The
Trial of the Angels in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas
William Wagner ORC
Summary
In
this article the author offers an in-depth study of the development of St.
Thomas Aquinas’ thought concerning the nature of the trial and the sin of the
fallen angels. He first establishes the presupposition in St. Thomas’ teachings
that the angels knew by faith of the mystery of the Incarnation during their
period of trial. Then the author presents the writings of Peter Lombard and
Dionysius which influenced St. Thomas, and the saint’s own writings, in order
to show the progress of his thought concerning the trial of the angels. This
presentation makes clear the impasse to which St. Thomas arrived in the face of
the mystery of evil due to the conviction that the angels had to attach their
will to some real good that was really possible for them to attain as the
object of their beatitude.
Finally,
treating the subject for the last time in De Malo, St. Thomas resolves the
impasse by distinguishing between a finis ad quem and a finis a quo. In the
former, the rational creature proposes a positive good as his final goal, which
he must judge to be attainable. In the latter, finis a quo, the “good” which
must be achieved is successful flight from something which is dreaded. In the
case of the fallen spirits, the dreadful something from which they
“successfully escaped into hell” was the concrete proposal of beatitude under
the precise terms of the economy of salvation.
While
St. Thomas does not delineate the precise nature of that proposal, the author
offers a solution based upon the teachings of St. Thomas, according to which,
the sin of the angels was an aversion from or a rejection of the divine rule
that their supernatural beatitude was to be obtained through the instrumentality
of the Incarnation.
I. Introduction: Setting the Stage
1.
Scope and Aim
Discussion
in this essay shall focus directly on the major texts in which St. Thomas formally
examines the trial and sin of the created spirits. Attention fixes, accordingly,
on the original negative response of the reprobate spirits, not on the positive
response of the holy angels. Thomas’ texts will be analyzed in chronological
order. The purpose is to elucidate his doctrine both with respect to its
immediate content and with regard to the development of his doctrinal thought.
By the end it will become evident that the position of the juvenile Aquinas is
quite distinct from that enunciated towards the end of his life. Indeed, the
study depicts Thomas struggling to explain the “mechanics” to the sin of the
fallen spirits. Alongside his biblical reflections, his intellectual journey is
punctuated by his encounters with Peter Lombard and Dionysius; he does not
achieve complete equilibrium until his very late work, De Malo.
The
development of thought in his reflections on the angelic trial manifests itself
already in the material presentation of the question. In the first two works
(Sentence Commentary and Contra Gentiles), Thomas initially explains the very
possibility of a sin on the part of the pure spirits. Then, secondly, he asks
if they desired to be like God. And thirdly, he asks if that was a sin of
pride.
In
his commentary of Dionysius’ Treatise on the Divine Names, Thomas naturally
submits himself to the order and exigency of the work under consideration. He
refrains, moreover, from his customary scholastic method of articles with
objections, substantial response and rebuttals (clarifications). Nonetheless,
the brief commentary on the sin of the devil is of maximum importance to the
development of his subsequent thought. Dionysius had managed to speak of the
sin of the reprobate spirits without a single mention of the word “pride”.1
While St. Thomas accepts and follows the intuition of Dionysius: “Aversion therefore
is in them the evil”,2 he does not yet fully appreciate the momentousness of
the proposition. Thomas was aware that Lombard had presented the divided camps
of the spirits under the headings of “conversio” and “aversio”,3 but no special
significance was attached to this.4 Whatever influence Dionysius exercised on
Lombard, apart from his conception of the angelic choirs, must have been
indirect; he mentions Dionysius by name only twice.5
In
the Summa Theologiae and in De Malo Thomas’ approach is quite different.
Moreover, the pertinent texts in the Prima Pars indicate a period of deep and
somewhat uncertain interrogation regarding the rebellion of the spirits (a fact
curiously overseen by commentators). First, he departs from the pattern in the
Sentence Commentary. Now he first asks whether the angels sinned by desiring
equality with God. Only thereafter does he ask whether this was a sin of pride.
These modifications pave the way for a significant revision of the definition
of pride.
The
principal texts to be discussed are as follows: 6
1. Super Sententiis, lib. II, dist. 5, q.
1, aa. 12 (12541256)
2. Summa Contra Gentiles III, qq. 109110
(12611264)
3. De Divinis Nominibus IV, lect. 19
(12651266)
4. Summa Theologiae (= STh.) I, q. 63, a.
13 (Prima Pars: 12661268)
5. De Substantiis Separatis (12689)7
6. De Malo q. 16, aa. 24 (12681269)
2.
Presuppositions & Unmet Expectations
Before
addressing particular texts, let us note certain theological or doctrinal
presuppositions against which Thomas develops and articulates his thought. A
complete work would have to include a thorough and chronological analysis of
these as well. Submitting, however, to the delimiting exigencies of this essay,
suffice it to mention the most important factors. According to St. Thomas, the
trial of the angels – like that of man – took place in the state of grace in
the obscurity of faith.8 Proportionate to their spiritual, intuitive nature,
this trial, once proposed, was decided in an instant.9 Those angels who
lovingly accepted the divine plan were
On
the assumption that the angels were created in grace (Thomas’ assumption), the
act of the first instant was already meritorious in all the angels, but
imperfectly so. First, the good action of any creature in the state of grace is
meritorious (cf. II Sententiae, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 1c; De Malo q. 2, a. 5 ad
7), but since the angels in that first moment could not advert to the
supernatural order and opt for the beatific vision according to the required
modality foreseen in the divine plan, that original, imperfect choice did not
suffice for beatitude but had to be reiterated in the faith’s knowledge and
consent to the plan. This is the doctrine implicit in St. Thomas’ statement:
“God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of
them, and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (De Civitate Dei
XI, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all immediately glorified;
those who rejected it were immediately and definitively damned.
Secondly,
lest the reader’s attention be distracted by certain expectations, it is
opportune from the outset to underscore what St. Thomas did not do! Regarding
the precise object of the trial of the Angels, St. Thomas did not specify any
particular mystery in the economy of salvation which might have precipitated
the angelic trial, e.g., the Incarnation of the Son of God. Still, he did
maintain, along with other theologians, that the created spirits, while yet in
the state of faith and trial, did have knowledge about the coming of Christ:
All the angels had some knowledge from
the very beginning respecting the mystery of God’s kingdom, which found its
completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified
by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had.10
It
is remarkable and a telltale sign of St. Thomas’ state of quandary that only a
few articles before (STh. I, q. 57, a. 5 et ad 1) he had offered a different
opinion. Moreover, in each of these texts (one placed before the treatment of
the sin of the spirits and one immediately after), St. Thomas refers to and
interprets an identical text in Augustine (Super Genesim ad Litteram, lib. V.
cap. 19). In the earlier text (q. 57) he is only willing to speak of the
natural and beatific knowledge of the angels (while ignoring completely the
knowledge of faith crucial to the state of trial); there, he interpolates
Augustine’s statement into a comment on the beatific knowledge of the good
angels. Bycontrast, in STh. I, q. 64, a. 1 ad 4 – as shown – he presents the
Christological knowledge of the angels according to faith, glory and to
supernatural wisdom. All the spirits had the first kind of faith knowledge at
the beginning.
In
his Expositio Super Isaiam, St. Thomas – referring there again to the same text
of Augustine – is more explicit. The questions are: who is the grapet reader,
and who asks his identity?
First he gives the question, then the
response: “I who speak”. It is well known that all the saints together
understand this of Christ. The question belongs to the angels, who namely did
not fully understand the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, and therefore
ask, as though ignorant, according to Jerome. Opposed to his view is Augustine
in his Literal Commentary on Genesis (lib. V. ch. 19). He states that the
angels, from the (very) beginning of their creation knew everything that he
would be doing, whether the rational seeds of things he had imprinted into
them, or whether things he withheld to himself that would come to be, although
they were in them, so that they could come to be. And so it can be seen that
the angels knew about such mysteries.11
Reflecting
on the whole position of St. Thomas, Benoist D’Azy draws a valid conclusion:
Despite a certain fluctuation of
expression, which is perfectly explainable, St. Thomas, at the different
periods of his life, always taught that the angels knew by faith the mystery of
the Incarnation during their period of trial.12
Notwithstanding
having affirmed such Christological knowledge, Thomas never expressly posited
this as the focal point in the angelic trial. At best, inferences may be drawn
in this direction from certain (supposed?) implications on his part. Strongest
among these, it seems, would be his rather emphatic affirmation that every grace
of all the Holy Angels – including their sanctifying grace, ergo, their light
of glory – are Christological graces.13 The further point in his doctrine, that
their peccability could only have been detonated over some rule or standard set
up by the divine will,14 practically begs the question.
In
his biblical commentaries, though, – whether directly in his own name, as when
commenting Isaiah 14:12ff,15 or Ezekiel 2816 or John 8:34ff, Ephesians 1:20,
etc., or when collecting the thoughts of the Fathers in the Catena Aurea – St.
Thomas disappoints such inferences by his sheer silence, “failing”, as he does,
to establish the desired link. I do not deny that such a link may be reasonably
drawn, … only that the “check” may not be drawn from the account of express
statements by the Angelic Doctor.
3.
Magisterial status question is
Finally,
the Church’s Magisterium is quite succinct on the question of the trial of the
created spirits and the reprobation of those who rebelled against God. The
actual sin of the devil is not directly addressed until the fourth Lateran
Council (1215), which declared: “The devil and other demons were created by God
naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing.”17 Still, the doctrine
is mentioned much earlier in many contexts; we cite merely an excerpt from Pope
Leo’s Letter to Flavian, confirming the Council of Calcedon (453):
It was the devil’s boast that humanity
had been deceived by his trickery and so had lost the gifts God had given it;
and that it had been stripped of the endowment of immortality and so was
subject to the harsh sentence of death. He also boasted that, sunk as he was in
evil, he himself derived some consolation from having a partner in crime; and
that God had been forced by the principle of justice to alter His verdict on
humanity, which He had created in such an honorable state. All this called for
the realization of a secret plan18 whereby the unalterable God, whose will is
indistinguishable from His goodness, might bring the original realization of
His kindness towards us to completion by means of a more hidden mystery, and
whereby humanity, which had been led into a state of sin by the craftiness of
the devil, might be prevented from perishing contrary to the purpose of God.19
Similarly,
the Catechism of the Catholic Church deals briefly with the trial of the angels
and the sin of the fallen spirits:
391 Behind the disobedient choice of
our first parents lurks a seductive voice, opposed to God, which makes them
fall into death out of envy [Cf. Gen 3:15; Wis 2:24]. Scripture and the
Church’s Tradition see in this being a fallen angel, called “Satan” or the
“devil” [cf. Jn 8:44; Rev 12:9]. The Church teaches that Satan was at first a
good angel, made by God: “The devil and the other demons were indeed created
naturally good by God, but they became evil by their own doing” [IV Lateran
Council].
392 Scripture speaks of a sin of these
angels [cf. 2 Pt 2:4]. This “fall” consists in the free choice of these created
spirits, who radically and irrevocably rejected God and his reign. We find a
reflection of that rebellion in the tempter’s words to our first parents: “You
will be like God” [Gen 3:5]. The devil “has sinned from the beginning”; he is
“a liar and the father of lies” [1 Jn 3:8; Jn 8:44].20
The
net result, thus far, simply establishes the fact that the evil spirits, as
free personal agents, knowingly and willingly chose (caused) their own evil
state by radically and irrevocably rejecting God and His Kingdom.
Act I. Commentary on Lombard’s Sentences
Scene
1. Letting Peter Lombard speak for himself
First
let us consider what Peter Lombard taught. Lombard addresses the question of
the trial of creatures in book II of the Sentences. He comes to the question of
the actual choice of the spirits in their trial in the 5th distinction of the
second book of Sentences. Prior to this, though, he had discussed the creation
of the angels and indicated the parameters of the trial in the economy of the
divine plan. Created in a state of goodness, there was a slight delay before
the trial and fall.21 Their goodness, according to Lombard, was a mere natural
state of innocence.22 Access to the supernatural order of grace and glory was
to be gained only in and through a trial. Those who responded well were to be
confirmed simultaneously in grace and glory; those who responded badly would be
reduced to a state of abject reprobation:
All the angels were created good, and
in the very beginning of creation they came forth in goodness, that is, without
vice. They were also just, that is, innocent; but they were not just in the
sense of having the exercise of virtues. They were not yet provided with the
virtues, with which those who stood in the trial were endowed in their
confirmation in grace; whereas the other, having become proud by free choice,
fell away. They say there was a short delay between [their] creation and the
fall or confirmation. And in that brevity of time they were all good, though
not yet by the use (exercise) of free will, but by the benefice of creation.
And such there were, who were able to stand firm, that is, not fall through the
goods of creation, [and others] who fell. They could, therefore, sin or not
sin, but they could not advance to the merit of life except grace be
superadded,23 which in fact was added to some at their confirmation.24
In
Lombard’s scenario, therefore, there was never really a state of grace and
supernatural faith prior to the choice during the trial which resulted in
either confirmation or reprobation.25 The very acceptance or rejection of the
proposed supernatural order precipitated the definitive resolution of their
destiny. Following Origen he saw that original evil choice encased in a lie.26
Lombard
presents the angelic trial under the moral categories of “conversio” and
“aversio”. The mark of the good angels is that they turned (conversio) to God’s
plan and were confirmed in the good, whereas the evil spirits turned away from
God in aversion and became fixed in evil.
