Monday, September 13, 2021

Argument from Contingency

The argument from necessity/contingency does not require the world to have had a beginning in time, which is what makes it an especially  powerful proof. It has two parts. First, it is shown that it's impossible for absolutely everything that exists to be contingent. For something to be contingent means that its existence depends on the existence of  something else.

        A exists only if B exists.
        B exists only if C exists.
        C exists only if D exists., etc.

If this regression were to go on infinitely, neither A nor B nor C  etc. can exist, since there will always be lacking some ultimately  necessary existent upon which all the others depend. This is the  metaphysical analog to the impossibility of infinite regression in a  logical proof.

        P is true only if Q is true.
        Q is true only if R is true.
        R is true only is S is true. etc.

If this goes on infinitely, you cannot establish that P is true. In  fact, in modern logic, if it can be shown that the proof of a theorem  requires infinite steps, that is the same as showing it is unprovable.

Getting back to the existential regression, note that this is not necessarily a regression in time. A cause can be temporally simultaneous with its effect. This is forgotten by modern physicists,  who are so accustomed to using spacetime diagrams to determine the  range of possible causal links between events (i.e., event A cannot  cause B if it is in the future of B), that they tend to confine  causality to spatiotemporal relation, though this is just a shorthand.  In the 3rd proof, we don't even need to insist that B is the cause of  A, only that the existence of A depends on the (simultaneous)  existence of B.

Aristotle's cosmos could be eternal with an only finite regression,  since there were only finitely many eternally moving spheres, the  outermost being the first mover from which all others received their  motion. This is compatible with St. Thomas' argument, except now we  are speaking of existence rather than motion. You might say that the  existence of an animal depends on the existence of its constituent 
chemicals, which in turn depend on some other contingency, etc.  Ultimately, however, for existence to be grounded, there must be some  necessary existent. Even atheists effectively acknowledge as much when  they posit spacetime or the multiverse or some other substratum as  some ultimate existent that must be, so that there cannot be nothing.

Where St. Thomas goes beyond Aristotle and to a truly theistic  argument is that he does not stop at a necessary existent and leave it  at that. He then asks whether that existent's necessity comes from  itself or some other necessary being. For example, in a fatalistic  universe, all beings would be necessary, yet some necessities would be  determined by others. Ultimately, there must be some being that is not  only necessary, but derives its necessity from itself and nowhere else.

To St. Thomas and other Scholastics, it would be too obvious for  comment that even eternally persisting matter could not derive  necessity from itself. Matter cannot exist by itself, but needs form,  and needs to receive its form or determination from somewhere. Nor can  a material being with some eternally fixed form be self-necessary,  since its materiality implies the possibility of change, so there must  be something preventing it from changing. Then there should be some  immaterial being that is self-necessary. In this regard St. Thomas has  only to show, as he does elsewhere, that angels or other purely  spiritual beings are not self-necessary.

Whatever remains, though we can't describe or define it, is something  that does not receive form or any determination of being or even  simple existence from anywhere but itself. Not only must it exist, but  this necessity derives from itself. Such a being deserves the name of  God if anything does.

 

Demonstrating the Personal Status of Early Stage Human Embryos from Systems Hylomorphism

Introduction

There have been approximately 45 million medical/surgical abortions performed in the United States since the legalization of abortion in 1973 by Roe v. Wade.[1] This is not including the abortions that occur through abortifacient contraception, which some have estimated to be around 2.8 million abortions per year in the United States alone.[2] The statistical evidence clearly demonstrates that our culture does not appreciate the value of human life. However, as Catholics, we are called to defend the dignity of human life from the very moment of conception. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church states, “human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a person – among which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life.”[3] If we are to combat the culture of death, we must present a coherent account of the human person which ensures the full personal status of early stage human embryos. To accomplish this task, I will be using the Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphic framework, which distinguishes material substances according to form and matter. Furthermore, I will be defending the position that hylomorphism is completely compatible with immediate hominization, utilizing Rev. Nicanor Austriaco’s systems hylomorphism which attempts to synthesize systems biology with the hylomorphic theory. Finally, I will be arguing that the rational soul is the integrating principle of the human body, and that we are endowed with souls at the moment of conception.

