Is the Human Embryo a
Person?
Kevin D. O’Rourke, O.P.
Is the human
embryo a person? The answer to this question is found in the sciences of
biology and philosophy, but for practical purposes, the answer has significant
implications for human rights. If the human embryo is not a person, then it
would not seem to have any rights. In that case, without fear of opposition,
human embryos could be subjected to research and experimentation that might
result in their destruction. If the embryo is a human person, what rights does
it have? Embryos, even though they are self directed, do not exist as
autonomous organisms. They are subject to the care of other people. What is the
responsibility of individuals who cares for a human embryo? What is the
responsibility of the community to make it possible for the human embryo to
survive and flourish? If the human embryo is not a person at the first stages
of its existence, it seems necessary to determine when it is endowed with
humanity; at what stage of its existence can we predicate personhood? In order
to consider this question adequately, we shall depend upon the biology of human
development and the concept of person as it has been utilized through the ages.1 Hence, we shall consider:
I. The meaning of the term person;
II. Whether the human embryo fits into
the category of person;
III. The implications of the foregoing
considerations.
Before
proceeding to these considerations however, we must consider the concept of
potency, because it is fundamental for our considerations.
Pre-Note on Potency
In the
philosophical construct we shall be using in this presentation, all of reality
is divided into act and potency. A being in act, exists here and now. Things
exist in act as substances or as accidents inhering in substances. Thomists
speak of a substance being in first or second act. That is, a substance exists
(first act) and performs actions in accord with its nature (second act).2 A being in potency is not in act here and now,
but has the intrinsic capacity to be rendered into act, that is, to become what
it is not here and now. There are various modes of being in potency.3 Passive potency means that an agent may be
rendered into act, by another being in act. For example, many people who are
pale have the passive potency to become tan by exposure to the sun. Before
exposure to the sun, they were not tan, but had the passive potency to acquire
this quality.4 Active potency implies
that a being in act has the capacity to become something else, or to act in a
different manner, by reason of its own power. The agent goes from not acting to
acting, or from sitting to standing. Experience teaches that Beings act in
accord with their nature. (Operatio sequitur esse). An active potency
may be remote or proximate, depending upon the stage of development of the
being with the potency. A rose bush has the potency to bloom and produce
flowers; in the winter this potency is remote, in the spring this potency is
proximate. A grain of corn has the potency to grow into a large stalk of corn, given
the proper environmental conditions; not into an oak tree. When it is still a
grain of corn, it does not look like the large stalk it has the potency to
become. The concept of potency enables us to explain changes in a being when we
know that the subject or substance under consideration remains the same, even
though appearances change. Moreover, the concept of active potentiality is
significant in the discussion of the embryo as person. Certainly, an embryo
does not look or act like the entity that we usually refer to as an adult
person. But as we shall see, it does have the active potency to develop into a
mature adult, the entity that we usually refer to as a person.
I. What is a person?
In Catholic
philosophical and theological considerations, the definition of person is
usually derived from Boethius, a philosopher/theologian who lived in the 5th
Century. Boethius defined person “as an individual substance of a rational
nature.”5 The two key terms are
individual and rational. When commenting upon this definition, Thomas Aquinas
indicated that this definition applies to human beings because they are
separate from one another, thus they are individuals, and because they are
rational, that is, they “have control over their own actions and are not only acted
upon as are all other beings, but act of their own initiative.”6 He considered the term person a special name
differentiating substances of a rational nature from other substances and it is
clear that the use of the term followed upon intrinsic qualities of the agent,
not upon a decision based upon social acceptance or law. As Aquinas uses the
term, “the mere presence of the intellective soul is sufficient for
personhood.”7 Furthermore, for him,
“the name of person does not belong to the rational part of the soul, nor to
the whole soul alone, but to the entire human substance”8, to body and soul as an integral unity. As we
shall see, the notions of initiative and rationality referred to by Aquinas are
carried over into the concept of person as it used by most modern bioethicists
and philosophers, but they use the term consciousness. Aquinas also used this
definition of person when explaining the Trinity, but he stated that “the word
is not used in the same sense of God as of creatures but in a higher sense than
that by which we name creatures.”9
The divine persons of course, are not the topic of our study. When Aquinas uses
the word person in reference to human beings, he maintains that they are creatures
composed of matter and form; that is of body and soul.10 Person is simply
a specific name for a human being following from the form of a human being.
When the rational form is present, then the entity in question is a person.
This concept will be especially important when we consider whether human being who
do not possess consciousness are persons.