Concerning
the “conversio” and confirmation of those who remained standing and the
aversion and failure of those who fell. After this, reflection invites one to
inquire what the effects might be, when they are divided by aversion and
conversion. After creation, namely, some were quickly converted to their
Creator, others felt aversion. To be converted to God was to adhere to Him in
praise; to withdraw in aversion was to have hatred or envy, inasmuch as the
mother of envy is pride, by which they wanted to be on a par with God. And
these are they who turned to and were illuminated by God applying grace; and
those, indeed, are blinded, not by an injection of evil but by the desertion of
grace. They were deserted not in the sense that what had been priorly given was
withdrawn, but rather that it was never applied so that they be converted. This
is therefore the “conversio” and “aversio” according to which they who were
naturally good were divided: such that some be placed above that goodness by
the justice of goodness; whereas others be through the same corrupted by the
guilt of evil. “Conversio” made these to be just; “aversio” made the others to
be unjust. Each was [an effect] of the will; and the will of each, a will of
liberty.27
In
converting to God the holy angels freely adhered to him joyfully; concomitant
with this choice they were enlightened, became participants of the divine
wisdom and shared in supernatural justice. By contrast the reprobate spirits
freely turned away (aversion) from God in prideful hatred or envy. Envy,
Lombard informs us, the mother of pride,28 by which they wanted to put themselves
on a par with God. The camps were diametrically opposed: on the one side divine
light, on the other side blindness. The good angels experienced an elevation
beyond nature; the evil spirits fell beneath nature.
Hence,
they who stood firm and faithful did so in virtue of the cooperating grace of
God;29 and they who fell, did so through their prideful resistance to grace,
rendering it ineffective.30 Among the latter Lombard numbers the highest
created spirit, Lucifer.31
The
respective trials for angels and mankind called for their docile obedience to a
divine regulation, which ultimately had their confirmation and exaltation in
view:
Therefore, because (man), as an example
to the rational spirit, was in part humbled unto the sharing of the lot [usque
ad consortium] of an earthly body, lest perhaps in this he would seem to be
exceedingly depressed, God’s Providence added, that after a while when having
been glorified with the same body, he would be raised to the sharing of the lot
[ad consortium] of those who remained in their own purity, so that because he
had accepted less out of the dispensation of his own Creator as one founded, he
would after a while accept through the grace of the Same (to be) glorified. Thus, therefore, God our Founder, disposing
rational spirits according to differing lots [varia sorte] in virtue of the
judgment of His own Will, established for those, whom He had left in their
purity, a mansion above in Heaven; but those, whom He associated with earthly
bodies, a dwelling below on Earth; imposing a rule of obedience for each, so
that both the former from there where they were, should not fall down, and
these latter from there where they were, should ascend to where they were
not.32
A
“divine regulation” would be proposed to each of them separately (“utrisque”
not “amboque”). It remains undetermined whether Lombard saw that as essentially
the same rule (two sides of a single coin) or disparate regulations. Here, like
Thomas after him, Lombard draws no specific, at least, express link to the
Incarnation.33 grace was apportioned, just as the others did persist, until,
with the former falling down through pride, grace was apportioned to them.”
While
considering the “place” of the angels in creation, Lombard also indicates the
moral cause for the fall of so many:
By the witness of a number of
authorities it has been shown the angels were in “heaven” before the fall; and
that some fell from thence by pride, while others did not but remained there
standing firm.34
In
what did this pride consist?
Lucifer said: “I will ascend up to
heaven and exalt my throne, I will be like the Most High” (cf. Is 14). — He
solves it. But there he calls “heaven” the heights of God, to whom he wishes to
compare himself; and as such “I will ascend into heaven, that is, up to
equality with God”.35
The
“pride” in question is the capital sin of pride: the inordinate attachment and
pursuit of one’s own excellence or honor. He affirms as much himself:
After he was created, pondering the
eminence of his nature and the depth of his knowledge, he prided himself in
comparison to his Creator, to such a degree that he wanted to be equal to God,
as it is said in Isaiah: “I shall ascend to heaven, up over the stars of heaven
I will exalt my throne and I will be like the Most High.” He wanted, therefore,
to be like God, not by imitation but by an equiparity of power.36
Scene 2. Thomas Amends Lombard’s
Position
a)
Created State of the Angels
Although
the Sentence Commentary was among Thomas’ earliest works, written during his
first years as a lector at the University in Paris, he was still an autonomous
thinker, even when commenting the theological master, Peter Lombard. This is
apparent in this particular question on the trial of the angels. He follows Lombard
in affirming that the angels were not created in the beatific vision, but
enjoyed a kind of natural, intellectual vision of God.37 However, while
acknowledging Lombard’s thesis, to wit, that the more common opinion holds the
angels to have been created in a purely natural state of innocence, Thomas,
nevertheless, asserts that the more reasonable thesis holds that they had been
created in the state of grace.38
Finally,
Lombard maintained that the angels only received grace and glory as a fruit out
of the trial.39 Later in the Summa Thomas rejects this position as impossible:
An act cannot be meritorious as coming
from freewill, except in so far as it is informed by grace; but it cannot at
the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of
meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it
does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the same
time to merit it. Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace before
he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.40
In
short, if they were not created in grace, … they had to have received grace
posteriorly, yet before the trial, in order to merit heaven. For Heaven (a
supernatural reward) could not be merited without grace.
b)
The Sin of the Angels
St.
Thomas, like Lombard, declares that the sin of the reprobate spirits was a sin
of pride. Because the word is used in multiple fashions, he specifies the
precise formality of pride which constitutes the formal sin of the evil
spirits.
I
respond, saying that pride can be taken in three ways:
First, as it is taken habitually,
indicating a certain inclinability towards pride, whether arising solely from a
certain inflexibility of nature, or whether coming from a corruption of desire.
And in this fashion pride is said to be the beginning of every sin.
In another way, pride is said to be
that which actually carries one outside the limits of a precept, such that one
is not subject to the law giver. As such it is not a special sin but rather a
certain general condition, for every sin follows on the side of aversion.
Thirdly, pride is said to be the
inordinate appetite for one’s own proper excellence, especially in matter of
dignity and honor. And in this way it is a special sin, one of the seven
capital vices. And in this wise the first sin of the angel was pride. This is
evident not only from the side of the desire, for he craved the eminence of
dignity, but also on the part of the motive, for out of the consideration of
his own beauty he fell into sin.41
Here,
he distinguishes three different denotations of the word pride (“superbia”):
First,
“inclinibilitas” occurs only twice in the works of St. Thomas, both in this
article of Sentence Commentary. Inscribed in every created nature is the
longing for the supreme good. In spiritual creatures this is the ground of free
will, for the immediate manifestation of the supreme good alone would
necessarily elicit the act of love. In the case of every other “good” in
creation, falling short of this limit of necessity, rational creatures can
freely take it or leave it. But that which they take or opt to desire they tend
to vigorously (inclinibilitas) or to tend to cling to firmly (inflexibilitas)
once in possession. This is a natural quality or penchant of creatures as such,
… that was only augmented after the fall. In the state of innocence it is
linked with the very peccability of creatures, for there must be some material
object (some good thing) motivating a deviation from the rule of the superior,
in which formality alone the angels could have sinned.42 Hence, this penchant –
here termed “pride” in a broad sense – is at the root of all sin. This is not,
he contends, the sin of the angels, but a natural disposition or quality of
creatures.
Secondly,
pride is predicated of any act of insubordination whereby one refuses to follow
the directives of a superior. In this sense one is not speaking about a
specific kind of sin, but rather the general condition of all sins, inasmuch as
every sin includes a turning away (aversion) from some regulation. This second
meaning is distinct from the first in that “inclinibilitas” only indicates the
penchant or potentiality, whereas in this second case real sin is the subject of
predication: actual insubordination. Still, Thomas does not detect the precise
sin of the angels under this heading either.
Finally,
pride indicates a disordered appetite for one’s own proper excellence and
exaltation, especially in the area of dignity and honors. This constitutes the
special sin of pride, one of the seven capital sins. And it was in this sense,
he claims, that the devil sinned, seeking eminence for himself, motivated by
the consideration of his own extraordinary beauty.
Accordingly,
the youthful Thomas, following the Master, Peter Lombard, identified the sin of
the fallen angels with the capital sin of pride.
Act II. Sin of the Separated Substances
in the Summa Contra Gentiles
The
Sitz im Leben of the Summa Contra Gentiles – written precisely as an ongoing
debate with nonbelievers – severely limits the scope of St. Thomas’ interest in
the trial and sin of the spirits. In CG III, cc.109110 his discourse is
directed against the pagans of the platonic sort. The Platonists, namely, held
two ad rem doctrines concerning the “spirits”: First that they were not only
capable of evil, but actually did evil; and second that, existentially, they
possessed an aerial body. Were the second thesis true, St. Thomas points out,
the “spirits” would not really be spirits , but actually a subtle species of
animals. Moreover, having a body would necessarily include the passions, which
in turn would open the possibility to sins of passion, which were commonly
attributed to the “spirits” in the pagan world. Having already demonstrated the
pure spirituality of the separated substances in CG II, cc. 4951, St. Thomas
contents himself with the scriptural verification of the fact of moral sin
among the spirits.43 This is followed by the categoric denial, based on the
pure spirituality of the separated substances, that their own sin could in any
way be one of sensuality or passion; rather it could only be a spiritual sin
proportionate to their purely intellectual nature.44
St.
Thomas then shows the two modalities according to which a spiritual sin a
priori could take place in a separated substance. He bases his argument on a
double principle of order: there must be an order among causes hierarchically
arranged; there must be an order with respect to the final goal:45
We must give some consideration to the
fact that, as there is an order in agent causes, so also is there one in final
causes, so that, for instance, a secondary end depends on a principal one, just
as a secondary agent depends on a principal one. Now, something wrong happens
in the case of agent causes when a secondary agent departs from the order of
the principal agent. For example, when the leg bone fails because of its
crookedness in the carrying out of the motion which the appetitive power has commanded,
limping ensues. So, too, in the case of final causes, when a secondary end is
not included under the order of the principal end, there results a sin of the
will, whose object is the good and the end.46
Here
again, we meet the idea of a deviation from an “order” established by a
superior authority. God alone has no superior, He is Himself the final end; in
Him alone therefore can there be no deviation from order. But in all other
beings (creatures!) there is a possibility for error when the achievement of
the goal involves a middle term.47 Why is this so and how can this be? Thomas
explains:
Indeed,
although natural inclination of the will is present in every volitional agent
to will and to love its own perfection so that it cannot will the contrary of
this yet it is not so naturally implanted in the agent to so order its
perfection to another end, that it cannot fail in regard to it, for the higher end
is not proper to its nature, but to a higher nature. It is left, then, to the
agent’s choice, to order his own proper perfection to a higher end.48
Accordingly,
a created spirit could sin by refusing to order himself and his finality to the
higher end, or by refusing to pursue these ends in conformity with the standard
set by the higher good.
Therefore,
it was possible for sin to occur in the will of a separate substance, because
it did not order its proper good and perfection to its ultimate end, but stuck
to its own good as an end. And because the rules of action must be derived from
the end, the consequence is that this separate substance tried to arrange for
the regulation of other beings from himself wherein he had established his end,
and thus his will was not regulated by another, higher one. But this function
belongs to God alone. In terms of this, we should understand that “he desired
to be equal to God” (Is 14:14). Not, indeed, that his good would be equal to
the divine good, for this thought could not have occurred in his understanding,
and in desiring such a thing he would have desired not to exist, since the
distinction of species arises from the different grades of things, as is clear
from previous statements.49
In
this solution, St. Thomas has coalesced in some fashion the 2nd and 3rd forms
of pride he had presented in the Sentence Commentary: rebellion and the capital
sin of pride. Paramount, however, still remains the affirmation that the
capital sin of pride was the real motive behind the sin of the devil, for it
was by preferring his own subjective glory, which he thought attainable, that
he was led to deviate from the divine rule. As such, his doctrine remains in
substantial agreement with the position he articulated in the Sentence
Commentary.
Act. III. Rebellion of the Spirits in
De Divinis Nominibus
In
Dionysius Thomas met a peer with extraordinary intellectual acuity. Dionysius
capably raised and entertained the challenging questions of evil with frontal
bluntness:
If
the Beautiful and Good is beloved and desired, and esteemed by all … How is it
that the host of demons do not desire the Beautiful and Good? What is that
which depraved them, and in short, what is evil? And from what source did it
spring? … And how does any existing thing desire it, in comparison with the
Good?50
The
encounter with Dionysius must have fascinated Thomas;51 here was a thinker who
discoursed on the deepest moral and metaphysical levels on the nature of evil
and who never once, when explaining demonic evil, even referred nominally to
pride! A seed is planted in the mind of Thomas that was difficult in birthing,
that left him in a state of quandary, perplexity which he could not fully
resolve. Both the questions in Summa Theologiae and in De Substantiis Separatis
belie his immense travail, as we shall show. Thomas took the seed of truth from
Dionysius; he nevertheless failed to identify it for what it really was,
because the essential kernel of truth was encased in an equivocal shell. He
culled the conclusion:
For
we do not say “the demons because evil except in this” that they lacked in
habit and operation by which they ought to have been ordered to the divine
good.52
Hence,
the demons are not naturally evil, but become so by their own deeds:
Through the lack of some “goods” which
ought to be in the angels.53
“They are said to be evil for this
reason” that in their action they conduct themselves defectively in what is due
their nature. And in what order this takes place, he subsequently indicates,
saying, “aversion is in them the evil”.54
Reflecting
on the matter, Thomas reformulates the truth, without its fully coming to light
in his own mind.
