Conciliarism
and Papacy
Robert
E. McNaixy, S.J.
In the opening decades
of the fifteenth century the Church was in a state of acute constitutional crisis.
Three popes, Gregory XII, Benedict XIII and John XXIII, representing three
obediences, Rome, Avignon and Pisa, created a tricephalic Church which inspired
"that threefold conflict cursed by all." The presence of these multiple
contenders to the papacy, each claiming authentic succession to the throne of
St. Peter, was intolerable; it divided the Church into opposed parties, created
problems of conscience and fragmented her energies. The resulting ambiguity
meant that the universal Church was in effect subsisting without a pope at its
head, that its essential unity was in peril and that, in consequence, the
common good of Christendom was seriously threatened. The Council of Constance
(1414-18) resolved this difficult problem. By removing the three claimants and
by electing (Nov. 11, 1417) Oddo Colonna, who took the name Martin V, it
liquidated the multiple obediences and restored unity to the Church after
almost forty years (1378-1417).1
The nature of the
ecclesiological problem which this council resolved as well as the various
legal means which its periti employed in this task make it unique in conciliar
history. In view of the grave disunity in the papacy (and, in Christendom
generally) it is not surprising that conciliarism in one form or another
entered into the theological perspective of this council; for its ultimate
purpose, the restoration of unity to the Holy See, could not be achieved
without in some way reformulating the character of the relation of pope to council,
and acting with determination on this formulation. This is what the Council of
Constance accomplished, and it is from this accomplishment that its theological
and canonical problematic stems. If Gregory VII in his day saved the papacy
from the empire, Constance may be said to have saved the Church from the
papacy, and at the same time it saved the papacy from itself. The precise
evaluation of its efforts in this direction constitutes an important task for historical
theology; a thorough exploration of all the dimensions of the problem exceeds
the scope of this short paper which proposes to elucidate some conciliar
implications contained in the celebrated decree Haec sancta (April 6, 1415) of
the Council of Constance.2
The history of the
Great Western Schism (1378-1417) is a prolegomenon to understanding the Council
of Constance.3 It provided the
historical context out of which the council and its dramatic decisions
ultimately emerged. The schism which divided the Church at a crucial moment in
her history was rooted in an unfortunate historical episode—the tragic conclave
which elected Bartolomeo Prignano as Urban VI on April 8, 1378. More precisely
the schism arose from a combination of complicated factors and their interplay:
1) the definitive transference of the papacy from Avignon to Rome by Gregory
XI, Urban's immediate predecessor; 2) the highly tense atmosphere which
surrounded the conclave on the night of April 7-8, 1378; 3) the unreasonable,
uncompromising, unbalanced personality of Urban VI face to face with the curial
cardinals; and 4) the general dissatisfaction of the French cardinals with this
unmanageable Italian pope.
Whether the election of
Urban VI was invalid by reason of the grave fear which the cardinals
experienced in that tumultuous conclave remains uncertain.4 Publicly, solemnly and freely they recognized him
at his coronation on Easter Sunday, April 18, 1378. At least on the surface it
seemed that they did; there may, however, have been hidden motivation of another
kind, even inner compulsion. But in the weeks after the conclave it became
apparent that Urban posed a serious threat to the sacred college, to its
privileges and to its prestige that was totally out of harmony with tradition.
The words which Robert of Geneva addressed to Urban epitomize the tension that
existed between pope and cardinals: "Unlike your predecessors, Holy
Father, you do not treat the cardinals with that honor which you owe them. You
are diminishing our authority, but verily I tell you that we will do our best to
diminish yours."5 In the late spring
of 1378 the cardinals gradually deserted the pope in Rome; assembling at Fondi
near Naples, they elected on September 20, 1378 the French cardinal, Robert of
Geneva, who took the name Clement VII and soon departed for Avignon where he
established his papal residence, surrounded himself with his own curia, and solidified
the schism.