Moreover
Aquinas maintains that the matter and form of any living being must be
commensurate or conformed to one another. This concept is known as the
hylomorphic theory.11 Hence, “the powers of the soul and biological
capacities must correspond to each other.”12 That is, the form must be able to function in the
matter that it enlivens. The form of a giraffe would not be able to function in
the body of a lion. Nor would the form of a daisy be able to inform the body of
a chicken. Both the concept of rational activity and the concept of matter and
form being commensurate to one another will be significant when we consider the
embryo at the time of fertilization. The need to have the matter commensurate
to the form leads to many of the theories which even in modern day opt for
delayed hominization.
Modern Concept of Personhood
From Thomas
Aquinas to the present day is quite a leap. But our consideration is not so
much with the historical development of the concept of person, but rather with
its connotation and denotation in our present culture. Present day thinking in
regard to the concept of person is founded upon the writings of John Locke.
Locke was not concerned with the ontological structure of the human person,13 as was Thomas
Aquinas. Locke was aware of the concept of substance, and did not seem to deny
its validity, but did not consider it necessary for his deliberations.14 Rather he concentrated
upon the activities that are associated with being a person. Locke defined a
person as15
A conscious
thinking thing (whatever substance made up of, whether spiritual or material,
simple or compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of
pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for
itself, as far as that consciousness extends.”
Following
Locke, many present day philosophers, especially those interested in bioethics,
concentrate exclusively upon the activities or attributes that indicate
personhood. They are not concerned with the substratum or the ontological
nature of the conscious subject, nor are they concerned with the concept of
potency. One observer states: “Most present day authors regard consciousness as
the sine qua non of personhood.”16
But in addition to consciousness, some bioethicists indicate other capacities or
attributes that are associated with personhood. Stephen Tooley lists seventeen
different capacities of personhood, beyond consciousness that have been
proposed by other philosophers or bioethicists.17 Most of these capacities indicate a permanent basis
for consciousness, that is, an ongoing subject, but because they are not
concerned with the ontological substratum of human activity, these authors do
not investigate explicitly substance or potency. Joseph Fletcher, an American
famous for Situation Ethics, mentioned neocortical function, self-awareness and
euphoria (as found in retarded children), and human relationships as
constituent factors of personhood.18 For our purposes, it is significant to note that
these capacities, such as consciousness, are innate; not due to an extrinsic
source, and that the subject develops them over time. Though not derived from
law, the implications of personhood may be defined or defended in law as human rights.
By the same
token, according to the Lockian teaching that associates personhood with
consciousness, it is possible for one to be a human being and not be a person,
if the human being has not yet acquired or loses the capacity of consciousness.
One of the more famous statements of this conviction was proposed by another
American pragmatist. Tristam Engelhardt.19 He maintains:
Not all
humans are persons. Fetuses, infants, the profoundly mentally retarded and the
hopelessly comatose provide examples of human non-persons. Such entities are
members of the human species…but they do not have standing in the moral
community…One speaks of persons in order to identify entities one can warrant
blame or praise. For this reason, it is nonsensical to speak of respecting the
autonomy of fetuses, infants, or profoundly retarded adults who have been never
been rational.
Englehardt is
not alone in this conviction. It is shared by many writing in the field of
bioethics.20 This
conviction, however, is not logical. If human beings who do not possess
consciousness are not persons, why does society, (and bioethcists as well),
demand that conscious persons offer proxy consent for those individuals who
cannot speak for themselves. Would it not be more accurate to speak of human
beings who do not possess the capacity of consciousness as impaired persons, or
persons in need of help?
Pope John
Paul II referred to this conviction when speaking about the care of patients in
a permanent vegetative state. (PVS):21
Faced with
patients in similar clinical conditions (PVS), there are some who cast doubt on
the persistence of the “human quality” itself, almost as if the adjective
vegetative state which symbolically described a clinical state, could or should
be applied to the sick person as such, actually demeaning their value and
personal dignity….A man even if seriously ill or disabled in the exercise of
his highest functions, is and always will be a man, and he will never become a
“vegetable” or an “animal.”