Demonstrating the personal status of human embryos is paramount

            Abortion advocates, although willing to admit the humanity of early stage human embryos, reject their moral status. Australian philosopher Peter Singer is a prime example of this,

To describe a being as 'human' is to use a term that straddles two distinct notions: membership of the species Homo sapiens, and being a person, in the sense of a rational or self-conscious being. If 'human' is taken as equivalent to 'person', the second premise of the argument, which asserts that the foetus is a human being, is clearly false; for one cannot plausibly argue that a foetus is either rational or self-conscious. If, on the other hand, 'human' is taken to mean no more than 'member of the species Homo sapiens', then it needs to be shown why mere membership of a given biological species should be a sufficient basis for a right to life. Rather, the defender of abortion may wish to argue, we should look at the foetus for what it is - the actual characteristics it possesses - and value its life accordingly.[4]

Singer distinguishes three forms of consciousness: (1) pre-consciousness, (2) consciousness, and (3) self-consciousness. Only those who are self-conscious have an absolute right to life. In other words, the pre-born, infants, and the mentally handicapped don’t necessarily have the right to life. Singer seems to adopt a materialistic account of the universe, which reduces everything to physical matter. To refute materialism we need to establish two things: (1) that human beings are a composite of matter and form, and (2) that the rational soul is immaterial.

Presenting the hylomorphic account of the human person.

The term Hylomorphism is a composite of two Greek words “hyle” (matter) and “morphe” (form). Matter, for Aquinas, does not refer to physical substances but a “material thing’s potentiality for substantial change. It is not, he thinks, a substance…  He takes this to be nothing but the potential that a material thing has for undergoing substantial change. He does not think that it is something having a form.”[5] When the Scholastics used the term form they were not referring to the shape of a material object, rather they meant that which makes something the kind of thing that it is. Man by definition is a rational animal, so the form of man is a rational soul. To quote the Council of Vienne (1312): “We reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the Catholic faith every doctrine or proposition rashly asserting that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body…”[6]

Matter and form are two principles of a substance or being, but they never exist separately. So it is wrong to think of a human being as “composed” of a body and soul as though these were two physically distinct things. We cannot divide the visible human and say this part is the body and this part is the soul (except perhaps a disembodied soul).

Demonstrating the immateriality of the soul is essential

Those who reject the inherent dignity of human embryos typically operate within a materialistic framework. Since materialists reject immaterial realities, they unsurprisingly also reject the existence of immaterial souls. If we are to make a case for the dignity of human embryos, we need to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul.

The soul is immaterial

We can demonstrate the immateriality of the soul in several ways. First we can note the existence of immaterial realities in general such as abstract concepts, categories of logic, numbers, etc. Various philosophers have attempted to reconcile empiricism (the notion that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience) with idealism (e.g., George Berkley and Immanuel Kant). The problem with empiricism is that we can't prove by sense experience that all of reality is just sense data or mental phenomena or ideals. Using the example of thoughts, we cannot perceive our thoughts through the senses.

Secondly, our ability to abstract universals from particulars requires a principle that can extract immaterial realities from corporeal entities (such as a triangle and triangleness). This can only be done by an immaterial principle that we call the rational soul. Thirdly, we can note the universal human desire for the “infinite and absolute truth which is God.”[7] This universal desire points to a transcendent quality about the soul. It suggests that the rational soul is ordered towards the greatest good, namely, God Himself. To quote,

 The human will is never satisfied with what it possesses, but desires goods that are always greater and can be content only in the possession of the infinite and absolute Good which is God. Therefore we find in the human soul a capacity for the infinite which no partial truth and no limited good can satisfy. A being, however, is happy only when its desires are satisfied. Since the soul can be satisfied only by infinite Truth and absolute Good, one must conclude that there is in the soul a desire for perfect and absolute happiness, that is, for that happiness which only perfect Truth and absolute Good can give it.[8]

 

When do we receive the rational soul?