Every
will of angel and man is naturally subject to God. The good therefore of the
angelic and human will is that it be regulated by the divine will. Aversion
therefore from the rule of the divine will is an evil in the demons.
Every
appetite which falls short of its regulatory rule tends towards its object in a
way beyond that which is proper, like the concupiscible appetite tending more
that it should towards the sensually delectable, when it is not ruled by
reason. Thus therefore, the will of the demons, reacting aversely to the rule
of the divine will, tended more than it should have in the desire of their
good. And hence what follows: “and exceeding/departing from what was befitting
for themselves”, for they desired namely for themselves something which
exceeded their state.55 Everything that is made to achieve some goal in a
determined manner, if it would deviate from this manner it cannot achieve the
goal. The manner in which the angels are made to achieve the ultimate end of
their will is through a will [strictly] moderated in accordance with the divine
rule. If therefore they exceed this measure, they do not achieve the goal.56
Indeed,
Thomas’ text demonstrates that he, perhaps by simply misreading the Latin
translation,57 misrepresented the thought of Dionysius and so was inadvertently
confirmed in his own erroneous position and quest, searching for the possible
real good that the demons ostensibly sought to achieve in their trial. After
defining that “they are said to be evil for this reason, moreover, because they
are weakened with respect to the operation according to nature”, John
Sarracenus continues translating:
… et convenientium ipsis excessus et
non consecutio et imperfectio et impotentia et salvantis ipsius perfectionem
virtutis infirmitas et fuga et casus. Et aliter: quid est in daemonibus malum?
Furor irrationabilis, demens concupiscentia, phantasia proterva.
John
Parker renders the text thus:
The evil then, in them [the demons], is
a turning aside [aversion] and a stepping out of things befitting themselves,
and a missing of aim, and imperfection and impotence, and a weakness and
departure, and falling away from the power which preserves their integrity in
them.58
Thomas
understood the excessus in a secondary meaning comparable to the English sense
of excess, namely, of going beyond the measure. This line of thought fell in
well with his prior thesis: the fallen spirits wanted some befitting good in an
excessive manner, and so violated the divine rule. But another fundamental
meaning of “excessus” is “a stepping out of”, a departure from a standard, or
definitively by death. Modern translations of Dionysius follow this pattern,
suggesting that Dionysius’ statement is simply negative.59 In a word, he does
not say they departed from the rule in a “greedy” pursuit of some particular
good, but rather that they fell short of the mark for an undisclosed reason.
Subsequently
Dionysius reiterates his thought metaphorically:
And again, differently: what is the
evil in the demons? irrational fury, insane concupiscence, reckless fantasy.60
St.
Thomas feels constrained to assure the reader that Dionysius didn’t hold that
the spirits had bodily passions, but was only reporting an opinion of the
Platonists.61 But it is probably closer to the mark to say Dionysius saw their
deviation from the rule accompanied by a frenzy of insane, hate-filled raging,
which he expresses in this anthropomorphic fashion. In itself this is
practically a tautology, … but Dionysius’ intention seems to underscore the
rage they felt against the divine rule. And herein lies the secret which Thomas
misses in this commentary and will only discover at the end of his career in De
Malo. St. Thomas will spend the next 12 years trying to figure out how the
demons could have thought to achieve some real kind of happiness when departing
from the divine rule. He constantly comes up against this wall of
impossibility. He agrees fully with Dionysius on this point: Whereas in man
there can be defective reason with respect both to the universal as well as to
the particular good, this is not the case with the pure spirits. “But he
excludes this both with respect to the universal good, which is God, from whom
they cannot [simply] recoil in aversion, and with respect to participated
goods, which are natural goods given to the angels.”62
Accordingly,
the problem is not one of ignorance, … and still the demons don’t see!
But
that “they don’t see”, this comes from the fact that they themselves by a free
choice closed their “faculties for inspecting the good”, that is to say, they
voluntarily averted their intellect, not from the consideration of the true,
but from an inspection of the good, inasmuch as good, since they evidently did
not want to follow it.63
Why
they would voluntarily focus their attention on the “wrong thing” was the
enigma. The last three words are the key; yet they are equivocated in Thomas’
mind, they are demoted to a subordinate, consequential position. He cannot find
an upfront motive without it becoming the formal object of their choice. That
this was not the intention of Dionysius, was already expressed by himself, when
he stated:
The evil then, in them [the demons], is
a turning aside [aversion] and a stepping out of things befitting themselves,
and a missing of aim, and … departure, and falling away from the power which
preserves their integrity in them.64
These
are all purely negative. Hence, in this commentary there is a colossal
equivocation at play. When Dionysius says “aversion”, Thomas responds, as it
were, “Yes, I know! For every moral decision entails both an aversion from the
true good as a result, following upon a ‘conversio’ to an apparent good”. This
basic moral doctrine was basic stock in the presentation of Peter Lombard, “So,
what’s new?!”
Precisely
the perfect “symmetry” is false; we would do better to say that the black
election of the reprobate spirits was asymmetrical. Bishop Fulton Sheen, coming
across a drunken woman on the street, observed: “Men go for booze because they
like it; women go to booze, because they don’t like something else. What’s your
problem, woman?”
Another illustration:
suppose Edward were to tell Tim, “Jeff went bad, because he disobeyed.
Disobedience was his evil.” And Tim – reflecting that every sin “disobeys” some
law – replies, “Aye, disobedience (= aversion), but what was his r e a l sin
(= conversion to what good)? sensuality? avarice? vanity? What was he really
after?”
But
Edward returns laconically, “No, nothing else, … just disobedience! He didn’t
like the boss! He just wanted to disobey him, to show him that he doesn’t have
command of everything!”
Thomas
could not buy into Edward’s remark for most of his life; he couldn’t grasp the
scenario of an aversion without an effective conversion to some good. This is
just what he did in his Sentence Commentary when delineating three meanings of
pride. He rejected the “privative” generic form of insubordination (which
corresponds to the position of Dionysius!) in favor of the “positive” form of
the capital sin of pride (= conversion), which, really aspiring to some good,
accepts the concomitant disobedience (= aversion) in the transaction.
We
shall see how this works out in the subsequent acts of this drama.
Act IV. Trial and Sin of the Evil
Spirits in the Summa Theologiae
In
the Summa Theologiae Thomas first establishes the possibility of an angelic
sin.
But
every created will has rectitude of act only insofar as it is regulated
according to the divine will, to which the last end is to be referred … thus …
there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condition of
its nature.65
Since
the will for the good is indelibly inscribed by the Creator in the creature’s
will, evil cannot be chosen directly, but only under the formality or
appearance of good. Man, due to the impediments of the body and the plodding
nature of his rationality, often sins through ignorance by choosing an apparent
good. Such an ignorant election is not possible in case of the pure spirits due
to their intuitive lucidity. They could only sin “by choosing something good in
itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which
induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated,
but not on the part of the thing chosen”.66 Moreover, an occasion for such a
deficient election could only arise in a supernatural order,67 since the angels
enjoyed natural beatitude immediately upon creation in virtue of their
intuitive, intellectual nature. Their sin could only be spiritual in nature. A
priori, it would have to regard the supernatural end, either directly or
indirectly, that is to say, with regards to the means. Each scenario would
involve communion in the same modality of fault: deviation from the right path,
which is pride:
But
there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order;
unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is
precisely the sin of pride — not to be subject to a superior when subjection is
due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.68
Herein
there is a certain shift, at least of accent, from the definition he had given
to pride in the Sentence Commentary. There, rebellion was simply a generic
quality of all sin, … here it constitutes a formal element of the angelic
pride. Still, this diabolic pride is characterized by a singular pursuit, an
equality with God which they intend to achieve.
Thomas
dedicates the third article to differentiate this pursuit: “It is said, in the
person of the devil (Is 14:13.14), ‘I will ascend into heaven … I will be like
the Most High’.”69 “Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God.”70
He
first observes that there are two fundamental ways in which one could, a
priori, aspire to equality with God, by sheer equality or by similarity. The
first would be by way of strict metaphysical equality with God. In this fashion
“He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural knowledge
he knew that this was impossible”71. This is a principle that he should have
applied with even greater rigor! He articulates it more completely elsewhere in
the Summa Theologiae:
Now no one is moved to the impossible.
Consequently no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means
appear to be possible. Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.72
We
can, he explains, foster light wishes or velleities about impossible things,
but we cannot effectively will such things we deem to be impossible, especially
when it comes to a matter of the final good of happiness, to which all other
things must be ordered.
Wherefore
the complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good
for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the
impossible; and by some is called “velleity”, because, to wit, one would will
[vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of the will,
fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means
of anything but what is possible.73
In
this way the devil could not have willed to be equivalent to God. Now, in order
to facilitate the critical reading of the text, I insert the second half of the
corpus from STh. I, q. 63, a. 3:
Now it is quite evident that God
surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature;
and one angel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower
degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with
God.
To
desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways.
In
one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be similar to God.
And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; provided
that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may
obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even
in the right way, as of his own, and not of God’s power.
In
another way one may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not
natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is
proper to God; in which desire there would be sin.
And
it was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to
resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be
desiring his own “notbeing”; since no creature can exist except by holding its
existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect:
(1) by desiring, as his last end of
beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature,
turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by
God’s grace.
Or
(2), if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by
grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from divine
assistance according to God’s ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm’s opinion,
who says [De casu diaboli, iv.] that “he sought that to which he would have
come had he stood fast”.
These
two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have
final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone. Since, then, what exists of itself is
the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he
sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be
like unto God.
Rather
than equiparity, Thomas affirms, the devil sought similarity to God. This can
take two forms. In the first, one becomes similar to God in a befitting modality.
If one did this in conformity with the divine will (rule!), there would be no
sin; indeed, it would be virtuous. For example, to practice justice is to be
like God. However, one would sin, if one tried to achieve this befitting form
of similarity by dint of one’s own efforts and not with the help of God. And
one would also sin, if one tried to be similar to God in an unfitting,
unnatural way. For example, he says, by wanting the power to create heaven and
earth, which is proper to God. “In this way”, he claims, “the devil aspired to
be like God”.
Two
observations are due at this point: First, this last example is misplaced, for
the desire to have the power to create is nothing less than the wish to be
metaphysically equal to God, since this power accrues to God precisely as Ipsum
Esse. Every creature has participated esse. Hence, this example falls under the
impossible category of perfect equiparity with God, which Thomas had just
rejected as impossible. Secondly, taking the matter from a slightly different
angle, the example is inopportune, for even if rightly placed, the desire for
creative power is evidently impossible for a creature. Hence, such a desire
cannot exceed a mere velleity. For this very reason, it could not be the
material object of the angels’ sin. This point is all the more interesting, for
Thomas himself accentuates that the devil didn’t aspire to metaphysical
autonomy from God, since, as a creature, his every good, beginning with his
being, depends fully upon this metaphysical dependence.
A
further clarification is also due. The statement, “And it was in this way that
the devil desired to be as God” is to be understood of the both kinds of
similarity and not just the latter. That is to say, the antecedent of “in this
way” is “the way of similarity” in opposition to “way of equiparity”. This
proves itself in the light of the two options which he presents, each
“fulfilling” one of the species of similarity to God.
First,
he presents the disordered pursuit of a naturally good assimilation to God. He
suggests that the devil wanted to be like God by achieving the beatitude to
which his nature was innately capable, turning his will away from that form of
supernatural beatitude which came at the price of accepting grace from God.
This scenario is doubly curious. First, because natural beatitude was not
something to which the angel could arrive (“poterat pervenire”), but rather a
beatitude which came with his nature:
As
regards this first [natural] beatitude, which the angel could procure by his
natural power, he was created already blessed . Because the angel does not
acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, … is
straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity.74
Hence,
it could not have been a question of coming to something, but rather of wishing
to remain in something, by refusing something higher, that is, supernatural
beatitude. However, the angel could not be ignorant that the refusal of the
finality of grace together with the loss of grace did not leave any alternative
of natural felicity in the knowledge of God. In a word, this hypothesis is
morally impossible. The angel could not have sinned by wanting to achieve
natural beatitude by his own strength.
If
that wasn’t the case, Thomas now tells us, then the devil desired to achieve
supernatural beatitude, not by the grace of God but by dint of his own effort.
Here the contradiction is even more striking and impossible. The angel was not
ignorant as to the fact that the beatific vision of God is impossible without
the grace of God.
The
only things that would remain true out of this discussion are these:
1) on the supposition that these
efforts were possible (and they were not), then the angel would have become
like God in an improper manner.
2) the two (impossible) suppositions
would have coalesced in the same formality inasmuch as the demons wanted to
have happiness and beatitude as the fruit of their own labor.
Yet
the demons themselves knew these options were not real possibilities. They had
no illusion that they would really achieve happiness through such choices as
these.
