Kant’s
Autonomous Morality
We
reserved our discussion of Kant's ethical system for this place because he
centers it all about the idea of duty. In contrast to the various systems of
eudaemonism, the theory that man's last end is happiness of some kind, Kant's
ethics is a stern deontologism, the theory that man's last end is the
fulfillment of duty. It has an unmistakable affinity to Stoicism, "virtue
is its own reward," "duty for duty's sake," but he develops it
in an original way.
Kant
never tired of saying that two things ever filled him with admiration,
"the starry sky above and the moral law within." On the morallaw he
based the whole structure of his philosophy, for after he had devoted his
Critique of Pure Reason to demolishing the ability of human reason to discover
truth speculatively, he tried in his Critique of Practical Reason to build it
all up again on a practical and moral foundation. His thought is easier to
follow in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.
He
begins by stating that the good taken purely and simply is found only in a good
will, and a good will is one which acts, not from natural inclination, but from
duty. Only acts done from duty have moral worth. Even acts done in the line of
duty but not from the motive of duty have no moral value. They lack the form of
morality, that which precisely gives them their moral quality, and this can be
nothing else but respect for the law, which is what he means by duty. Thus an
act is not good because of the end to which it leads, but solely because of the
motive of duty from which it is performed.
The
moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it
or in any principle of action which has to borrow its motive from this expected
effect. For all these effects (agreeableness of condition, indeed even the
promotion of the happiness of others) could be brought about through other
causes and would not require the will of a rational being, while the highest
and unconditional good can be found only in such a will. Therefore the
pre-eminent good can consist only in the conception of the law in itself (which
can be present only in a rational being) so far as this conception and not the
hoped-for effect is the determining ground of the will. Thispre-eminent good,
which we call moral, is already present in the person who acts according to
this conception and we do not have to expect it first in the result.1
What
is this law, respect for which must be the motive of an act to make it moral?
It must be the pure concept of law as such. If any act I do is to be moral, I
must ask myself: Can I make the maxim or principle on which this act rests into
a universal law binding all?
The
shortest but most infallible way to find the answer to the question as to
whether a deceitful promise is consistent with duty is to ask myself: Would I
be content that my maxim (of extricating myself from difficulty by a false
promise) should hold as a universal law for myself as well as for others? And
could I say to myself that everyone may make a false promise when he is in a
difficulty from which he otherwise cannot escape? I immediately see that I
could will the lie but not a universal law to lie. For with such a law there
would be no promises at all inasmuch as it would be futile to make a pretense
of my intention in regard to future actions to those who would not believe this
pretence or—if they overhastily did so—who would pay me back in my own coin.
Thus my maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a
universal law.2
Kant
goes on to say that, whereas everything in nature works according to laws, only
rational beings can have an idea of law and consciously conform their conduct
to principles. This capacity is will, which is the same as practical reason. An
objective principle of law binding the will is a command, stated as an
imperative expressing the ought. An imperative may be hypothetical (if you want
this end, you mustuse these means), or categorical (you must do this
absolutely).
If
the action is good only as a means to something else, the imperative is
hypothetical; but if it is thought of as good in itself, and hence as necessary
in a will which of itself conforms to reason as the principle of this will, the
imperative is categorical....
There
is one imperative which directly commands a certain conduct without making its
condition some purpose to be reached by it. This imperative is categorical. It
concerns not the material of the action and its intended result but the form
and principle from which it results. What is essentially good in it consists in
the intention, the result being what it may. This imperative may be called the
imperative of morality....
There
is, therefore, only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.3
This
statement of the categorical imperative is repeated often by Kant, sometimes
with a slightly different wording and emphasis, but the underlying meaning is
always the same. What in Kant's view makes an act morally wrong? It is in
making an exception for myself, and thus contradicting the law in my own favor.
When
we observe ourselves in any transgression of duty, we find that we do not
actually will that our maxim should become a universal law. That is impossible
for us; rather, the contrary of this maxim should remain as a law generally,
and we only take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves or for
the sake of our inclination, and for this one occasion.4
The
fundamental reason why such conduct is wrong is that it subjects other persons
(as means) to myself (as end), perverting the whole realm of ends, according to
which each rational being, each person, must be treated never merely as a means
but always as an end in himself. The dignity of the rational being, the
nobility of a person as such, is therefore the fundamental reason why I must be
moral. But this principle involves a further and startling conclusion. If I
must not subject other persons as means to myself as end, I myself am not
subjected as means to another as end.