Bioethicists
writing in the Catholic tradition do not exclude from personhood human beings
who have lost permanently or never attained “consciousness”. Many in this
tradition now use a more acceptable phrase coined by an Australian bioethicist,
Nicolas Tonti-Phillipini, and refer to permanently unconscious patients as Post
Coma Non-responsive patients. (PCNR) 22
In sum, it
seems that there is a considerable gulf between the meaning of the word person
in the Catholic tradition, and that of the contemporary bioethicists. Is there
any way of bridging this gulf? It seems there is. Contemporary bioethics offers
a very static concept of personhood. It does not recognize explicitly the
concept of potency, but it does imply that the subject who acquires
consciousness is the same as the subject who at one time did not possess
consciousness. On the other hand, the Thomistic concept is dynamic; it
envisions a developing entity, a body that changes and develops under the
impetus of its own form. If one were to take the consciousness criterion for
personhood literally, an adult human being with competent intellectual
faculties would not be a person when asleep. Yet, contemporary bioethicists
will admit that the attributes that are associated with personhood are acquired
over time, that the individual who acquires consciousness is the same
individual who at one time did not possess consciousness, and that “the
essential powers of personhood need not be actualized for a person to be
present.”23 Thus,
there is a continuity observable in the conscious person; an implicit admission
of potency. The adult was at one time a child, an infant, and even a fetus,
with the capacity, or active potency, to develop consciousness. Having achieved
some semblance of agreement in regard to the term personhood, let us move on to
consideration of the human embryo.
II. The Embryo and its Human
Development
Knowledge
concerning the development of the human embryo has increased over the past
fifty years to the present day.24 In our generation, this knowledge has increased
exponentially, mainly as the result of improved electronic magnifying devices
and the ability to observe fertilization in the process of In Vitro
Fertilization (IVF). Our purpose will not be served by presenting detailed
biological information. Rather, I shall present agreed upon conclusions
concerning embryology. It is true that some disparate interpretations are often
presented concerning the implications of human biological development, but
there is a consensus among embryologists concerning the scientific facts of early
human development.25 There is
agreement on the following biological findings among renowned human
embryologists:
First, the
process of human development begins when the sperm and ovum are united. That
is, human life begins at fertilization when a one cell zygote is formed by
fusion of a sperm and ovum.
Second, the
zygote is not a small homonucleus, ( not a preformed image of the human person)
but develops in an epigenetic manner.26
The structure and organs of the future fetus, infant, young and mature adult
are present potentially in the one cell zygote.
Third: the
zygote has a genetic package (the human genome) that is the basis for future
human development. In potency, it contains all the matter needed for the
development of the fetus into a mature adult with consciousness. This genetic
make up is the blueprint and efficient cause of human development.
From the
viewpoint of hylomorphism, the matter of the zygote is commensurate with the
form (the human soul). The matter of the embryo, the genome, consisting of 46
chromosomes and numerous genes, must be activated by a form that is able to
enliven the matter in accord with its potential. We call this form the human
soul.27 Thus,
the zygote at the time of fertilization is not a potential human being; rather
it is a human being with active potential.
The beginning
of the human person with active potential for future development is present at
the time of fertilization. There are no other marker events in the development
of the zygote that would indicate “that it receives the capacity to develop
biologically through the several stages of gestation and become an adult human
person.”28
Opinions
contrary to the above statement do not question that the zygote is a living
being. Rather, they question whether or not it is a human being from this
initial point of its existence. There is general agreement that at the time of
fusion, the zygote is a living entity. But is this living entity an individual
with active potential to become an adult human being? Mainly because of three
factors, there have been voices raised against the proposition that humanity or
personhood, or ensoulment, begins at fertilization of sperm and ovum.29
These factors are:
1. Most of
the zygotes that are formed are never implanted. The mortality rate for zygotes
before implantation is usually estimated anywhere from 20% to 60%; some
estimate as high as 80%.30 The intuition is offered that it seems ridiculous to
claim that God creates a human soul for each zygote and then shortly afterward
allows it to die.31
2. Multiple
births may occur after the one cell zygote has been formed. In the case of
monozygotic twins for example, was there one person present, or were there two
persons present, when the zygote was formed? If there was only one, what
happens to this person when the second person appears? If there were two
persons to begin with, were they both living in the same body? Those who
present this argument prefer to delay hominization until the time when multiple
births are impossible and use the term Pre-embryo to designate the zygote from
the first days of its existence.32
3. The matter
must be commensurate with the form. In order to prove that the matter and form
are commensurate, there should be visible some semblance of the organs which
signify human consciousness. The primal streak, the beginning of the central
nervous system (CNS) at least should be present in its initial stages in order
to presage the compatibility between the human body and the human form, the
spiritual soul.33
Response to Objections:
These
objections which seek to delay the beginning of the human person until after
the time of initial animation have been answered at length by others. I shall
reply to them briefly, citing sources for longer refutations.