As
a chaser, St. Thomas notes that by that choice, whereby they would have been
the principle of their own beatitude, they would also have been perverse
delight of exercising principality over others. I am not sure that it adds
anything to his argument, but it may offer an insight into his own hidden reflections
on the angelic trial. Where the two arguments really coalesce into one is that
in each scenario, they didn’t want to cooperate with the plan (rule) of God.
That was where Thomas had situated pride in the preceding argument at the
negative point of aversion. Here in this argument, he fails to offer any
realistic scenario in which the evils spirits were really striving to achieve
some form of happiness which they truly deemed attainable through their
rebellion.
This
Waterloo experience leads us to reflect upon his solution in the next act, on
the mystery of Evil in the Separated Substances.
Act V. The Trial of the Angels in the
Treatise on Separated Substances
Thomas’
Treatise on Separated Substances is like a mini-Summa Contra Gentiles on angelology.
While he deals with the philosophers, it is to measure and correct their
writings against the truths of the faith. The treatise is a celebration of
faith, undertaken as he said, to honor the spirits with his mind, since he was
not able to take part in a liturgical celebration in their honor.75 When, in
chapter 17 the hour has finally come to set things straight about evil in the
spirit world with the light of Christian Doctrine, St. Thomas selects Dionysius
to guide him through the spheres of heavenly doctrine,76 as later Beatrice
would be selected to guide Dante through the heavenly spheres.
This
work is either “tellingly” or “frustratingly (sadly)” incomplete, cut off
precisely in the area of our present discussion. The preferred attribution
stands in close relation to the date assigned to the work. The editor, Spiazzi
OP, would have us believe that it was begun in 1268 and that Thomas worked on
it until 1273, the year before his death. This explains the lugubrious
panegyric epilogue by the editor: “The holy Doctor Angelicus wrote up to this
point, but prevented by death he could not complete this treatise, and for that
matter many others which he left uncompleted.”77 Vansteenkiste OP can dispense
with the epilogue, as he assigns the early date of 1259 to the work, at a point
when Thomas was newly being introduced to the works of Dionysius.78 Still, if
Thomas could present the Dionysian doctrine with such lucidity at the end of
the 1250’s, why was the parallel article in the Summa (I, 63, 3) left in a
state of conundrums? Hence, more reasonable are I. T. Eschmann’s and Jacques
Maritaine’s assignments of 1268 and 1269 respectively. The reasons, both why
Thomas wrote the work why it was left incomplete may well have been the same:
the enigma that stumped him in the Summa (I, q. 63, a. 3c) still stumped him.
And still, he made progress which prepared the way for his final insights.
What
was his progress in thought? We may affirm that it was negative, that it had
exhausted itself. The “unfinished symphony” On Separated Substances ends in a
crescendo of arguments that indicate that the pure intellects of the created
spirits could not fall culpable prey to any error, and since by nature their
will can only choose good, as it is presented to them by the intellect, there
was no room for an evil election in them. The arguments he raises are not just
“paper tigers” that he will easily tear up like flimsily stage props in
Hollywood, rather they were “beasts” which tormented him, because his mind
adhered to their logic, while in faith, he knew that the demons were evil
through their own voluntary election, inflated somehow by their perverse
knowledge.79
He
reiterates the position of Dionysius, like someone suspecting that he holds the
key to a riddle, but does not know how to apply the decryption key:
Therefore we shall have to say that the
demons were not always evil but some of them began to be evil, when by their
own choice, they followed the inclination of the passions. And accordingly,
Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names that “aversion”,
namely from God, “is an evil for the demons themselves, and it is a forsaking
of those things which are fitting to them because they were carried away by
pride beyond themselves”. And later on, he adds certain remarks pertaining to
punishment as “not reaching the ultimate end” and imperfection through a lack
of a due perfection, and “impotence” of pursuing that which they desire by
nature and an “infirmity” of the power conserving in them, a natural order,
calling them back from evil.80
The
following text presents his insolvable impasse:
For in an incorporeal and intellectual
substance, there seems to be no appetite except the intellectual, which is of
that which is absolutely good, as appears through the Philosopher in XII
Metaphysics. Now no one is made evil from the fact that his intellect tends
toward that which is good absolutely, but from the fact that it tends toward a
qualifiedly good thing, as though it were absolutely good. Therefore it does
not seem possible that an incorporeal and intellectual substance should be made
evil by its own appetite.
112. — Again, appetite can be only of
the good or of the seeming good, for the good is that which all beings seek and
one is not rendered evil because he seeks the true good. Therefore, every
individual who is made evil through his own appetite, must seek a seeming good
as though it were truly good. This, however, cannot be unless he is deceived in
his judgment, which does not seem capable of happening in an incorporeal and
intellectual substance which, as it seems, cannot have a false apprehension.
For even in our case, insofar as we understand something, there can be no
falsity. Accordingly, Augustine says in the Book of EightyThree Questions, “Everyone
who is deceived, that, indeed, in which he is deceived, he does not
understand”. And accordingly, concerning those things which we grasp properly
by our intellect as well as concerning the first principles, no one can be
deceived. Therefore it seems impossible that some incorporeal and intellectual
substance should become evil through its own appetite.81
So
typical of the objections he customarily raises, one might easily oversee that
Thomas had come to an impasse. He could not intellectually understand how the
demon could effectively choose some false but apparent good as the converging
point upon which his pride depended and to which he clung. This conclusion is
valid. In this, at least, he has come beyond STh. I, q. 63, a. 3.
It
is not until the Disputed Questions on Evil, that he gains the definitive
insight.
Act VI. The Dénouement in De Malo
Scene
1. Rhetoric Musings
It
is indulgent and, yes, romantic to entertain the thought (not without good
reason!), that Thomas after so many “defeats” and frustration should so
willingly enter the arena of jousting with such blunted and unsuccessful
lances, to enter unarmed, as it were, into the hostile arena of disputed
questions! While other saints, at the evening of their lives, are relishing
flames of love, heavenly mansions, clouds of heavenly contemplation and the
sublimities of love, Thomas, that unpredictable ox, leaps into to the midst of
evil to exonerate his God, and there acquits and exonerates himself so well. I
call it a romantic thought in line with the school of thought which would hold
David’s going out with a sling to slay Goliath a romantic undertaking.
Thomas,
who despite his great mind, had not been able to resolve the riddle which held
the secret to the first birth of evil, finally, in the midst of battled
disputations, was handed, as it were, the light, the insight, the key to
understanding the sin of the devil.
Let
us “literate” for just a moment, with a “Hamlet Moment” about “the question”.
The digression is justified, since it will lead us straight to the heart of the
matter. Shakespeare had the key too, though anthropologically enfleshed.
Consider Hamlet’s reflection. Then disengage it from the flesh, so that it
become an archetypal monologue in the realm of spirits,82 where doubt and fear
played no role!
To
be, or not to be: that is the question:
Whether
‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The
slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or
to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And
by opposing end them? To die: to sleep;
No
more! and by a sleep to say we end
The
heartache and the thousand natural shocks
That
flesh is heir to, ‘tis a consummation
Devoutly
to be wish’d. To die, to sleep;
To
sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there’s the rub;
For
in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When
we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must
give us pause: there’s the respect
That
makes calamity of so long life;
For
who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
The
oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely,
The
pangs of despised love, the law’s delay,
The
insolence of office and the spurns
That
patient merit of the unworthy takes,
When
he himself might his quietus make
With
a bare bodkin? who would fardels bear,
To
grunt and sweat under a weary life,
But
that the dread of something after death,
The
undiscover’d country from whose bourn
No
traveller returns, puzzles the will
And
makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than
fly to others that we know not of?
Thus
conscience does make cowards of us all;
And
thus the native hue of resolution
Is
sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought,
And
enterprises of great pith and moment
With
this regard their currents turn awry,
And
lose the name of action.83
1)
“To be or not to be: that is the question.” An existential question about life:
whether in the face of the present circumstances life should go on.
2)
“The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”, seen from the side of offended
spirits, are the horrible “present circumstances”, are the divine rule
supernaturally set by God before the spirit world, who by embracing them in
loving, humble service would be eternally beatified in God. But the very offer
is an awful, awesome slight to their honor!
3)
“Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them?” Oh, if
only they could oppose the divine will and come out triumphant. (Behold, a
velleity!) But what can they achieve against Almighty God? What can they hope
for?
4)
“To die: to sleep; No more! and by a sleep to say we end the heartache and the
thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to, ‘tis a consummation devoutly to
be wish’d.” Indeed, there is one alternative: Suicide! But how could a spirit
commit suicide? Is this too not a mere velleity? Or is there a spiritual
analogy?
5)
“To die, to sleep; to sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there’s the rub. … For who
would bear the whips and scorns of time, the oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s
contumely, The pangs of despised love, the law’s delay, the insolence of office
and the spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes, when he himself might
his quietus make with a bare bodkin?”
Oblivion,
nirvana, “the Woods are lovely dark and deep”, in a word, suicide under any
name is such a sweet beckoning for those who hate the alternatives life
presents! Conscience and the fear of punishment after death only “makes cowards
of us” men, … for the spirits, though, fear is not a factor in their choice.84
St.
Thomas came to this insight in demonic psychology apparently in the course of
the Disputations on Evil. Let us see his resolution to the question.
Scene
2. Rhetoric Aside: Thomas’ (unpolished) Solution
Finally,
the Disputations on Evil afforded Thomas with the formal elements necessary for
the essential, if not definitive, solution to the enigma of the Trial and Sin
of the created spirits. However, our expectations may not be too high: we say
he discovered the “formal elements” to the solution, but a polished formulation
of the solution was not forthcoming.
Let
us survey the yield from the disputation. Two significant factors in Thomas’
solution my be stated by way of statistics. First, in De Malo articles on the
sin of the angels St. Thomas has practically abandoned the use of the word
“pride”; there, the word “pride” appears only three times.85 The proper meaning
of “pride”, which Thomas had pointed out in his Sentence Commentary, consists
in a conversion to one’s own proper goodness (perfection, honor) . On the order
of nature, though, St. Thomas has proven that the angel could not have an
inordinate love for himself, since he is created in a state of natural
perfection and beatitude. Accordingly, the trial of the angels could only have
transpired on a supernatural plane upon which the angels were still pilgrims
underway, that is, in potentiality, and called to a new final end or
beatitude.86 About a beatitude not yet achieved, the angel could not be self-inflated
through a positive attachment to self.
Any
form of “pride” would therefore have to consist in a reaction to the
supernatural economy of grace and the particular rule by which supernatural
glory was to be attained. The possibility of such “pride” therefore could
consist only in a deviation, a rebellion against the divine rule. That was the
generic form of “pride” which youthful Thomas discarded from consideration in
the Sentence Commentary. Avoiding further equivocation and in strict line with
the doctrine of Dionysius, Thomas expresses the formal motivation behind the
guilt of the spirits in terms of aversion. Under the varying verbal and
substantive forms, the root form of “aversion” appears some 30 times in
Question 16 on the demons.
Since,
whatever the will immediately wills or converges upon (“conversion”) is good,
in some positive sense, Thomas will identify the formal, evil element in sin
with the aversion from the proper rule more than aversion from the proper end.
Therefore,
we can note two things in faults, namely, departure from the rule or measure
and departure from the end. … And it is evident from [the examples] that it
belongs more to the nature of fault to disregard a rule of action than even to
fail to attain the end of the action. Therefore, it belongs intrinsically to
the nature of fault, whether in nature or human skills or moral matters, to be
contrary to a rule of action.87
Dispensing
therefore from the use of term “pride” (signifying a turning to some good),
Thomas orchestrates the angels’ trial and sin as an election by means of which
the reprobate spirits strove to be like God in such a way that they rebelled
against His ordinance in the process. Hence, there was a “positive” element of
pursuit, but the principal element was the rebellion. Thomas, in company with
the traditional position, held the devil’s sin to be the paradigm behind the
epic metaphors for proud, reprobate princes in the Old Testament (Is 14,1214;
Ez 28, 219).
Having
been tormented in the past by the question how the devil could choose to do
evil and what good he might have truly aspired to, we should not be surprised
to find Thomas passionately concerned with the possible and the impossible in
the pursuit of divine likeness. In the single article on whether the devil
sought to be like God (De Malo q. 16, a. 3), the “possible” and the
“impossible” are hashed about so much that the words appear more than 20 times.
And notwithstanding, – even here in De Malo – Thomas does not sieve matters
with sufficient rigor.
In
this crucial article, where Thomas proves that the enemy sought the divine
likeness, he excludes, first of all, those forms of divine similitude which are
absolutely impossible. First, God alone is “Ipsum Esse”, of which there can
evidently only be one. Every other being exists by participating in being by a
divine gift, which is absolutely less than God. Concerning this truth the pure
spirits could not have been ignorant. So he draws a conclusion, based on a
principle, ready for further application:
And
so we conclude that his intellect could not have understood equality with God
to be within the nature of the possible. And no one strives for what the person
understands to be impossible, as he De Caelo et Mundo says. And so the movement
of the devil’s will could not have inclined to desire equality with God
absolutely.88
Not
only from the side of “divine” metaphysics would such a will be impossible, but
also from the side of “personal” metaphysics. First, “the devil evidently did
not desire something whereby he himself would no longer be the same individual.
But he would no longer be the same individual if he were to be equal to God,
even if this were possible”.89 That is to say, if it were possible in itself,
it would mean his existential dissolution as a person.90 By the same token, the
devil could not actually wish to be absolutely independent from God, since his
own participated hold on existence depends solely on God.91
St.