Who
then imposes the moral law upon me? I impose it on myself. This is what he
calls the autonomy of the will.
Reason,
therefore, relates every maxim of the will as giving universal laws to every
other will and also to every action toward itself; it does not do so for the
sake of any other practical motive or future advantage but rather from the idea
of the dignity of a rational being, which obeys no law except that which he
himself also gives....
He
is thus fitted to be a member in a possible realm of ends to which his own
nature already destined him. For, as an end in himself, he is destined to be
legislative in the realm of ends, free from all laws of nature and obedient
only to those which he himself gives. Accordingly, his maxims can belong to a
universal legislation to which he is at the same time also subject.... Autonomy
is thus the basis of the dignity of both human nature and every rational
nature.5
Kant
goes on to derive from the moral law the three truths which hethought could not
be established by speculative reason, but which we took as the three
presuppositions to ethics: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the
soul, and the existence of God. Unless we are free, we can neither legislate
the moral law for ourselves nor observe it. We can never reach but only
approximate a perfect fulfillment of the moral law, but since our function in
existence is always to tend to realize it more perfectly, we must be immortal. The
One who does realize it perfectly, who is the absolute fulfillment of holiness
and the ideal of all goodness, is God.
Granted
that the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule
of prudence), the righteous man may say: I will that there be a God, that my
existence in this world be also an existence in a pure world of the
understanding outside the system of natural connections,6and finally that my duration be endless. I
stand by this and will not give up this belief.7
So
these truths are neither mere hypotheses nor rational convictions, but
practical postulates demanded by our moral needs which we accept on belief, an
attitude Kant calls pure rational faith.8
Criticism.
—Kant's vigorous assertion of the moral law, his stern preachment of the claims
of duty, the paramount importance he attached to the ethical issue, and the
high seriousness with which he approached the fundamental problems of
philosophy, acted as a powerful antidote to the materialism and hedonism of a
shallower age. All this was to the good, butit should not blind us to the
defects of his system. We shall limit our criticisms to three:
(1)
The motive of duty
(2)
The categorical imperative
(3)
The autonomy of the will
1.
To rest all morality on the motive of duty is unnatural and inhuman. Kant
nowhere says that an act not done from duty is immoral, only that it is
nonmoral; nor does he say that to be moral it must be done from pure duty
alone. All he says is that unless the motive of duty is present it cannot be
moral, and, if it is done from both duty and inclination, only the motive of
duty can give it its morality. But even this is overplaying the role of duty.
Is it only her sense of duty and not her love for her child that gives morality
to a mother's devotion? Is it only cold obligation and not large-hearted
generosity that makes relief of the poor a moral act? Certainly a sense of duty
will be present in such cases, but love and generosity are always esteemed as
higher motives than mere duty and give the act a greater moral worth. We fall
back on duty only when other motives fail. Duty is rather the last bulwark
against wrong acting than the highest motive for right acting.
How
could Kant explain heroic acts, such as giving one's life for one's friend?
These are always thought the noblest and best, precisely becausethey go beyond
the call of duty. Kant is then faced with this dilemma: either he must deny
that heroic acts are moral, and thus fly in the face of all human evaluations,
so as to make his ethics useless in practice; or he must make heroic acts a
strict duty, thus putting a burden on human nature that it cannot bear and
robbing these acts of the very quality that makes them heroic.
2.
That the moral law commands us with a categorical imperative is undoubtedly
true, and Kant emphasizes it well, but his formulation of it is faulty. The
moral imperative is properly: "Do good and avoid evil," plus the more
definite principles derived from this, rather than Kant's formula: "So act
that the maxim from which you act can be made a universal law," which is
only a negative rule. Evil ways of acting could never become universal laws,
for they are self-destructive; but there are also good ways of acting that can
never become universal laws, such as a life of celibacy. Hence the reason for
the moral goodness of an act is not the fact that it can be made a universal
law. Kant might answer that we can will celibacy to be a universal law for a
definite type of person in definite circumstances; but this answer is no help,
for if we start making exceptions of this sort the term universal law loses all
meaning. It finally narrows down to just one single case. To use Kant's own
example, I might will that anyone in my peculiar predicament could get out of
it by lying, and still have the law universal for that class of people.
To
determine the goodness of an act wholly from the maxim which governs it and not
from the end to which it naturally leads is to adopt a purely subjective norm
of morality. All three determinants, the nature of the act, its motive, and the
circumstances, must be considered, and not the motive alone. It is difficult to
square Kant's view here with the acceptance of intrinsic morality.
3.
