself, which cannot be revealed). Yet what the Orthodox attribute to the energies falls under what Catholics attribute to the Divine Essence (since we do not regard God's operations as really distinct from Himself), so again there is no incompatibility, especially if, as some scholars have come to understand - and I tend to agree from my reading - Palamas considered the essence/energy distinction to be more of a formal distinction than a real one. Modern Orthodox, however, tend to treat the distinction as real, which creates a contradiction with the Council of Florence's definition that the Holy Spirit has His essence from the Father and the Son. Yet this conflict is now a consequence of the hesychast essence/energies theology, which is the more substantive difference.

    My impression is that the filioque is a problem only for those who want it to be. Where there's an earnest desire for reunion, there should be no problem for theologians of East and West to close the small gap on this issue (as they actually did at Lyons and Florence, and with the various Uniate churches) without compromise of conscience.

    Overall, I believe that this issue is something of a pretext or excuse for refusing obedience to the Holy See, which is the real Church-dividing issue. If we could come to an agreement on papal primacy, no one would stumble over the filioque, as the linguistic differences are minor and it's well known that the Latins intend only what Christ Himself said in John 15:26.



For more information on the Filioque, read:
https://bekkos.wordpress.com/2008/01/21/st-maximus-on-the-filioque/

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