Thomas then posits, what he holds to be the resultant, possible aspiration of
the devil in sinning. The answer is quite complex, and, to my mind, still
defective. First, the text, and then a particularized analysis:
And
so we conclude that the devil’s sin regarded something supernatural, not
something belonging to the order of nature. Therefore, the devil’s first sin
was that, to attain the supernatural happiness consisting of the complete
vision of God, he did not elevate himself to God so as to desire with holy
angels his ultimate perfection through God’s grace. Rather, he wanted to attain
his ultimate perfection by the power of his own nature without God’s bestowing
grace, although not without God’s acting on his nature.
And
so Augustine in his work On Free Choice [ch. 24] holds the devil’s sin to
consist of his pleasure in his own power. And Augustine in his Commentary on
the Book of Genesis says that “if an angelic substance were to turn to itself,
and the angel were to delight in itself more than in the one in whose
participation it is happy, it would swell with pride and fall”.
And
because having one’s ultimate perfection by the power of one’s own nature, not
through the favor of something higher, is proper to God, the devil in this
regard evidently desired equality with God.
And
he also desired in this regard not to be subject to God, namely, so as not to
need God’s grace in addition to the power of his nature.
And
this agrees with what I said before, that the devil did not sin by desiring an
evil but by desiring a good, namely, his ultimate happiness, improperly, that
is, not as a happiness obtained through God’s grace.92
Having
rejected the “impossible dreams”, Thomas indicates the actual object that
purportedly moved the angelic will in its positive movement of conversion to a
positive good. In order to achieve supernatural beatitude as his final
perfection,93 which consists in the beatific vision of God, the devil did not
turn to God as the holy angels did, desiring to receive it as a fruit of God’s
grace, but the evil one tried to achieve this end by the power of his own
nature and not by grace, knowing as he did, that having been created immortal,
God would not withdraw his natural powers from him.
We
repeat, that simply speaking it is impossible that a natural power can produce
any supernatural effect, let alone the supreme effect in the order of grace,
the beatific vision. Hence, strictly speaking, the wish to achieve the good of
the beatific vision by the dint of solely natural powers is precisely that, a
wish, that is a velleity, which is not the kind of will capable of consummating
either a sin or a virtuous act. John of St. Thomas, perceiving this anomaly,
tries well to come to the Angelic Doctor’s rescue, by introducing a useful
distinction, though he too fails to overcome the essential difficulty:
We
affirm that also in the first sin of the angel, pride could have entered in
with respect to supernatural beatitude, by refusing and despising it, in such
wise that virtually and interpretively he wanted to have them but not from
divine grace, but rather from his own strength. Neither did he want to have it
in common with many. Formally, however he only wanted effectively to refuse it,
and rest in his natural felicity and beauty. Accordingly, the refusal of
supernatural beatitude on the part of the angel should not be separated from
his delight of resting and remaining in his natural felicity.94
The
major contribution is that he understands that “supernatural beatitude gained
by natural virtue alone” was merely the object of an angelic velleity. This
means, the angels saw it as something good, but refused it because it could
only be achieved by grace. And precisely here, in company with Suarez and in
modern times Molinie, he fails to profit from his own insight.
Suarez,
as was pointed out, contemplated the metaphysical possibility of the Hypostatic
Union as the formal object of the angelic trial. He suggests that the devil, so
upset by the very idea that another creature, a human nature, should enjoy this
prerogative and so be elevated above him, had effectively preferred that this
mystery had been accomplished at the fitting time in his own nature. The devil
would have been aware that this would have been the end of his own personal
existence, but not the end of the existence of his created nature, which would
have continued to exist consciously by subsisting the Logos. John of St.
Thomas’ point bears repeating. The devil could only have wished that that had
been the plan of God, but effectively he could only refuse to cooperate with
the plan of God.
Molinie
(a French Dominican in the midst of French existentialists!) expounds upon the
anguish of metaphysical poverty into which the elevation into the order of
grace would have plunged the angels. For, by nature they had already committed
themselves in a supreme natural love to the God of nature; but now, in grace,
they were being called to disengage this natural oblation in favor of an
unknown God! In this moment of anguish the angels would also have perceived the
perverse option of rendering this oblation not to God with the help of grace
but to themselves or to another (higher) angel:
For there is at the same time
[alongside the oblation of self to God in grace] another possibility, which
constitutes exactly the temptation, namely to adopt a false god in an act,
which in any case (narcissism or idolatry) would allow him to confer upon
himself a divine importance, evidently a lie (as he well knows!), but
nonetheless true for his appetite.95
Generally
an acute thinker, in this particular point Molinie’s reflection is better drama
than theology. Similarly, the devil’s dramatic reply to Faust’s question as to
how he could get out of hell to visit him, while also theologically deficient
in particulars, does point in the direction of the real question:
Why
this is hell, nor am I out of it. Think’st thou that I who saw the face of God,
and tasted the eternal joys of Heaven, am not tormented with ten thousand
hells, in being deprived of everlasting bliss? 96
It
is not only “impossible things” which can’t be willed (but only wished), but it
is likewise impossible to will as one end (but not to wish) certain “possible
things”, namely, those which cannot possibly constitute true happiness. Man, to
be sure, especially in his fallen state, suffers many illusions in this regard,
but the angels in their original integral state of natural beatitude could not
be ignorant about this. They knew full well that a greater good awaited them in
the beatific vision.97 Likewise, the supposed angelic anguish over their
metaphysical poverty (if not aggravated by other concomitant factors) would
have to have been greater in their natural state than in the state of faith,
inasmuch as the divine promises in grace are the greatest assurance for the
conservation of contingent beings in existence. Surely, the security of a son
is superior to that of a servant: “Now the servant abides not in the house for
ever: but the son abides for ever. If therefore the Son shall make you free,
you shall be free indeed” (Jn 8:3536).
This
is the second major point in Thomas’ response above (De Malo 16, 3c), namely
that in refusing to follow the divine rule the devil experienced a perverse
pleasure and effectively did accomplish his goal – the same he had promised to
Eve – that he would become like God knowing, (determining) good and evil. He
became his own rule of conduct, which is proper to God alone. In this, he cut
off his nose to spite his face! That is to say, he exploited the option to
rebel, n o t because he thought he would be happy in that choice, but because
his only perverse happiness consisted in slapping God in the face and screaming,
“I will not serve!”
Hence,
when it is affirmed that the spirits would have wished to have supernatural
beatitude, but n o t by the grace of God, … this formula must be completed, in
order to make theological sense. It is n o t the case that the fallen spirits
really wanted or thought they could have supernatural beatitude by dint of
their own natural efforts without the help of divine grace (an impossibility).
Rather what they actually and effectively decided to do was this: they refused
to pursue and accept the sole, possible supernatural beatitude with the help of
grace. Now it is not a question of just any grace, but precisely that
particular modality of grace that was presented to them in the actual economy
of their salvation.
Thomas
has repeated it again and again, that their sin was a sin of aversion to the
divine rule. The angels were already in a state of grace; a single act of
divine charity could have been sufficient for their elevation to eternal
happiness in the vision of God. God, however, did not establish that possible
economy of grace, rather he established another economy of grace. And in that
“other economy” (the only one offered to the angels), there was something in
the “rule” – the means to glory – that somehow provoked a sense of slight in
certain angels.
Suppose
a king was to invite one of his common subjects to marry his daughter and so
become a member of the royal family and heir to the kingdom. There is nothing
in this scenario of elevation (Molinie’s imagination) that would justify
anguish or rebellion on the part of the servant. But suppose that the king made
this offer contingent upon the fact that the servant renounce his profession in
order to accept the offered elevation. Here problems may or may not ensue. If
the king were to require that the subject repudiate his Christian faith in
order to receive the honor, clearly the subject would have to refuse the evil
king’s evil suggestion. Suppose though, the king would require that the subject
renounce his autonomy as a master gold smith in order to serve under the royal
gold smith. Here, secundum quid, problems again can arise.
By
nature the highest spirit was prince over all of creation.98 In the order of
nature, therefore, he would have been the cause for the highest degree of
natural beatitude for all the other spirits and mankind; he had, namely, the
natural position and power to communicate to all other intellectual and
rational creatures a more perfect intellectual knowledge of the Divinity. In a
way, this mission could have continued in a supernatural economy as well. While
the beatific vision could only be communicated directly by God, still Lucifer’s
light and vision would have remained the highest in creation, and so he would
have exercised principality over all the other spirits and mankind with respect
to the governance of creation; all illuminations would have their highest
creaturely articulation in his, the Light Bearer’s light! He would have been
the high priest of the universe! In such an economy, Lucifer and his followers
might well have been pleased to accept and comply with the divine offer. There
were only advantages, nothing humiliating or degrading, … indeed, one could
hardly speak of any renunciation. There were, moreover, no material grounds for
any attempt or presumption to attain to supernatural beatitude by mere natural
powers, as this was patently impossible.
That
original idyllic order came crashing down with the unveiling of the actual
economy of salvation which God called His first creatures to embrace. Were that
plan (rule!) the mystery of the Incarnation, then the angelic world would have
been plunged into a deep darkness of trial by the inscrutable obscurity of
faith. Thomas doesn’t take us through this door, but he practically brings us
to it. He has made it clear that the stumbling block for the fallen spirits was
the divine rule: “The stone which the builders rejected; the same is become the
head of the corner. This is the Lord’s doing, and it is wonderful in our eyes”
(Ps 118:2223). He has affirmed time and again, especially here in De Malo that
aversion to the divine rule (Economy of Salvation) was the evil and sin of the
fallen spirits. In fact, this was the only kind of evil they could have
committed, since the natural object of the will is always good. But in the
obscurity of supernatural faith the goodness of the divine plan could itself
have become obscured, such that the angels divert their attention to another
more manifest good. Here, was the stumbling block in Thomas’ angelic psychology.
He had been impeded for so long by the conviction that the angels had to attach
their will to some real good that was really possible for them to attain as the
object of their beatitude. Given the pure intellect of the spirits, he knew
there was no room for such a speculative error. He couldn’t find the leverage
necessary to explain their moral evil which could only consist in deviation
from a superior’s mandate:
Evil
consists both of the privation of form and the privation of due measure and
order, as Augustine says in his work On the Nature of the Good. And so acts of
the will have evil both from their object, which gives the acts their form
because one wills evil, and from taking away the due measure or order of the
acts themselves, as, for example, if one in the very course of willing good
does not observe due measure and order. And such was the sin of devils that
made them evil. For they desired a suitable good, not an evil. But they desired
it inordinately and immoderately, namely, in that they desired to acquire it by
their own power and not by God’s grace, and this exceeded the due measure of
their status. Just so, Dionysius says in his work On the Divine Names: “Evil
for devils, therefore, consists of a turning away”, namely, inasmuch as their
desires turned away from the direction of a higher rule, and “too much of
suitable things”, namely, inasmuch as they exceeded their due measure in
desiring suitable goods. But regarding sin, defect of intellect or reason and
defect of will always accompany one another proportionally. And so we do not
need to suppose that there was in the devils’ first sin such a defect of
intellect that they judged falsely (e.g., that evil is good), but that they
failed to comprehend the rule governing them and its ordination.99
From
this text it is clear that St. Thomas still thinks the devil actually sought to
attain some good that was befitting to him: “he wanted some good appropriate to
himself”. Simpliciter, this was true, but secundum quid, it was not true. In De
Malo q. 16 a. 3c he will identify this befitting goodness as the beatific
vision. He will mistake the devil’s intention, namely to want this by the power
of nature alone. Thomas still lacks an insight here because he has only
considered the “divine rule” against which the devil rebelled in a formal way,
but not in an existential or material fashion.
The
devil wanted to achieve supernatural beatitude by grace, not by mere nature,
but in such a way that he was moved thereto only by God and not by the
instrumentality of any other creature. This may be affirmed, because this is
the only modality in which the “supernatural good” was, at least, a priori
really possible. Yet this possibility lost its footing in reality, when God set
the foundation stone to the economy of Salvation: “And again, when he brings in
the first begotten into the world, he says: And let all the angels of God adore
him” (Hb 1:6). At this juncture it was no longer possible effectively to aspire
to supernatural beatitude by a direct and nonmediated collaboration with divine
grace. But if “mediated”, then the first creature would, perforce, have lost
his singular post in creation and in the divine plan. What had, a priori, been
a possible object of will, … had become the impossible dream of a mere velleity.
It was in the savoring of these two that the devil made his choice: “If I can’t
have the one, I won’t take the other!” A mere velleity was the tag on the
“conversion” to the positive good, he would have wanted, were it possible!
Milton, the blind poet, had better insight than Thomas on this point, perhaps
having had closer existential encounters with evil. In Paradise Lost Satan,
having fallen into the abyss, defiantly exclaims and reveals his true intent:
“Is
… this the seat …
That
we must change for Heaven? – this mournful gloom For that celestial light? Be
it so, since he
Who
now is sovereign can dispose and bid What shall be right:100 farthest from him
is best101
Whom
reason hath equalled,102 force hath made supreme Above his equals.103 Farewell,
happy fields,
Where
joy for ever dwells! Hail, horrors!104 hail, Infernal world! and thou,
profoundest Hell, Receive thy new possessor–one who brings A mind not to be
changed by place or time.
The
mind is its own place,105 and in itself
Can
make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.