Kant's recognition of the dignity of the human person is one of the most
admired parts of his philosophy. But he carries it so far as to make a created
person impossible. We must never use each other merely as means, but God may do
with us what He pleases, short of contradicting His own attributes. To make the
human will autonomous does violence to the rights of God the Creator. Kant is
forced to this position by his rejection of the traditional proofs for God's
existence, thus paying the price for faulty metaphysics. In Kant's system our
reason for accepting God's existence is ultimately that we will His existence,
for we need Him to justify morality to ourselves. As Kant says, this is a
practical faith rather than a reasoned conviction. But here is another dilemma.
Really God either does or does not exist; if He does not exist, we cannot will
Him into existence simply because we feel a need of Him; if He does exist, the
human will cannot be wholly autonomous but is subject to the law God imposes on
us.
Kant
correctly argues that there can be no morality without free will. But in his
discussion of freedom there is always a confusion betweenfreedom of choice and
freedom of independence, as if one could not retain free will and still be
under the command of another's law. To save freedom he demands autonomy, but by
demanding autonomy he destroys all real obligation and therefore all real law.
The
obligation an autonomous will imposes on itself is an obligation only in name.
A will that binds itself is no more bound than a man who locks himself in but
still holds the key in his hand. Kant does not think that we may either make or
not make the moral law for ourselves as we please, or that we frame its
provisions arbitrarily. We cannot escape from the categorical imperative, and
the maxims that we will into universal laws cannot be otherwise than they are.
Why not? If this necessity is founded on the very nature of things (and Kant
thinks that it is, for it is our one grasp of the noumenon, the thing-in-itself),
then it is determined for us by some other will than ours and to this will we
are subject. Either there is no obligation or it is imposed on us from without.
The only other alternative is an identification of the human will with the
divine, the pantheistic trend taken by Kant's followers.
TRUE
NATURE OF OBLIGATION
We
return now to the alternatives proposed at the beginning of this chapter: that
moral obligation must be imposed on us either by ourselves or by our fellow man
or by God.
Moral
obligation does not come from oneself. We have just discussed Kant's version of
this theory and found it unacceptable. One cannot have authority over oneself
and be subject to oneself in the same respect, be one's own superior and
inferior. A lawmaker can repeal his own laws. If man made the moral law for
himself, he could never violate it, for he cannot will both its observance and
its violation at once, and his act of violation would simply be an act of
repeal. Such a law could impose no obligation.
Moral
obligation cannot come from fellow man. As moral beings all men are equal. They
all have the same last end and must use the same means to it under the same
moral law. Therefore no man or body of men has original jurisdiction over
another so as to bind him under moral guilt, under pain of losing his last end,
since it is in no man's power to grant or refuse to another the attainment of
the last end. Even the state, man's most powerful organization, has no power
here. For what obligation have men to obey the state? Of itself the state can
exert only physical compulsion, unless it can appeal to the authority it
receives from a Source beyond itself that controls man's last end and enjoins
obedience to the state as necessary for reaching that last end. Hence moral obligation
cannot come from fellow man, whether taken individually or as organized into
society.
Moral
obligation, therefore, can come only from God. But a negativeargument by
elimination is insufficient in so important a matter. We must show positively
why and how this proposition is true.
Voluntarists
have immediate recourse to the will of God. Man is obliged to live a moral life
because God wills it, and no further reason need be sought why God wills it
than the freedom and supremacy of the divine will itself. Intellectualists
agree that God does will that a man live a moral life, but they are also
concerned to show that the divine will, though supremely free, is not arbitrary
or capricious. The following explanation is deduced from St. Thomas' principles.
Obligation
is moral necessity, imposed on a free will, thus differing from physical
necessity, which controls nonfree beings. How does any kind of necessity arise?
St. Thomas9 notes that necessity
arises from the causes of a thing. From the efficient cause arises the physical
necessity of compulsion and restraint, for these are brought about by the
action of an external agent. From the material and formal causes arises the
physical necessity of internal determination, for matter and form constitute the
nature of a being and specify for it its type of activity; only intellectual
natures having free will partially escape this determinism. We are left with
the final cause, and it is from this that moral necessity arises.
Moral
necessity, which binds a free will without destroying its freedom, must come
from the final cause, for only an end or good known by the intellect can move
the will, either to arouse or to restrain it. But onecannot will an end and at
the same time refuse to will the means necessary to the end; otherwise he would
have a mere ineffectual wish, not a decision of the will. Four possibilities
occur:
(1)
Neither the end nor the means are necessary
(2)
The end is necessary but not the means
(3)
The means are necessary but not the end
(4)
Both the end and the means are necessary
1.