According to biologist Rev. Nicanor Austriaco O.P., “For both the Peripatetic Philosopher [Aristotle] and the Angelic Doctor [Thomas Aquinas], a human rational soul cannot inform a body unless that body possesses a level of complexity and organization appropriate to that form of life. This is the theory of delayed hominization.”[9] St. Thomas, following the opinion of Aristotle[10], thought that “ensoulment” occurred forty days after fertilization for boys, and ninety days for girls.[11] In addition to adopting Aristotle’s view of delayed animation, Aquinas also followed his view that the human embryo underwent a succession of souls: first a vegetative (or nutritive) soul, then an animal (or sensitive) soul, and then, finally, a human (or rational) soul.[12] He believed that the semen of the father was the “agent cause of material developments in utero. It was responsible for setting in motion the precise sequence of changes involved in the development of menstrual matter into a material subject appropriate for a rational soul.”[13] Rev. Nicanor Austriaco adds, “This was a crucial element of a classical theory of delayed hominization. Today, we know that the semen does not even survive the first five days of embryonic development. However, without the semen, what organizes the embryonic body? What prepares the embryo to receive the rational soul?[14]

We must receive the rational soul at the moment of conception

Austriaco’s question leaves the classical hylomorphic account in serious trouble. Instead of postulating that

human development is a discontinuous process involving the sequential appearance of three separate and distinct substances… systems hylomorphism with its species-based understanding of souls is able to acknowledge the temporal unity of the developing organism—the developing human being is one throughout development because it has one human soul—while retaining the basic framework of hylomorphism.[15]

 

According to systems biology, “the human organism as a dynamic, complex, and seamlessly integrated network not of organs or cells but of molecules, including DNA, RNA, lipids, metabolites, and proteins, connected by reaction pathways which generate shape, mass, energy, and information transfer over the course of a human lifetime.”[16] Rev. Nicanor Austriaco defines systems biology as,

 

 

In contrast to the prevailing reductionist and mechanistic view, the organism is seen here as a single, unified whole, a complex and dynamic net­ work of interacting molecules that appear and then disappear in time… From the systems perspective, this particular pattern, this organization of the molecules of the human being, would be a manifestation of his immaterial soul. As noted above, one metaphysical principle that governs the relationship between the body and its soul is that matter has to be properly disposed to receive a form. From within the context of the systems perspective, this principle means that matter is disposed to receive a soul when it contains all the molecules required to give rise to the species-specific network that corresponds to a partic­ular type of soul. Thus, a human body is disposed to receive a human soul at fertilization and would cease being disposed when the molecular network disintegrates.[17]

 

One of the questions of modern philosophy is how an organism retains its identity over the course of substantial physical change. If it is true, as some scientists suggest, that “98% of the atoms of the adult human body, including those found in the brain and nervous system, are replaced in about two years,”[18] then how can we legitimately claim that the organism is essentially the same over the course of time? This is only possible within the hylomorphic framework which distinguishes between substantial and accidental forms. As Rev. Austriaco notes, “[The systems-hylomorphic account] explains the stable dynamism of the human being. A man is stable because of his substantial form, yet he is dynamic because he is capable of changing his accidental forms… During accidental changes, the substantial form or soul remains, ensuring the integrity and identity of the organism.”[19] He continues, “It is the soul that makes a man a human being by organizing the matter, determining his identity and stability, and specifying his biological end.”[20]

Conclusion

In this article I have demonstrated several things: (1) that organisms are a composite of form and matter, (2) that human beings have an immaterial soul, (3) that the rational soul is the integrating principle of the human body, and (4) that we must necessarily be endowed with souls at the moment of conception. Based on this metaphysical account of the human person, abortion constitutes homicide properly speaking. Yet if this is the case, then our laws should reflect this reality. In fact the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, as well as the Declaration of Independence, already grants ‘persons’ the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Since governments exist to ensure the well-being of its citizen, then we should enact laws protecting the most vulnerable. I would even argue that governments should not only illegalize abortion, but criminalize it as well.