As the schism developed
and became inveterate, the direction of ecclesiological study changed from
theory to practice. The double obedience—Rome and Avignon—posed a real problem
in the historical order which demanded more than speculation. Theories of the Church
and her constitution which the decretists and decretalists had been devising
since the late twelfth century were now reconsidered in light of their
pertinence to the contemporary state of the divided papacy.6 Moreover, the progress and solidification of
the schism into well-defined obediences exposed constitutional weaknesses in
the structure of the Church. Because of the fundamental and exclusive authority
of the papacy, the obediences were able to widen, develop and preserve the schism.
Each obedience, convinced of the validity of its claim, maintained its supreme
position, created its own curia, and exercised jurisdiction over a portion of
Christendom, while admitting no higher authority competent to heal or to contain
the expanding schism.
In June 1394 the university
of Paris proposed to the French king three possible methods to solve the
problem which the divided obediences in the Church posed: first, via cessionis,
or the simultaneous resignation of both Boniface IX (1384-1404) of Rome and Clement
VII (1378-94) of Avignon, and the election of a new pope by the cardinals of
the two obediences; second, via compromissi, or the examination of the claims
of Rome and Avignon by an impartial board of arbitration; and, third, via
concilii, or the convocation of an ecumenical council to restore unity to the
divided Church.7 It soon became
apparent that via cessionis and via compromissi could only be effective where
the parties concerned were magnanimous which neither Boniface IX nor Clement
VII (nor his successor Benedict XIII [1394-1423]) really were. Proposals and
counterproposals between the two rivals terminated in frustration. From their
general deportment it was obvious that the schism would not be terminated by
personal initiative—submission to arbitration or submission of resignation—on
the part of either Rome or Avignon.
The intransigency of
the contenders only served to enhance the possibilities inherent in the
solution via concilii, an approach that was favored by the impasse at which the
schism had actually arrived as well as by the most influential theologians of
the day: Pierre d'Ailly for example, Jean Gerson, Heinrich von Langenstein and Conrad
von Gelnhausen. If the papacy could not or would not terminate the schism, then
a general council would be gathered on the authority of the cardinals; and as representative
of the universal Church, it could act with her authority and on her behalf.
This was the intent of the thirteen cardinals of both obediences who convoked a
council to meet at Pisa on March 25, 1409. Their competence to call a general
council in the dire circumstances of 1408-09 could be justified on solid
theological and canonical grounds; and the council, which they called, was
generally recognized by contemporaries as legitimate.8 Both popes, Benedict XIII and Gregory XII—Benefictus
and Errorius, as they were sarcastically called— were summoned to defend their
positions before the council. Neither appeared.9
On the basis of schism, perjury, scandal and heresy both were deposed in the
fifteenth session (June 5, 1409) from the papal office. Neither, however, was moved
by these dire proceedings. Both continued to maintain their papal positions. On
June 26 the council elected Cardinal Peter Philargi as Alexander V (1409-10). Thus
the sacred college which thirty-one years earlier had initiated the schism, now
augmented it by creating the tricephalic Church.10
But the initiative
which the cardinals had taken at Pisa foreshadowed a new stage of development.