What
matter where, if I be still the same,
And
what I should be, all but less than he
Whom
thunder hath made greater? Here at least
We
shall be free; th’Almighty hath not built
Here
for his envy, will not drive us hence:
Here
we may reign secure; and, in my choice,
To
reign is worth ambition, though in Hell:
Better
to reign in Hell106 than serve in Heaven.107
“Better to reign in Hell than serve in
Heaven”, this is the bitterness and “joy” of aversion: to stand unbeaten; to flaunt
the Most High; to “know” his own truth – “he stood not in the truth, because
truth is not in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own: for he is a
liar, and the father thereof” – (Jn 8:44), confident that he can foil God’s
plan: “He was a murderer from the beginning” (Jn 8:44).108
Without
orchestrating the climactic rebellious choice in the light of the Incarnation,
Thomas finally did come to understand how the devil could make an everlasting
choice about a final goal knowing full well that he could never be truly happy
in it. Only a perverse happiness would remain his lot. Again from Milton: the
Archfiend exhorts his fallen cherub companion:
Fallen
Cherub, to be weak is miserable,
Doing
or suffering: but of this be sure–
To
do aught good never will be our task,
But
ever to do ill our sole delight,
As
being the contrary to his high will
Whom
we resist. If then his providence
Out
of our evil seek to bring forth good,
Our
labour must be to pervert that end,
And
out of good still to find means of evil;
Which
oft times may succeed so as perhaps
Shall
grieve him, if I fail not, and disturb
His
inmost counsels from their destined aim.109
Thomas
expresses this knowledge in the 5th sed contra to De Malo q. 16, a. 3. In the
process he draws a double distinction: first, with respect to the final end;
and secondly, with respect to the natural object and their possible division in
the spirit.
Things
indivisible by nature are sometimes divisible by the will and reason. And so
nothing prevents a person desiring something (e.g., to be free of miseries)
that results in the person’s nonexistence, although such a person does not
desire not to exist. Therefore, it likewise seems that nothing prevents the
devil’s having desired equality with God although the consequence of this is
for the devil himself not to exist.
The
two points coalesce in one reality here. To escape a fire in a burning
building, one might leap out the window, even though one is on the 20th story.
Now that’s one, single leap! But in the mind and the will it can be separated
into “fire escape” and “death leap”. The latter, of course, is evil. Still, the
mind can separate the two formalities of “departure” and “arrival” such that
one reflect and choose only one portion. Thomas clarifies and refines his
thought further in his response:
When
one wishes something to be taken away from oneself, one constitutes oneself as
the starting point [“termino a quo”], which does not need to be preserved in
the process, and so one can desire not to exist so as to be free of miseries.
But when one desires a good for oneself, one constitutes oneself as the end
point [“termino ad quem”], and such a terminus needs to be preserved in the
process. And so one cannot desire for oneself a good, the possession of which
would result in the person’s not existing.110
Every
moral action is like a coin: it has two sides, heads and tails; they are
inseparably part of one coin, but formally distinct. Let us call heads, the
positive conversion to some real or apparent good, a “terminus ad quem”; and
tails, the aversion from some opposing evil, a “terminus a quo”. The pursuit of
a positive goal (“terminus ad quem”), as Thomas had always maintained, must be
attainable. However, a choice motivated by aversion to some evil can be taken
without reference to the real possibility of actually attaining a positive
goal; escape from the hated evil is sufficient ground to make a choice based on
aversion. The reason for this, as Thomas shows, is because in flight one
subjectively is removing oneself from the evil. And this undertaking will be
also a success, even if it is by death. The man who leaped from the window did
escape the fire. And the devil who leapt down to the fires of hell did
subjectively escape the evil of the divine rule.
This
is a quantum leap forward in Thomas’ thought and the solution to his dilemma.
Because he had always focused on the positive goal, he had always been stumped
by the necessity that it be truly possible. Given the perfection of the angelic
intellect, there could, of course, be no mistakes on their part in this regard.
But now that he has finally grasped Dionysius’ affirmation, that aversion from
the divine rule was the only possible moral evil in the evil spirits, the
impossible suddenly becomes possible. That is to say, a mere velleity –
directed to an impossible supernatural good – was a sufficient heads to the
coin toss of demonic fate, since they chose tails! That is to say, the velleity
was not their choice, but it served to derail their attention, to focus it only
on their loss of honor, in the light of which they chose to say, “Non
serviam!”.
We
are acquainted with the phenomenon on every side: it is the rationale in
suicide. It is an effective escape from some evil. And it is the mentality of a
pouting brat: “If I can’t play by my rules, then I won’t play at all!”
3.
Curtain Time
The
stage has gone quiet; the curtains have fallen. Yes, it was curtains for the
bad guys! The chips (the dice, the cards, the coins) have fallen where they
may! Curiously, like 30 coins strewn into the temple, they lie face down, tails
up, … a plunge of despairs into the depths. All that was and could have been!
Saul, jealous of his place, envied David and fell on his own sword; Jonathan,
like a disciple of an earlier Michael, bowed to the divine plan, rejoiced at
David’s anointing and elevation above him. He would have been happy to serve as
David’s first minister. Oh Jonathan, a worthy go before “patron saint” to a
later John, also a friend of the bridegroom, glad to hear his voice, glad to
confess that he was not the Christ. Yes, we know the storyline.
Thomas,
like a fiddler, visited the dramatic scene of the crime five times, seeking to
pluck, note by note, a theme song gone wrong.
First
try (Sentence Commentary): a disciple of Lombard, he held that the bad guy
suffered an incurable bout of the capital sin of pride, wanting to exalt and
conserve his position of excellence in the created universe.
Second
try: discoursing to nonbelievers (Contra Gentiles), he maintains his course:
the bad guys, seeking to really gain something good, sought to disregard the
guidelines of the manufacturer (= Creator).
Third
try: along comes Dionysius affirming, “aversion is the bad guys’ evil”. Thomas:
“Been there, heard it before, …” It’s really Greek to Thomas. Having already
been working with “conversio” and “aversio”, since it was ABC’s for Lombard as
well, Thomas, consequently, only imperfectly assimilates Dionysius’ deepest
point: aversion is the whole package, not the down side of it. Still, Thomas is
evidently intrigued that one can speak of the fall of the bad guys without
using the word “pride”.111
Fourth
try (Summa Theologiae): Thomas is trying to crack a hard nut; he replaces the
capital sin of pride with a “pride” more closely in tune with Dionysius, but
still stumbles on an impossible discordant chord: he is still trying to
prove/discover the positive good the bad guys positively sought to attain. “It
couldn’t have been a velleity, that doesn’t rhyme.”
Fifth
try (De Substantiis Separatis): a bittersweet success: he demonstrates the
failure (impossibility) to find a positive good the devil sought to achieve,
because he couldn’t have one. Perhaps too humble to acknowledge the truth of
his find or too much in the dark to know where to take this light, the work is
chopped off, an uncompleted puzzle.
Sixth
Try (De Malo): Thomas buys in more deeply to Dionysius’ take on aversion.
Velleities beaten back and dispersed, still hover about. A tautological truth
had never been articulated: every sin committed against the final cause for any
reasons, must – in this precise sense –ultimately fail: the good desired cannot
be possibly achieved. The “good” that could be achieved is achieved only
through the alchemy of equivocation: “Evil, be thou my good!”112 So great is
its power, that velleities (morose thoughts about what might have been), though
they cannot be willed in and for themselves, precipitate by instigation not
themselves but rather a bitter rebellion against an author’s script which had
rendered them impossible. That is to say, the “velleitous” reverie on an
impossible dream (“finis ad quem”) can set the stage for the free creature’s
tragic, self-chosen demise:
When
all is done, divinity is best;
Jerome’s
Bible, Faustus, view it well.
“Stipendium
peccati, mors est.” Ha! Stipendium &c:
The
reward of sin is death? That’s hard.
Si
peccasses, negamus, fallimur, et nulla est in nobis veritas.
If
we say that we have no sin
We
deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us.
Why
then belike we must sin,
And
so consequently die.
Ay,
we must die, an everlasting death.
love
for themselves was already consummated in an orderly fashion.
What
doctrine call you this: Che sera, sera,
What
will be, shall be? Divinity, adieu.
These
metaphysics of magicians,
And
necromantic books are heavenly;
Lines,
circles, letters, characters.
Ay,
these are those that Faustus most desires.
…
A sound magician is a demigod. Here, tire my brains to get a Deity.113
And
so the world began with the holy joy of the blessed angels and the
Schadenfreude of the demons.
VII. Epilogue
The
play is over, … the chips (now cards) lie there uncovered before, but now less
like coins or cards; nay, rather they are like so many pieces striving to form
a puzzle. And the puzzle is still incomplete. At the hand of Thomas, we now
know h o w the devils flung their cards down; we know that they rebelled
against the rules of the game and refused to play.
Has
Thomas played his cards so close to the breast, that we cannot even catch a
glimpse of the actual rule, the stumbling block that materially precipitated
such a falling out? But first, has God kept it such a complete secret?
Following Augustine, Thomas taught that the angels knew about the Incarnation
from the beginning of their life in faith, that is during the trial. Thomas
himself taught rather emphatically that each and every grace of the angels was
Christological in nature. And so, though he never himself formalized these
reflections into the affirmation: the trial of the angels was based upon the
Mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God in order to recapitulate all
things in Christ, we may wonder if in his silent way, Thomas beckons us: “Read
my lips”!
To
this I add four further cards/pieces of the puzzle, which Thomas has tucked up
his sleeve, which indicate how he perceives our union with the angels,
particularly in the light of their sacred ministry in complementation to the
sacred ministry and hierarchy of the Church. They are texts which may suggest
what Thomas had in his heart, but did not openly express on parchment.
1.
Angels, ministers of Christ’s Priesthood
Hierarchical
power appertains to the angels, inasmuch as they also are between God and man,
as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. IX), … Now Christ was greater than the
angels, not only in His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as having the
fullness of grace and glory. Wherefore also He had the hierarchical or priestly
power in a higher degree than the angels, so that even the angels were
ministers of His priesthood.114
The
angelic ministries are a share in the priestly, ministerial power of Christ.
2.
Formal principle of the angelic and priestly ministries
[Holy]
Orders in the angels is not based on the distinction of nature, except in an
accidental way, namely insofar as the distinction of their grace followed upon
the distinction in nature. Per se, their orders are based on the distinction of
grace, for their orders regard the participation of divine things and their
communication in the state of glory, which is according to the measure of
grace, as the end and effect of grace as it were.
But
[holy] Orders in the militant Church regard the participation and communication
of the sacraments, which are causes of grace, which therefore precede grace in
a certain respect. Hence, sanctifying grace is not necessary for our orders,
but only the power of dispensing the sacraments. And for this reason too [holy]
orders [in the church] are not based on the distinction of sanctify grace, but
upon the distinction of power.115
The
angels’ ministerial powers, “orders”, are their Light of Glory, a
Christological grace they merited in their trial! It is essentially superior to
the “holy orders” which men exercise only in virtue of the priestly character –
distinct from grace and glory – imprinted on their souls.
3.
Mode of the operation of the angelic ministry
Comparing
the priestly sacramental ministry to the angelic ministry, Thomas affirms:
What men do in a less perfect manner,
i.e. by sensible sacraments, which are proportionate to their nature, angels
also do, as ministers of a higher degree, in a more perfect manner, i.e.
invisibly — by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting.116
Equal
effects, by higher ministers in a superior manner! Yes, Thomas used
“purification”, “illumination” and “perfection” to discuss and describe the
efficacy of the sacraments.
4.
The union of the angelical and ecclesial hierarchies in Heaven
According
to Dionysius, just as our hierarchy or Church stands to the celestial
[hierarchy], even so stood the hierarchy of the Old Law to ours. Consequently,
just as the old hierarchy was underway to ours and signified it and, because it
signified it, upon the coming of the new the old was assumed into and to its
[holy] orders, even so our hierarchy is underway to the celestial [hierarchy]
and at once a sign of it; hence, in the [eternal] fatherland there will not be
two hierarchies, one of men and another of angels, but one and the same, and
mankind shall be distributed among the orders of the angels.117
The
Angelic Doctor’s vision of the union of men and angels in the grace of Christ
and in the complementarity of ministries far exceeds what is commonly held to
be his position. Since the unity he predicates is based essentially on the
unifying grace of Christ, there seems to follow from this certain pressing
implications also about the material object and formality in the angelic trial,
such that the good angels were beatified in the grace of Christ and the
reprobate spirits’ quintessential mark is their identity as the antichrist.
By
this is the spirit of God known: Every spirit which confesses that Jesus Christ
is come in the flesh is of God. And every spirit that dissolves Jesus is not of
God. And this is Antichrist, of whom you have heard that he cometh: and he is
now already in the world. (1 Jn 4:23)
The
fact that a single rule discerns all spirits, good and bad, tells more than
their current good and bad dispositions, it also indicates the ultimate source
of these dispositions: a “Non serviam” on the one side, and a “Quis ut Deus” on
the other side: each a response to the mystery of Christ proposed in the very
beginning.
1. Cf. De Divinis Nominibus, IV, lect. 19,
§§ 533541 (Marietti, Romae 1950).