1. In regard
to the number of zygotes that are created thus predicating the existence of
human souls that do not inform bodies for an extended period of time, we must
admit a quandary. Clearly, many of the zygotes that do not survive are not
human from the time of fusion of sperm and ovum.34 Often, the fusion is not successful because the
requisite number of chromosomes is not present. When the fusion does result in
a human zygote that is never implanted in the uterus and dies shortly after
fertilization, there is no facile explanation. The Creator seems to provide
“seeds” in abundance that never bear fruit. Moreover, are we to say that when
more than half of the infants born died in childbirth, that they were never
living human beings?
2. While the
cause of multiple births is not well understood, using it as an objection
challenging the time of humanization is not well founded. Multiple births, for
example monozygotic twins, often occur when a pluripotent cell in the morula
breaks loose and develops as another human organism, a process similar to
cloning. There is one human person before twinning occurs, and that human
person continues in existence after a new human person develops through
parthenogenesis.35 Moreover, monozygotic twinning may occur well after
implantation and the formation of the primitive streak.36 Thus, the term
Pre-embryo loses any relevance and is considered to be “scientifically
inaccurate and erroneous.”37
3. Indeed,
the matter must be commensurate with the form in order for an organism to
develop to maturity. However, modern science makes abundantly clear that the
sufficient matter for the development of the human person is the genome in the
one celled zygote. The genome is the formal cause (the blueprint or program)
for future development of the zygote, as well as the efficient cause of its
future development. Thus, the theories set forth for delayed hominization,
often utilizing the thought of Thomas Aquinas as proof, become quite
implausible.38 “The zygote has its own molecules to start operating and starts
producing its own enzymes and proteins at syngamy.”39
In addition
to these specific refutations, the teaching of Pope John Paul II calls into
question any attempt to defend delayed hominization;40
Some
people…claim that the result of conception, at least up to a certain number of
days, cannot yet be considered a personal human life. But in fact, from the
time that the ovum is fertilized… the life of a new human being with its own
growth is begun It would never be human if it were not human already. This has
always been clear and modern genetic science offers clear confirmation. It has
demonstrated that from the first instant there is established the program of
what this living human being will be; a person, this individual person with its
characteristic aspects already well determined.
III. Implications
1. Though it
seems highly probable that the human form, the soul, is infused in the matter
at the time of fertilization, this has not been defined by the Church. The
Second Vatican Council declared: “Life once conceived must be protected with
the utmost care; abortion and infanticide are abominable crimes.”41 But after the
Council, the Sacred Congregation of Doctrine and Faith, after once again
condemning abortion added, “This declaration expressly leaves out the moment
when the spiritual soul is infused.”42 In a more comprehensive document in 1987 however, the
Congregation went a bit further, but still did not make a definitive statement
in regard to the moment of ensoulment. It stated: “the conclusions of science
regarding the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning by
human reason a personal presence from the first appearance of human life: how
could a living human creature not be a human being? The Magisterium has not expressly
committed to this affirmation of a philosophical nature.”43
In the
encyclical Gospel of Life, Pope John Paul II strongly affirmed these statements,
but once again did not define the moment when ensoulment takes place. Would it
be possible for the Church to define the moment when human life begins on the
basis of philosophical evidence? Other spiritual truths have been defined on
the basis of philosophical evidence, for example, that the rational
intellectual soul is the form of the human body.44 Even though the arguments from reason “provide a
valuable indication for discerning a personal presence at the moment of the
first appearance of a human life”45 the reluctance on the part of the Magisterium to make
a formal definition is understandable. Biological knowledge is continually developing
and changing. Even though there is much that is known about human generation,
and all this knowledge points to the rational form existing from fertilization,
there is still much that is not known about the operation of the human form
(soul) and the process of human generation.
2. Human
beings who do not have the capacity to perform all the actions associated with
being human are still human. They have the human form, the human soul, at least
in first act. This form may not be able to activate all the human capacities
because of physical disability; that is, it is incapable of second act in
regard to some human functions. But there remains a passive potency, the
virtual power,46 to perform these actions. Depriving retarded or debilitated
human beings of moral personhood is a grave injustice. Society indicates the
worth of human beings unable to speak for themselves by demanding proxy
consent.
3. Because
the human fetus is a person it has the right to life, the most basic of all
rights. How best to protect and foster the recognition of this right by individuals
and society? Surely widespread education is needed concerning the beginning of
human life. In other words, our first task is to win the hearts and minds of
the people through education and persuasion so that they understand when human
life begins and the evil of abortion. It seems our first task is to establish
that the beginning of human life is a scientific, not a religious question.