Obviously there is no obligation when both end and means are optional. There is
no obligation of going to this particular college, because there are other
colleges as means, and a college education is not an absolute necessity as an
end.
2.
If there are several alternative means to the same end, there is no necessity
of willing these means rather than those. Even if the end is absolutely
necessary, other means can be used and the end can still be reached. Doing good
and avoiding evil would not be of obligation if there were some other way of
achieving our last end.
3.
If the end is not absolutely necessary, there is no necessity of using the
means even when they are the only possible means. This is always the case when
the end is not an absolutely last end, for every intermediate end is also a
means to a further end and is not necessary unless this further endis
necessary. The study of medicine is necessary for a doctor, but one need not
become a doctor. Good moral conduct is the only possible means to happiness,
but there would be no obligation to good moral conduct if happiness itself were
not necessary.
4.
The end is an absolutely last end that must be obtained at all costs, and there
is but one means to it with no substitute possible. The means are necessary if
they are the only means and if the end is necessary. By fulfilling both
conditions, we pass beyond hypothetical necessity to categorical necessity and
arrive at the absolute ought of moral obligation. We may now define it as the
moral necessity of acting in a certain way, laid on the free will by the
intellect perceiving the necessary connection of these acts as necessary means
to a necessary end.
Applying
this analysis to man's moral life, we find both requirements fulfilled:
(1)
A necessary end absolutely to be obtained
(2)
One necessary means with no substitute possible
1.
Man has an absolutely last end, attainment of which is absolutely necessary for
man. The human will is not free to seek or not seek happiness, but must of its
very nature seek it. This quest is universal, inescapable, irresistible. It is
the sole purpose for which man exists, theonly reason why he has any being at
all, and to miss it means utter futility and frustration. The human intellect
perceives this design of his Creator impressed on man's very nature not merely
as the offer of a reward which may be sought if one wishes but as the objective
order inherent in creation itself and exacted by man's being the kind of being
God made him to be.
2.
Man has only one means of reaching his last end, morally good human acts, and
only one means of losing his last end, morally bad human acts. We have already
proved that both the wisdom of God and the dignity of man demand that man's
attainment of his last end depend on his human acts done in the present life.
The norm of morality, especially the ultimate norm, shows how the distinction
of right from wrong is in the last resort founded on the nature of God Himself,
who could not, without contradicting Himself, provide a substitute.
So
much about the nature of moral obligation. But what of its source? Who imposes
moral obligation? The one who has established the end and the means and their
necessary connection. This objective order of things, commanded by God's intellect
and carried out by His will, is what we have called the eternal law, whose
created counterpart is the natural law, faintly and imperfectly reflected in
human law. Thus God, the Eternal Lawgiver, is the ultimate source of all moral
obligation.
When
we say that all moral obligation comes from our last end, do wemean the
subjective or objective last end, do we mean the happiness we are to experience
in possessing God or God Himself as the Supreme Excellence and Highest Good?
The two are inseparable, but the second is logically prior. God deserves our
obedience primarily because He is good in Himself, and only secondarily because
He is good to us. His command is not, "If you do this, you will be
eternally happy," but simply, "Do this." This command, being
absolute, unconditional, categorical, imposes moral obligation. The obligation,
once established, is then enforced by a suitable sanction, the gain or loss of
ultimate happiness.
We
can sum up our main point, that all moral obligation comes from God, as
follows:
Only
he who determines the necessary connection between the observance of the moral
law and man's last end, and makes the attainment of the last end absolutely
mandatory, can be the ultimate source of moral obligation.
But
only God determines the necessary connection between the observance of the
moral law and man's last end and makes the attainment of the last end
absolutely mandatory.
Therefore
only God can be the ultimate source of moral obligation.
ALL
OBLIGATION THROUGH NATURAL LAW
Apart
from supernatural revelation, God manifests His plan and will to man through
the natural law. All human positive laws, therefore, if they are to impose any
moral obligation, must derive this binding force from the natural law. In our
study of social ethics we shall see that human authority does, as a matter of
fact, owe its origin to the natural law. We are interested at the moment only
in seeing why human law must find its basis in the natural law.
There
are only three reasons why a person obeys a law:
(1)
The law commands what is personally advantageous.
(2)
Threat of punishment makes it expedient to obey.
(3)
The subject feels a sense of duty or moral obligation.