2. De Divinis Nominibus, IV, lect. 19, §
537. It is given as a quote from Dionysius by St. Thomas. While treating the
trial of the angels in the Sentence Commentary, Thomas used the word “aversion”
but a single time, and that only to indicate another form of pride, distinct
from the pride he (following Lombard) attributed to the fallen spirits (cf. II
Sent., dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3c).
Dionysius’
statement in one English translation reads: “The evil then, in them, is a
turning aside and a stepping out of things befitting themselves, and a missing
of aim, and imperfection and impotence, and a weakness and departure, and
falling away from the power which preserves their integrity in them” (chap. IV,
section 23). Translation by C. E. Rolt, 1897 (digital publication in Christian
Classics Ethereal Library).
From
the direct presentation of Lombard’s thought above, it is apparent that he too
thought in the categories of “conversio” and “aversio”. St. Thomas even
materially mentions the fact, writing: “After these things reflection leads to
the inquire, what the consequences were, when they were divided by ‘aversio’
and ‘conversio’. Having already shown in what condition the angels were
created, he now shows their difference form one another in terms of ‘aversio’
and ‘conversio’. He divides this in two parts; in the first he discourses on
the aversion of the angels.” (II Super Sent., dist. 5, q. 1pr.). Yet, he
practically sets aside this doctrine, which will later become the corner stone
of his final synthesis.
3. “Conversio” and “aversio” are standard
opposing concepts in moral theology. They play a key role in the present
discussion. The English word “aversion” is a good translation for the Latin
“aversio”. But the basic Latin sense of “conversio” cannot be simply rendered
with our idea of religious “conversion”. “Conversio” means a turning to some
good on the basis of attraction. In this essay, I will often simply use the
Latin term, lest through circumlocutions the evident pairing “conversio” et
“aversio” be lost from sight.
4. II Super Sent., dist. 2, q. 1pr.
5. Cf. II Sententiae, dist. 10, cap. 2,
aa. 2 et 3, where he discusses the ministries and missions of the holy Angels.
6. The dates for the works are taken from
Raymundi Verardo, in: Opuscula Theologica, Vol. I, Marietti, Romae 1954, pp.
xxi. Luigi Bogliolo, Guida alla Ricerca Scientifica e allo Studio di S. Tommaso
(Lateran U. Press, Rome 1967, inserted at p. 128) sets the commentary on De
Divinis Nominibus as contemporaneous with Contra Gentiles IIIV. In point of
fact, in Contra Gentiles, 21 of the 43 express references to Dionysius are
drawn from the De Divinis Nominibus. Still, in Contra Gentiles III, only 6 of
the 21 references are drawn from De Divinis Nominibus, not one of which
addresses the question of the demonic rebellion. Hence, it is reasonable, at
least with respect to the present topic, to follow Verardo’s chronology.
7. Raymundi Verardo is evidently uncertain
about the date to this work, giving a span from 12681273. Jacques Maritaine
gives the date 1269 (in an appendix to: St. Thomas Aquinas, 1958 [digital
edition from Notre Dame University, USA]) adding a year to the 1268 estimate of
I.T. Eschmann, in: A Catalogue of St. Thomas´ Works. Bibliographical Notes,
originally in: E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Random
House, New York 1956, 381439 (Weisheipl, 355), but actually drawn from
Wikipedia.
8. “It is natural for the angel to turn to
God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural
being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude,
comes from infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.” (STh.
I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 4). That they were also created in the
state of grace he holds to be the most probable position (cf. STh. I, q. 62, a.
3; I, q. 62, a. 2).
9. The “history” of the angelic trial and
sin demands, at least, two instants, for the first knowledge and act of will by
the created spirits could not even embrace the entire natural universe, to say
nothing of the order of grace which presupposes the former (STh. I, q. 63, a.
4; De Malo q. 16, a. 4c). Moreover, the first act (operation) of a creature,
deriving from the Creator, must needs have been a positive act of love (STh. I,
q. 63, a. 5c). Hence, minimally, two instants were required: the first
adverting and responding according to nature; and a second, taking in and
responding to the supernatural.
On
the assumption that the angels were created in grace (Thomas’ assumption), the
act of the first instant was already meritorious in all the angels, but
imperfectly so. First, the good action of any creature in the state of grace is
meritorious (cf. II Sententiae, dist. 40,q. 1, a. 1c; De Malo q. 2, a. 5 ad 7),
but since the angels in that first moment could not advert to the supernatural
order and opt for the beatific vision according to the required modality
foreseen in the divine plan, that original, imperfect choice did not suffice
for beatitude but had to be re-iterated in the faith’s knowledge and consent to
the plan. This is the doctrine implicit in St. Thomas’ statement: “God did not
distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the
turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (De Civitate Dei XI, 15).
Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant.
But some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby
destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the
beatitude which they had merited.” (STh. I, q. 63, a. 5 ad 4).
10. STh. I, q. 64, a. 1 ad 4. Dom Benoist
D’Azy interprets the text in this wise: “All the angels knew the Mystery of the
Reign of God, ‘maxime ex quo’ their beatitude. The ‘maxime ex quo’ should not
be translated ‘especially because of’ but rather ‘especially since’.
Accordingly, they knew about it already beforehand.” (Le Christ et ses Anges
dans l’œuvre de Saint Thomas, (in: Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 49
(1949) Toulouse, avriljuin. p. 9 fnt. 16), (cf. also, STh. I, q. 57, a. 5c et
ad 1).
In
STh. I, q. 57, a. 5c et ad 1) he is only willing to speak of the natural and
beatific knowledge of the angels (while ignoring completely the knowledge of faith),and
so interprets Augustine’s statement into a comment on the beatific knowledge of
the good angels. By contrast, in STh. I, q. 64, a. 1 ad 4 he presents the
Christological knowledge of the angels according to f a i t h and to glory and
to supernatural wisdom. All the spirits had the first kind of knowledge at the
beginning. And he refers this again to the mentioned passage in Augustine.
11. Expositio Super Isaiam, cap. 63,1ff;
line 1024. After tossing back and forth somewhat divergent positions from the
biblical gloss to Ephesians 3 and Dionysius, who understands the question to be
posed by the highest angels, not by the least, St. Thomas draws, at a minimum,
the conclusion: “The highest angels knew these sort of mysteries with respect
to the substance of the fact, nevertheless with regards to particular
circumstances they were not perfectly in the know.” The knowledge of the higher
angels regarding the economy of salvation, though was shared with the lower angels
as well, for this belongs to the very nature of the angelic hierarchies. While
with respect to some bits of information, a postponement in communication might
be argued, in the key and cornerstone of the entire economy of salvation, such
a delay is scarcely conceivable.
12. Dom Benoist D’Azy, loc. cit., p. 9. In
a subsequent article, Les anges devant le Mystère de lIncarnation, he repeats
his conclusion: “The Angelic Doctor held that Christ was revealed to the angels
during their trial as their Consummator in glory and as the Redeemer of
mankind” (in: Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 49 (1949) Toulouse,
juilletseptembre, p. 141). Francesco Suarez SJ comes to basically the same
conclusion: “Nevertheless I judge it to be much more probable that all the
angels in the state of pilgrimage knew about the Incarnation of the Word of God
by means of revelation, and so knew it by faith. This the divine Thomas STh. I.
q. 64, a. 1 ad 4 “It is to be said that the mystery of God, which is complete
through Christ, etc. … Where he says ‘maxime’, etc. he has declared with
sufficient clarity in the prior words that he is talking about all the angels,
all of whom were in the state of pilgrimage.” (De Angelis, Lugduni 1630, lib.
cap. 6, p. 405 § 9).
13. St. Thomas clearly attributes the
graces of the Angels to Christ, not only in terms of finality but also in terms
of efficient, instrumental causality (see my essay, The Relationship of the
Grace of the Angels to Christ in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, in:
Sapientia
Crucis 4 [2003], 113163). But even then, he does not affirm the mystery of the
Incarnation to have been the formal object of their trial. There is no
necessary and intrinsic cognitive link between an instrumental cause and the
beneficiaries of its efficacy. An individual could evidently receive an
inheritance without any prior knowledge or love of the benefactor.
14. Cf. STh. I, q. 63, a. 1c: “But every
created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to
the divine will, to which the last end is to be referred”. Again: “In another
way sin comes of freewill by choosing something good in itself, but not
according to proper measure or rule” (STh. I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 4).
15. In Super Isaiam, Thomas focuses his
literal exegesis on the historical king of Babylon. Only in passing and without
having drawn any link to Christ, does he note: “All this is exposed mystically
[anagogically] of the devil.” In STh. I, q. 63, a. 5 he calls reference to the
devil “metaphorical”, literally, “sub figura principis Babylonis”.
16. Thomas understands Ez 28 “mystically”
(Super Isaiam, cap. 11) or “metaphorically” (“sub figura” = Prince of Babylon;
“sub persona” = King of Tyre in STh. I, q. 63, a. 5c; cf. I, q. 63, a. 3sc: “ex
persona diaboli”) of the devil, but literally of the King of Tyre). Nowhere is
the mystery of Christ presented as a material cause of the angelic trial. See
also the same position in De Substantiis Separatis, cap. 20.
17. DS 800: “The devil and the other demons
were indeed created naturally good by God, but they became evil by their own
doing.” Cited in the CCC n. 391 as well. See also Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua,
saec. V, (DS 325).
18. The “secret” in the plan could regard,
yes, the Mystery of the Incarnation, … but it could also be predicated of the
mystery of the Cross alone.
19. Pope Leo I., Letter to Flavian, Bishop
of Constantinople, about Eutyches, in: Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils,
edited by Norman P. Tanner SJ, Sheed & Ward, Georgetown University Press
1990, Vol. I. p. 79. The text, as given, is a translation from the more
authoritative Greek of the original Latin Letter, since the Greek text was read
to the Council Fathers at Chalcedon, and some of those formulations found their
way into the decrees of the Council.
20. CCC391-392. The biblical references and
footnote have been inserted directly into the text.
21. II Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 4, n. 5.
22. “So the spiritual and angelic nature
was formed at its foundation according to habit of nature, and yet that form,
which it was afterwards to accept through love of and conversion to its
Creator, it did not have, but it was formless without it.” (II Sententiae,
dist. 2, cap. 5). He takes his cue from Augustine’s statement that creation
began in an unformed state, this being Lombard’s interpretation of De Genesi ad
litt., lib. I, c. 1, n. 2(PL 34, 247; CSEL 28-1, 4).
23. In passing, this phrase becomes
immortalized through Thomas, who applies it toman requiring the supernatural
help of grace, coming through the angels inSTh.I, q. 114,a. 3 ad 3 (obliquely
referred to inCCC350).
24. II Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 4, n. 5.
His affirmation, that they did not have the use of virtues must be understood
of the supernatural virtues in harmony with the following statement, namely
that they had not yet been infused. For in the pure spirits, the natural virtues
are not acquired by repetition, they are simply possessed with nature.
25. In II Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 5 he
affirms that at their creation the spirits only had natural knowledge and in II
Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 6, natural love. For this reason, their good actions
did not merit heaven. The good choice for God would be an act of supernatural faith
and charity, to be immediately (in the next instant) rewarded with eternal
glory.
26. II Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 4, n. 10.
At this juncture Lombard presents Jesus’ affirmation that the devil was a liar
and a murderer from the beginning (Jn8:44). Had he treated it as the
Christological focal point of the trial, we would have to present it, ... but
presents it as a posterior ramification of the original rebellion (II
Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 4, n. 11).
27. II Sententiae, dist. 5, cap. 1.
28. If “mother”, then prior in the order of
causality. Thomas will not buy this; indeed, he holds the opposite to be true.
However, this oft repeated thesis can gain credibility when the parameters of
reflection go beyond sinful choices and also take in velleities, which Thomas
rightly affirms do not constitute a moral decision in themselves. Still, they
can be the “background music” against which choices are made. While not
“causing” the actual choice, they can exercise persuasive sway. “No, you shall
not die the death. Rather, God knows …” (Gn 3:45) did not efficiently cause
Eve’s rebellion, but it certainly did persuasively influence and prepare its
way. “He who hesitates is lost” has a special application in trials where
velleities play their part, since they tend to focus the intellect and will on
the wrong point, such that one can defect from the right rule of conduct.
29. II Sententiae, dist. 5, cc. 34.
30. II Sententiae, dist. 5, cap. 5 n. 3.
“However that it [grace] was not given to the others, was their fault, because,
when they could stand, they did not want to, as long as
31. II Sententiae, dist. 6, cap. 12.
32. Sententiae, Editions S. Bonaventurae Ad
Claras Aquas Grottaferrata (Romae) 1971 [digital edition] lib. II, dist. 1,
cap. 6, n. 4. (http://www.franciscanarchive.org/lombardus/opera/ls201.html ).
The final verse in Latin reads: “utriusque regulam imponens obedientiae,
quatenus et illi ab eo ubi erant, non caderent, et isti ab eo ubi erant, ad id
ubi non erant, ascenderent”. The FransciscanArchives falsely translated this
as: “imposing a rule of obedience for each, to the extent that both the former
from that where they were, would not fall down, and these latter from that
where they were, would not ascend to that where they were not”. The
translation, in italics, has been emended to correspond to the Latin text.
33. This is interesting in view of
Lombard’s (ca. 1100 –1160) probable source for the position here affirmed,
namely, Gottschalk von Limburg’s (d. 1098) sequence on the Blessed Mother and
the Incarnation, which contains the verse: “Angelus ne cadat, homo / lapsus
hinc ut redeat / temptator nec resurgat”. [That the angel not fall; that fallen
man return; that the tempter not rise.] Interestingly, these are given as
finalities of the Incarnation.