Efforts to protect the life of the unborn through legislation should be coupled
with this educational effort. As we seek to alert people to the evil of
abortion, the words of Pope John Paul II must be kept in mind. He wrote:47
Decisions
that go against life sometimes arise from difficult or even tragic situations
of profound suffering, loneliness, a total lack of economic prospects,
depression and anxiety about the future. Such circumstances can mitigate even
to a notable degree subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability of
those who make these choices, which in themselves are evil.
In other
words, as we engage in the effort to protect the rights of the unborn, we must
realize that women seeking abortions are often in need of help, and that
condemning them can be counter productive.48 Moreover, we must avoid becoming self righteous and
hard hearted ourselves as we seek to improve the mores and laws of society.
4.
Maintaining that human life begins at fertilization and that society has a responsibility
to protect unborn children does not imply that human life is an absolute good.
Human life, even of unborn infants, need not be prolonged until prolonging life
is a physical impossibility. The Catholic tradition in regard to prolonging
life is well developed; if the means to prolong life do not offer hope of
benefit or impose an excessive burden, a person beset with a fatal pathology,
or the proxy for that person, may forego the means to prolong life, even if
death would result.49 Applying these norms in the case of the unborn and
infants is indeed a difficult proposition, but one truth of our teaching should
not be over emphasized to protect another truth.
Conclusion
Is the embryo
a human person? It seems there can be no equivocation; the answer is
affirmative. Convincing our peers of this fact will not be easy. The appearance
of the zygote and its lack of physical development in the first stages of
existence are the main arguments put forward to deny this truth.
The concept
of potency, in one way or another, must be relied upon to show the true nature
of human development. But we have made progress. I recall when the Pro-Life
movement started in the U.S. in the mid 1970’s many people considered a fetus a
growth within a woman’s body, similar to the appendix. Now there is a general
consensus that the unborn infant in the womb, at least after one or two months,
has a life of its own. Convincing the public that this life starts at
fertilization is our mandate; our debt to humanity.
1 There is no
dearth of literature in regard to the question of embryo as a human person. A
few of the relevant articles by scholars in the Catholic tradition are: Diane
Nutwell Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature
of the Human Embryo, Dept of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 1991. Benedict
Ashley, “A Critique of the theory of Delayed Hominization”, in McCarthy and
Moraczewski eds., An Ethical Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation, St.
Louis, Pope John XXIII Center; “When Does a Human Person Begin to Exist,” (sub
prelo) Collected Essays, Ann Arbor, Ave Marie University Press, 2006: J.
Bracken, “Is the Early Embryo a Person?” Linacre Quarterly, (Feb/2001) 68:1:
49-70; Jason Eberl, “The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological
Analysis,” Bioethics (April, 2000),14:2; 135-151; N. Ford, When did I
Begin?; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988; J. Donceel, “Immediate
Animation and Delayed Hominization,” Theological Studies,, 31: (1970:
76-105; T. Shannon and A. Wolter, “Reflections on the Moral Status of the
Embryo”, Theological Studies, 51 (1990) 603-626; P..Smith,
“ The Beginning of Personhood, A Thomistic Perspective”, Laval Revue
Theologique e Philosophique, (1983) p. 197; S. Heaney, “Aquinas and
the Presence of the Human Rational Soul in the Early Embryo,” The Thomist: (Jan.
1992) 56:1:19-48
2 Summa
Theol. I,76,4, ad. 1;
Heaney, p.36; Bracken, p. 62
3 F. Wade,
“Potentiality in the Abortion Debate,” Review of Metaphysics, (1975)
29:39-55.
4 For a
discussion of passive potency using the human sperm as an example, cf. J.
Eberl, p.152
5 Boethius. De
duabis naturis 3; PL 64,1343,
6 Summa Theol.
I. 29,1
7 J Eberl,
p.140
8 D. Irving,
p.18-46
9 Summa
Theol., I. 29, 2
10 Summa
Theol. I, 76,1
11 For a clear
explanation of the hylomorphic theory, cf. E. Sgreccia, “The Subject in a
Vegetative State; A Personalistic View” Zenit News Service, April 24,
2004:3-6
12 Summa
Theol., I.90.4.1,ad 1
13 B. Gordon,
“The Troublesome Concept of the Person” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 1999,
20: 347-359. (p,. 352); F. Wade,p.247, agrees that Locke had no idea concerning
substance in general, but did affirm that substances do exist.