The
first two reasons cannot guarantee obedience to the law. It will be kept as
long as it seems advantageous or the vigilance of the police cannot be eluded.
Since the subjects feel no moral obligation to keep the law, they will break it
as soon as it becomes more expedient to break it than to keep it. In these
cases it is not the law itself that binds the human will, but the
attractiveness of what the law prescribes or the fear of the punishment
threatened. A law, as a law, can bind the human will only by imposing moral
obligation.
But
human positive laws can impose no moral obligation on their ownaccount, since
they cannot determine man's last end or the means to it. They can impose moral
obligation only if the natural law commands that just laws enacted by
legitimate human authority are to be obeyed. We shall see that the natural law
does command this. Therefore human positive laws derive their binding force
from the natural law. Divine positive law is only an apparent exception, for,
though it imposes moral obligation on its own account, it is confirmed by the
natural law, which commands that God's commands shall be obeyed. Therefore all
moral obligation comes from the natural law, or at least (in the case of di
vine positive law) is accompanied by a parallel obligation from the natural
law.
SANCTION
The
concept of obligation leads to that of sanction. It is notorious that not all
people keep their obligations, that laws are disobeyed. What means can a
lawgiver use to insure obedience to his law? We saw that obligation is moral
necessity, a necessity resulting from the final cause. The final cause is a
motive urging a person to act but not destroying his free will. The only way,
therefore, that a lawgiver can get his law obeyed is by proposing a motive
sufficiently strong to attract the subjects to free acts of obedience. Such a
motive, such a means a lawgiver uses to enforce his law, is called sanction.
Sanction
means the promise of reward for keeping the law or the threat of punishment for
breaking the law, or both; it also means the rewards or punishments themselves.
It is used more commonly of punishment than of reward, for human lawgivers do
not usually give prizes to those who keep their laws, but both are genuine
meanings. The function of sanction is twofold:
(1)
To induce people to keep the law and to dissuade them from breaking it
(2)
To restore the objective order of justice after the law has been kept or broken
As
laws may be natural or positive, according as they are inherent in a being's
very nature or are the result of legislative enactment, so may sanction. A
natural sanction follows from the very nature of the act performed, as sickness
from intemperance, loss of business from dishonesty to customers, social
ostracism from surly and boorish behavior. A positive sanction is decided by
the will of the lawmaker and has no natural connection with the act, as a fine
for speeding or imprisonment for tax evasion.
A
sanction may be more or less perfect according to its capacity for fulfilling
its purpose. A perfect sanction is one that is both strong, in that itprovides
a rational will with a sufficient motive for keeping the law, and just, in that
it sets up equality between merit and reward, demerit and punishment. An
imperfect sanction is in some measure either weak or unjust or both.
As
moral philosophers we must discuss the kind of sanction attached to the natural
law. The following questions call for an answer:
(1)
Has the natural law any sanction in the present life, and, if so, what kind is
it?
(2)
Has the natural law a perfect sanction anywhere, and, if so, where?
(3)
What does the perfect sanction for the natural law consist in?
Imperfect
Sanction in This Life.—The natural law from its very nature cannot have
positive sanctions, for the lawgiver is God and any direct revelation of His
will to us would be divine positive law and not natural law. But it has some
natural sanctions. Observance of the natural law brings about the harmony
between our acts and our nature that we described when discussing the norm of
morality, harmony between our animal and rational tendencies, and between our
creatural, social, and proprietary relations. Barring accidents, there should
result peace of mind,friendship, honor, prosperity, health, and a long life, as
the result of the natural virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and
temperance. Frequent violation of the natural law should result in remorse of
conscience, loss of friendship, dishonor, poverty, disease, and an early death,
as the expected consequences of folly, dishonesty, cowardice, and debauchery.
So it would be if all evils were of our own making.
But,
as life is actually lived, this sanction is imperfect. Poetic justice is not
always done. Too often the good suffer and the wicked prosper all life long.
This occurrence is accidental in the sense of being nonessential, but not in
the sense of being infrequent. Few violate the whole natural law, and the
punishments for breaking part of it are offset by the rewards for keeping the
rest. Crimes are concealed and the social punishments avoided; the progress of
science is eliminating even some of the physical punishments. If everybody else
kept the natural law, the one criminal in the world would find the natural
sanctions crushing, but too many cooperate with the wicked and persecute the
good. Unforeseen calamities play a large part in life and they are not
distributed according to one's moral condition. It may be true in general that
"crime does not pay," but in many particular instances it pays well.