Recognizing their official responsibility, they had summoned an ecumenical
council as the legal authority for resolving the Great Schism. This action was
without parallel in conciliar history. The questions of the right of the pope alone
to convoke a council, of the incompetence of a council to judge a pope save in
the case of heresy, and of the legitimacy of either Gregory or Benedict were
secondary.11 The
atmosphere of the time was charged with the conviction that tradition and law
must yield to expediency and equity, that the cardinals in the concrete emergency
in which the Church was involved were empowered to act on behalf of the common
good of Christendom, that at all events the scandalous schism must be terminated
and the Church saved by the restoration of papal unity. The papacy had
demonstrated that it was incapable of ending the schism, while the cardinals at
Pisa had only made a bad situation worse. After the council the ecclesiastical scene
became ominous, especially with the election in 1410 of Baldassare Cossa as
John XXIII, a man utterly incapable of inspiring the confidence and assurance
that Pisa, as a council of unity, required to extinguish the schism.12
The tricephalic Church
born at Pisa only underlined more vividly the intensity of the constitutional
crisis in which the papacy was involved. The scandal of three popes contending
for recognition and leadership in Christendom gave urgency to the task of
finding an effective remedy for the sickness which was infecting the Church as
a whole. Despite the failure of the Pisan council the conviction was still
strong that unity could only be secured by the convocation of a general
council. This approach to the problem generally found favor among the
theologians and the canonists of the day. For two centuries the structure of
the Church had been studied from the point of view of the council as an ecclesiastical
institution; and various theological and legal concepts had been worked out to
show the relation of pope to council, and both to the Church as a whole. In the
ecclesiological writing of the time there emerges a view of the Church in which
the council is represented as superior in varying degrees to the pope. In the
situation of the second decade of the fifteenth century a council inspired by
the principles of a moderate conciliarism would be able to resolve the schism
by asserting its transcendency as representing the Church over the pope's
supremacy as head of the Church.
The German emperor
Sigismund (1361-1437) was among those who had confidence in the efficacy of a
general council to resolve the problematic of divided Christendom. Accordingly,
in 1413 he persuaded the Pisan pope John XXIII to convoke an ecumenical council
to restore unity and to reform the universal Church. On November 5, 1414 the
great German Council of Constance opened in the cathedral church of that city.
Supported by pope and emperor, by the cardinals of the three obediences, by the
national hierarchies and especially by the universities, it was in a position
to act legitimately on behalf of the whole Church which it represented. Everything
about the opening weeks of the council suggested that if the council could
resolve the schism, it would enjoy the solid support of Christendom in making
its decisions effective and binding.
In the opening months
of 1415 it had become apparent to John XXIII that despite his personal convictions
about the security and legitimacy of his papal title, the council was not going
to support him. From the second session (March 2, 1415), at which he solemnly swore
to abdicate, he was doomed; and, ironically, his doom was being prepared by the
very council which he had personally convoked to secure unity, with the hope,
of course, that as Pisan pope he would be the valid principle on which the
desired unity would rest. By March it was clear that there was no influential
group within the council which would support his position as legitimate pope.
As truly as John's position had grown out of Pisa's resentment of schism, it
would now be liquidated by Constance's desire for unity.
Despite the highly irregular
character of the papacy during the years of the schism, the medieval tradition
was still alive that linked necessarily pope and council. History gave no
precedent of an ecumenical council from which the papacy had alienated itself;
and it was problematic whether such a council could maintain itself. As a last
and desperate resort, therefore, John decided to appeal to this old tradition
by fleeing from Constance, and leaving the council without the support of the
pope who had convoked it. This John did on the night of March 20-21, aware that
he was violating his promise to abdicate, flying in the face of the greater
majority of the council, exposing it to ignominious failure, and threatening to
continue the hated schism. Doubtlessly he would dissolve the council, if the
council did not dissolve itself. The news of John's flight threw Constance into
an emotional uproar that only the persuasive force of Emperor Sigismund was
able to sedate.
The next twelve days at
Constance were to be epoch-making. The pope had defied the council; now the
council would defy the pope. Appraised of John's secret flight and aware of its
meaning, the fathers were called into session (March 26). The decree which they
issued in solemn form is nothing less than a public manifesto of the council's competence
in the Holy Spirit and its independence of papal authority. If de facto it had
come into existence through the authority of pope John, it refused de iure to
be dissolved by that same authority. In this sense it firmly declared:13 1) that it was
duly gathered in the Holy Spirit; 2) that it was rightly convoked and
initiated; 3) that it was not dissolved by the flight of the pope or by any
other prelate's flight, but that it "remains in its integrity and its
authority, even if ordinations to the contrary have been made, or shall be made
in the future"; 4) that the council will only be dissolved when its business—the
perfect extinction of the schism and reform in faith and morals—is finished;
and, 5) that the council will not suffer any transference save by its own
consent. This was the council's first answer to the threat involved in the
pope's flight from Constance and his subversive attempts to subtract the
cardinals from the council. Within the council as representing the Church there
is competence to maintain its legitimacy and its continuity, notwithstanding any
other power on earth.