Neither
does he specify the Incarnation to be the trial of the angels, but he does
affirmit to have been the confirming cause of their final grace. Lombard is silent
on this lattermatter. (Cf. Alois Winkelhofer, Angelus ne
cadat, in:Archiv für LiturgiewissenschaftVI/1 (1959), 58-59).
34. II Sententiae, dist. 2, cap. 4. n. 2.
35. II Sententiae. dist. 2, cap. 6.
36. II Sententiae, dist. 6, cap. 1
37. “In this beatitude of the divine vision
which is owed to the angels naturally, the angels were created ... But there is
another perfection into which they cannot arrive by nature, of which they are
nevertheless capable: namely that they behold God in his essence, not by means
of any received similitude, such that their beatitude be conformed to the
divine beatitude. Now they were not created in this beatitude, but – while
others fell [into sin] – they arrived at it.” (II Super Sent., dist. 4, q. 1 a.
1c). Already in the Prooemium to this distinction he reiterated Lombard’s
“naturalistic” position (II Super Sent., dist. 4, q. 1pr.). In II Super Sent.,
dist. 4, q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 Thomas interprets St. Augustine’s statement (text to
footnote 20) of a natural state (cf. also, ad 2, holding the same position).
38. II Super Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3c.
Moreover, this position, he says, is the position of the saints. In the Summa
Theologiae Thomas will continue to hold the same position (cf., STh. I, q. 62,
a. 3).
39. II Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 4, n. 5
(cited above, footenote 24).
40. STh. I, q. 62, a. 4c.
41. II Super Sent. d. 5 q.1 a. 3c.
42. Cf. STh. I, q. 63, a. 1c.
43. CG III, q. 109 n. 1: “However, that
there is sin of the will in demons is obvious from the text of Sacred
Scripture. In fact, it is said in 1 Jn (3:8) that ‘the devil sins from the
beginning’; and in John (8:44) it is said that ‘the devil is a liar and the
father of lies’ and that ‘he was a murderer from the beginning’. And in Wisdom
(2:24) it is said that “by the envy of the devil, death came into the world”.
44. Cf. CG III, q. 109 n. 4.
45. Order and hierarchy are practically
prime assumptions of the Medieval world view. Aquinas’ deeper assumption, as
Joseph Pieper notes with such acumen in The Silence of St. Thomas, is the fact
of creation, which gives ground to all goodness, truth, order and hierarchy
among creatures, standing together, as they do, in a relationship of dependence
upon God, first cause and final end. [Regnery Logos Editions, Chicago 21965,
47; original title: Über Thomas von Aquin – Philosophia Negativa, Kösel Verlag,
München].
46. CG III, q. 109, n. 5.
47. CG III, q. 109, n. 7: “But in any other
kind of volitional agent, whose proper good must be included under the order of
another good, it is possible for sin of the will to occur, if it be considered
in its own nature.”
48. CG III, q. 109, n. 7.
49. CG III, q. 109, n. 8.
50. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, transl.
C.E. Rolt 1897 (digital edition), ch. IV, sect. 18.
51. St. Thomas refers nominally to St.
Augustine well over 11,000 times in his works. Dionysius, notwithstanding the
parcity of his writing and narrower scope of topics, is cited over 2,200 times.
Before him in importance in theological matters come St. John Chrysostomus and
St. Gregory. We leave it up to the reader to rank Lombard and Aristotle, whose
works Thomas commented upon at length.
52. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, § 533.
53. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, § 534.
54. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, § 537.
55. It is practically necessary to include
the Latin here, due to an equivocation contained in the usage of “excessus”,
which will be explained subsequently: “Sic igitur voluntas Daemonum, aversa a
regula divinae voluntatis, magis debito in appetitum sui boni tendit; et hoc
est quod subdit: e t c o n v e n i e n t i u m i p s i s e x c e s s u s ; quia
scilicet appetiverunt sibi aliquid quod excedebat conditionem eorum.”
56. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, § 537.
57. St. Thomas used the translation by John
Sarracenus (done about 1233), critically comparing it at times with the
translation of Scotus Eriugena (cf. Petrus Caramello, De Fortuna Operum
Dionysii, Introduction to: S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Librum Beati Dionysii de
Divinis nominibus, expositio, Marietti, Romae 1950, p. xxii).
58. Cited from: S. Thomae Aquinatis, In
Librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis nominibus, expositio, Marietti, Romae 1950,
cap. IV, lect. 19, nn. 219.220, p. 194. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. IV,
sect. 23. Translation by John Parker, James Parker and Co., Oxford 1897.
59. The BAC edition, translated by Teodoro
H. Martin (Madrid 1990, p. 317) reads: “La depravación pues, es el mal para
ellos; la ausencia y abandono de aquellas cosas que les son connaturales. Es
privación, imperfección, impotencia. Es debilitamiento, caída, ausencia de la facultad
que los conservaria perfectos.” Maurice de Gandillac (Aubier, Paris, 1941): “Le
mal qui est en eux, c’est une déviation, un abandon des biens qui leur
conviennent, un insuccès, une imperfection, une défaillance, un affaiblissement
de la puissance qui conservait leur perfection, un fauxpas et une chute.”
60. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, Text of Dionysius, § 220, p. 194.
61. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, § 538.
62. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, § 541.
63. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect.
19, § 541.
64. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. IV,
sect. 23. Translation by John Parker.
65. STh. I, q. 63, a. 1c.
66. STh. I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 4.
67. STh. I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 3: “It is
natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God
is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object
of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned
away by sinning.”
68. STh. I, q. 63, a. 2c.
69. STh. I, q. 63, a. 3, sc.
70. STh. I, q. 63, a. 3c.
71. STh. I, q. 63, a. 3c.
72. STh. III, q. 13, a. 5c.
73. STh. III, q.13, a. 5, ad 1.
74. STh. I, q. 62, a. 1c.
75. De Substantiiis Separatis, prooemium, §
42 (in Marietti edition, Italy 1954).
76. De Substantiiis Separatis, cap. 17, §
144. (N.B., the chapter numbering in the digital edition of the works of Thomas
from Navarre University deviates from the Marietti edition; I follow the
Marietti numbering, which also includes paragraph numbers, lacking in the
digital edition.)
77. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opuscula
Philosophica, Marietti 1954, p. 58.
78. Ibid., p. 59. cf. Daniel Gallagher, The
PlatonicAristotelian Hybridity of Aquinas’ Aesthetic Theory, in: Hortulus. The
Online Graduate Journal of Medieval Studies, Vol. 2, n. 1, May 2006.
79. De Substantiis Separatis, cap. 19, §
161. Especially in fine where he refers to 1 Cor 8:1.
80. De Substantiis Separatis, cap. 19, §
108, transl. Francis J. Lescoe, 1959 (§ 165 in Marietti).
81. De Substantiis Separatis, cap. 19, §§
111112 (§§ 169170 in Marietti).
82. It is interesting and surely no mere
chance how many of Jesus’ words are simultaneously an answer to archetypal
questions and reproaches coming from the spirit world. Moreover, this was the
problem with the texts from Isaiah 14 and Ezechiel 28: disengaging the epic
metaphors from the flesh, so that only the spiritual propensities of pure
spirits remains.
83. W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene
1.
84. This was a key in the trial of Eve; the
Enemy had to remove the fear of death from the heart of Eve so that she more
easily dare scorn God.
85. I think that it is safe to assert that
this is a very conscious affirmation on the part of St. Thomas. Public
disputations were practically a regulated “free for all”. Any question or
objection could be raised on the proposed topic. After the public disputation
the Master had but a few days to reduce his note to a text that had to be
published. I find it practically inconceivable that the “pride” (superbia) went
practically unheard throughout the discussion. May we not perceive the
editorial hand of Thomas, the editor, at work behind this conspicuous silence?
86. De Malo q. 16, a. 3c: “And his evil
could not have consisted of anything else belonging to the order of nature. For
only things in which potentiality can be distinguished from actuality, not
things that are always actual, can have evil, as the Metaphysics says. But all
angels were instituted such that they immediately at the moment of their
creation had everything proper to their nature, although they had potentiality
for supernatural goods that they could obtain through God’s grace. And so we
conclude that the devil’s sin regarded something supernatural, not something
belonging to the order of nature.” (transl. Richard Regan, Oxford University
Press 2003).
87. De Malo q. 2, a. 1c.
88. De Malo q. 16, a. 3c.
89. De Malo q. 16, a. 3c.
90. Francisco de Suarez will spill
intolerable quantities of ink to p r o v e that the devil sinned by desiring
the Hypostatic Union for himself, after having acknowledged that the devil
would have known it to mean his own nonexistence as a person (De Angelis, V.
cap. 8ff).
91. De Malo q. 16, a. 3c: “And by like
argument, he could not have desired not to be absolutely subject to God, both
because this is impossible, and he could not understand it to be possible, as
the foregoing makes clear, and because he himself would cease to exist if he
were not completely subject to God.”
92. De Malo q. 16, a. 3c.
93. Note that in contradistinction to STh.
I, q. 63, a. 3c St. Thomas does not now include a wish for natural beatitude as
a possible motive for the angelic sin.
94. Joannes a S. Thoma, Commentarium in
Summam Theologiae. De Angelis in I. Partem, qq. 5963, Marietti, Romae 1951,
disp. 43.
95. M. D. Molinie: “Car il a en même temps
[à côté de l’oblation de soi même en grace à Dieu] une autre possibilité, celle
que constitue précisément la tentation, adopter un faux dieu dans un mouvement
qui, de toute façon (narcissisme ou idolâtrie), lui permettra de se donner un
importance divine, évidemment mensongère (il le sait), mais pratiquement vraie
pour son affectivité.”, in: L’Épreuve de la Foi et la Chute Originelle. Polycopy
edition, Nancy (France), pp. 5960.
96. Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus,
Scene III, lines 7478.
97. They knew this, yes, with the certitude
of faith, but also knew by nature that such a divine gift is possible.
98. I limit reflection to the devil alone,
but the argument analogically follows for all the spirits.
99. De Malo q. 16, a. 2 ad 4.
100.
This
phrase is a great equivocation. It’s like this: “Since God reigns in heaven, He
can make the rule there; but since I reign here below, I will make the rule!”
And the gloating is over t h i s equality with God.
101.
Aversion!
102.
He
has become like God, knowing (determining for himself) “good” and “evil”.
103.
By
his choice he remains supreme among the rebels. By implication he would have
lost this first place by complying to the divine rule.
104.
The
evil spirits had no illusion about achieving true happiness through their
decision.
105.
The
frightening logic of philosophical idealism, which also “knows” good and evil.
106.
Cf.,
De Malo q. 16, a. 3 sc. 7: “Isidore says in his work On the Supreme Good that
the devil sinned in that he wanted his power to be preserved by himself and not
by God. But preserving creatures and not being preserved by anything higher
belongs to God. Therefore, the devil wanted what belongs to God and so to be
equal to God.”
107.
John
Milton, Paradise Lost, book I, lines 244263.
108.
This
text is commonly interpreted with respect to Original Sin. This is true, but
only as a calculated step in the implementation of the more ultimate design
against the Incarnate Word. By both nature and grace the devil knew that God
would respect the laws he had imbued into creation; according to these “rules
of the game” the devil gave himself a prognosis of victory, he would defeat the
Plan of God.
109.
John
Milton, Paradise Lost, book I, lines 157168.
110.
De
Malo q. 16, a. 3 ad 5sc.
111.
The
capital sin of pride should have been excluded a priori given that fact,
already known to Thomas, that the angels were created in a state of natural
beatitude. Their natural love for themselves was already consummated in an
orderly fashion.
112.
John
Milton, Paradise Lost, book IV, lines 106111: “So farewell, hope; and with hope
farewell, fear; farewell, remorse! all good to me is lost; evil, be thou my
good; by thee at least Divided empire with Heaven’s King I hold, by thee, and
more than half perhaps will reign; as Man ere long, and this new world, shall
know.”
113.
Christopher
Marlowe, The Tragedy of Dr. Faustus, Act I, Scene 1.
114.
STh.
III, q. 22, a. 1 ad 1.
115.
IV Super Sent., dist. 24, q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1 ad
3. Thomas maintains this doctrine in the Summa Theologiae (I q. 108, a. 4c);
the expression here, though, is more pregnant.
116.
STh.
III, q. 64, a.7 ad 1. The priestly ministry exceeds the angels’ in this: in the
Sacrifice of the Mass, and in the fact that the angelic ministry does not
normally impress a sacramental character upon the souls as do the sacraments of
Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders.
117.
II
Super Sent., dist. 9, q. 1 a. 8 ad 4. Cf. STh. I, q. 108, a. 1c et 8c, where,
corroborating this opinion, he also appeals to Augustine: “Augustine says (De
Civitate Dei XII, 9), that “there will not be two societies of men and angels,
but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone” “non erunt duae societates hominum et angelorum,
sed una”. “Ordo” is a technical term for St. Thomas and has a threefold,
interconnected meaning: 1) the ministerial power of the angels; 2) the several
choirs of the angels, precisely as a hierarchical gathering of the angelic
ministers; and 3) the designation for the ministry power of the priesthood,
hence, the sacrament of Holy Orders.
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