Earthly sanctions are too weak against strong temptations; one may find a bad
conscience easy to live with for a million dollars dishonestly gained. For some
sins, as suicide, there can be no sanction in this life. One may be put to the
supreme test, tochoose between death and sin, and no possible temporal reward
can be offered for loss of life.
Perfect
Sanction Hereafter.—This imperfect kind of sanction to the natural law cannot
satisfy God, the Perfect Lawgiver. The determination of the sanction depends on
the lawgiver, and God does not work in a slipshod fashion. To make the argument
conclusive we must prove:
(1)
That God must assign a sanction to the natural law
(2)
That this sanction must be a perfect one
(3)
That it will be applied in the life to come
1.
God must assign a sanction to the natural law. A lawgiver must use the means
necessary to secure the observance of his law, otherwise he is not sincere in
imposing the law. But the only means which respects free will is sanction, for
it provides a motive without using external force or internal determination,
thus imposing moral but not physical necessity. Therefore God, the Supreme
Lawgiver, assigns a sanction to the natural law.
2.
This sanction must be a perfect one. This proposition is evident from the fact
that God is a wise and just lawgiver, and from the definition of a perfect
sanction as one that is both strong and just. A wise lawgiverassigns a sanction
strong enough to achieve the end of the law. Otherwise it will appeal only to
the upright who do not need it, and will fail to influence those whom the law
is especially designed to curb. It must counterbalance any advantage to be
gained in breaking the law. A just lawgiver assigns a just sanction,
distributing rewards and punishments in proportion to the degree in which the
law has been kept or broken, to the good or evil done. Otherwise a small
observance might compensate for a grave violation.
3.
This perfect sanction will be applied in the life to come. Since there must be
a perfect sanction to the natural law, and, as we have seen, the sanction in
the present life is not perfect, the perfect sanction must be applied in the
life to come.
Gain
or Loss of Man's Last End.—What does this perfect sanction consist in? It must
be the gain or loss of happiness in the possession of God, our last end. No
other sanction would be sufficient to make men keep the natural law. Those who
deliberately refuse to use the means should be deprived of the end. So long as
men feel that they can attain their last end, they seem to be willing to chance
any amount of temporal punishment that might befall them. Doubtless they have a
grossly inadequate realization of what such punishment might amount to, but,
even so, what temporal punishment can compare with utter and hopeless
frustration? If even this threat does not always prevent sin, and experience
shows that it does not, surely nothing less would do so. God Himself is unable
to provide astronger sanction, for He cannot offer a greater reward than
Himself or threaten a greater punishment than the loss of the Highest Good. To
go further would be to encroach on man's free will, and this God will not do.
The
above conclusion of natural reason leads as far as the philosopher can go. What
the precise nature of this reward or punishment will be, except that it must
consist in the gain or loss of final happiness in the possession of God, is
beyond the purview of unaided human reason.
SUMMARY
How
does moral necessity, which is the same as oughtness, obligation, or duty,
accomplish its effect? Immanuel Kant held that we impose obligation on
ourselves. Nothing, he says, is simply good except a good will. A good will is
one that acts from the motive of duty. Duty is the necessity of acting from
respect for law. The moral law commands with a categorical imperative: So act
that the maxim from which you act can by your will be made into a universal
law. The basis for the categorical imperative is the human personality. A
person is never to be used as a means, always to be regarded as an end. The
human will is an end in itself, autonomously imposing the moral law on itself.
Kant
is criticized for overstressing the idea of duty, incorrectly formulating the
moral imperative, and making the human will usurp theplace of God while
emptying obligation of all meaning. Moral obligation cannot come from oneself,
for any lawmaker can repeal his own laws, nor from fellow man, for as moral
beings all men are equal and cannot control another's last end.
Moral
obligation must come from God, who alone determines by the eternal law the
necessary connection between the observance of the moral law and man's last
end, and makes the attainment of the last end absolutely mandatory. This
determination of His intellect and will He manifests to us through the natural
law, which is the proximate source of all obligation; from it alone positive
laws derive their binding force.
Sanction
is the promise of reward or threat of punishment added to a law to secure
obedience.
There
is an imperfect sanction to the natural law in the present life. Some evil acts
have natural punishments, but they are not equally applied and are often
evaded.
There
must be a perfect sanction to the natural law in the life to come. God cannot
be indifferent as to whether His law is kept, He must provide a sufficiently
strong motive for keeping the law, He must distribute rewards and punishments
justly.
This
perfect sanction consists in the gain or loss of man's last end. No stronger
sanction is possible without destroying human free will.