14 Wade, p.247
15 “Essay
Concerning Human Understanding.” Oxford University Press, 1975: p.62
16 B. Gordon.,
p. 353
17 M. Tooley, Abortion
and Infanticide, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.90-91
18 “Four
Indicators of Humanhood: the Enquiry Matures”, Hasting Center Report, 4:4-7,
1974
19 “Some Persons
are Humans, some Humans are Persons, and the World is What we Persons Make it.”
In Philosophical Medical Ethics, Boston: Reidel, 1977: 183-194
20 J.P. Lizza
maintains…”there is a consensus among philosophers that they (PVS and other
non-cognitive patients) are not persons.” “Persons and Death”, Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy, 1993, 18: 351-374
21 “On the Care
of PVS Patients”, Papal Allocution, 3/20/2005,n.3., National Catholic
Bioethical Quarterly, 4:3;(Autumn 2004) 574-576,
22 cf.
“Reflections on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration,” n.3; Canadian Catholic
Bioethics Conference, June 21, 2004, St. Michaels College, Toronto; “Briefing
Notes, “ Sept. 2004; Australian Bishops, www.ache.catholic.org.
23 J. Eberl, p.
141; cf. Tooley and Fletcher
24 For a brief
and accurate account of embryo development, cf. President’s Council on
Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell Research, Appendix A, “Notes on Early
Human Development, p. 157-182; Washington, D.C. 2004; also, T. Sadler,
Langman’s Medical Embryology. 8th ed. Philadelphia, Lippincott Williams and
Wilkins, 2002;
25 For an
account of the agreement among embryologists, cf. C. Ward Kischer, “The
Beginning of Life and the Establishment of the Continuum”, Linacre Quarterly,
August, 1996, p. 76. Kischer points out that several scientists who express a
belief in delayed hominization are not embryologists.
26 Epigenesis is
a form of biological development the opposite of preformation. Thus, the entity
develops through activation of potentiality. D. Irving states that in genetics
this is called “a cascading effect”, whereby “each previous direction causes
the specific formation of each succeeding direction. .” p. 27.
27 Summa
Theol.I, 76, 1
28 Senate
Select Committee on the Human Embryo Experimentation Bill,1985 Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra,
Commonwealth Government Printers,1986
29 L. Cahill,
“The Embryo and the Fetus: New Moral Concerns” Theeological Studies, (1993)
54:124-143
30 Monitoring
Stem Cell Research, p.88
31 K. Rahner.
“The Problem of Genetic Manipulation,” Theological Investigations, New
York. Saber
Press, 1972,
225- 252; T. Shannon and A. Wolter, p.618
32 R. McCormick,
“Who or What is the Pre-Embryo,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal ,(March
1991) 1:4:1-15
33 N. Ford, When
Did I Begin?, Conception of the Human Person in History, Philosophy, and
Science, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988
34 J. Bracken,
p. 52-54
35 B. Ashley and
A. Moraczewski, “Cloning, Aquinas, and the Embryonic Person,” National
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, (Summer, 2001):1; 189-203; B. Ashley, p.10
36 K. Dawson,
“Segmentation and Moral Status,” in Singer et al, Embryo Experimentation, New
York, Cambridge University Press, 1990:p.58, also D. Irving, p. 35.
37 R. O’Rahilly
and Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology and Teratology, New York, John
Wiley and Sons, 1994, ftnote p. . 55
38 Ashley, p.
17-18
39 Bracken
quoting Ford, Kisher and Irving. p.. 60
40 Evangelium
Vitae, n. 60
41 Gaudium et
Spes, Church and the
Modern World, n. 51
42 CDF, Declaration
on Procured Abortion, 1974, ftnote 19; AAS 66(1974) n.7,
43 CDF.
Instruction: Donum Vitae,1987 AAS, 80,,(Jan. 12, 1988) 70-102
44 Council of
Vienne, 1312. Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. Denzinger et Schoenmetzer,
Barcelona, Herder, 1976.n.902
45 Evangelium
Vitae, n. 60
46 Summa
Theol. I., 77,8
47 Encyclical
Gospel of Life, (Evangelium Vitae), Origins, (April 6, 1995) 24:42:n.18
48 “Why Women
Have Abortions,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, September,2005
49 Cf. U.S.
Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives Washington, D.C. USCC, 2001;
Directives 56,57.; Congregation for Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on
Euthanasia; May 5, 1980;,
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