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

 

Thomas. (2017). Commentary on the Sentences. Aquinas Institute.

Thomas. (1912). The Summa theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. London: Burns Oates &    Washbourne.

Aristotle. History of Animals.



Austriaco, N. (2004) “Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective.” The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Volume 4, Issue 4: 719-338.

Austriaco, N. (2003) “Is the brain-dead patient really dead?” Studia Moralia.41: 277-308.

Austriaco, N. (2003) “The Pre-Implantation Embryo Revisited: A Two-Celled Individual or Two Individual Cells?” The Linacre Quarterly, Volume 70, Number 2, Article 4.

The Hylomorphic Structure of Thomisitic Moral Theology from the Perspective of a Systems Biology (Nicanor Austriaco)

A Hylomorphic Account of Personal Identity (Jeremy Skrzypek)

Dynamic Structure or Enduring Activity? Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Neo-Aristotelians on Substantial Form (Jeremy Skrzypek)

Is the Early Stage Embryo a Person? (W. Jerome Bracken)

Is the Human Embryo a Person? (Kevin D. O’Rourke)

Abortion: The myths, the realities, and the argument (Germain Grisez)

When Do People Begin? (Germain Grisez)

St Thomas Aquinas and Abortion (William Newton)

Protecting Prenatal Persons: Does the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibit Abortion (Joshua Craddock)

Personhood status of the human zygote, embryo, fetus (John Janez Miklavcic & Paul Flaman)

Rational Souls and the Beginning of Life: A Reply to Robert Pasnau (John Haldane and Patrick Lee)

The Roman Catholic Church and Abortion: An Historical Perspective (Donald DeMarco)

 

Mind you the same author you cite for delayed animation (i.e., St. Thomas), considered abortion a mortal sin pre-ensolutement.

 

 



[1] Estimates taken from the Center of Disease and Control.

[2] Ron Conte Jr., “More Prenatals are killed by Abortifacients than by Abortion,” (Article posted 23 July 2018). https://ronconte.wordpress.com/2018/07/23/more-prenatals-are-killed-by-abortifacients-than-by-abortion/

[3] Catechism of the Catholic Church § 2270

[4] Peter Singer, “The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2nd edition),” (UK: Oxford University Press 2005), 2.

[5] Brian Davies, “Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary,” (UK: Oxford University Press: 18 June 2014), 110.

[6] Norman P. Tanner, “Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils,” (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), 1:360.

[7] Unknown author. Quoted from “Homiletic & Pastoral Review,” (Catholic Polls, Inc., July 1993), 9-18. https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=644

[8] Ibid.

[9] Nicanor Austriaco, “Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective,” (The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Volume 4, Issue 4, 2004), 720.

[10] Aristotle, History of Animals, 7:3.

[11] Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences,  III, D3, Q.5 art. 2.

[12] Aquinas, ST. Ia, Q. 118, A. 2 ad 2. (cf. Michael A. Buratovich, "Letters to My Students about Bioethics, Embryos, Stem Cells, and Fertility Treatments," (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers: 20 August 2013), 39).

[13] Antonia Fitzpatrick, "Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity," (UK: Oxford University Press, 13 October 2017), 35.

[14] Nicanor Austriaco, “Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective,” (The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Volume 4, Issue 4, 2004), 735.

[15] Ibid., 736

[16] Nicanor Austriaco, “Is the brain-dead patient really dead?” (Studia Moralia 41, 2003), 304.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Nicanor Austriaco, "The Pre-Implantation Embryo Revisited: A Two-Celled Individual or Two Individual Cells?" (The Linacre Quarterly, Volume 70, Number 2, Article 4: May 2003), 123.

[19] Rev. Nicanor Austriaco, “Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective,” (The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Volume 4, Issue 4, 2004), 725-26

[20] Ibid., 728