In the fifth session on
April 6 the council issued the celebrated decree Haec sancta in which for the first
time in the history of the Church a conciliar statement sets forth and defends
the proposition that an ecumenical council is superior to a pope. Because of
the importance of this magisterial decree to the conciliar thought of the Council
of Constance it is worth citing its major provisions:14
In the name of the Holy
and indivisible Trinity; of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Amen. This holy
synod of Constance, forming a general council for the extirpation of the
present schism and the union and reformation, in head and members, of the Church
of God, legitimately assembled in the Holy Ghost, to the praise of Omnipotent
God, in order that it may the more easily, safely, effectively and freely bring
about the union and reformation of the church of God, hereby determines,
decrees, ordains and declares what follows: - It first declares that this same
council, legitimately assembled in the Holy Ghost, forming a general council
and representing the Catholic Church militant, has its power immediately from
Christ, and every one, whatever his state or position, even if it be the Papal
dignity itself, is bound to obey it in all those things which pertain to the
faith and the healing of the said schism, and to the general reformation of the
Church of God, in bead and members. It further declares that any one, whatever
his condition, station or rank, even if it be the Papal, who shall
contumaciously refuse to obey the mandates, decrees, ordinances or instructions
which have been, or shall be issued by this holy council, or by any other
general council, legitimately summoned, which concern, or in any way relate to
the above mentioned objects, shall, unless he repudiate his conduct, be subject
to condign penance and be suitably punished, having recourse, if necessary, to
the other resources of the law.
In order to give the
provisions of this decree a practical structure, the council promulgated
Frequens in the thirty-ninth session (Oct. 9, 1417) which stipulated that another
council be held five years after Constance, a second seven years later, and
finally a general council every ten years.15 If the decree Frequens had remained operative, there
would have been thirteen ecumenical councils between Constance and Trent; and
their impact on ecclesiastical development could have been impressive.
In the twelfth session
(May 29, 1415) John XXIII was deposed canonically for fostering the schism by his
flight, for notorious simony and scandalous life. The Roman pope, Gregory XII,
offered his resignation through proxy, prince Carlo Malatesta of Rimini, at the
fourteenth session (July 4, 1415), after having a bull read which convoked the
council anew. This legal nicety was allowed by the fathers for the sake of
peace, but in no sense to justify the legitimacy of their assembly which derived
immediately from Jesus Christ according to the decree Haec sancta.16 Benedict XIII
was deposed in the thirty-seventh session on July 26, 1417, after being allowed
to convoke the council, if he so wished. Thus, without having passed judgment
on the legitimacy of the three contenders, the council exterminated the Great
Schism, and opened the way to a new unity in the papacy.17
The council contended
that it enjoyed a certain supremacy over the papacy. On this contention it acted
in terminating the schism. No one seriously contested the validity of its
action in deposing John XXIII and Benedict XIII; and after their deposition by
the council their "obediences" soop dried up. With the election of
Oddo Colonna on November 11, 1417 (in a unique conclave whose membership
included the cardinals in curia as well as representatives of the Nations) unity
was again secured for the papacy—one of the principal reasons for which the
council had been originally summoned.18 The preoccupation of the council with the removal of
the papal schism and with the restoration of Church unity is of importance in
evaluating the import of Haec sancta. The whole thrust of the council was to
restore, reform and preserve the papacy. In its thinking the Church was indeed
papal, even though the circumstances of the times may have to the council.
required a certain shift in the relation of the papacy
In the historical
context there was no question at Constance of displacing the papacy from its
traditional place in the Church. The council did not restore the papacy to destroy
it. The papal office was recognized by the fathers as the seat of the one and
only primate of the Western Church, the pope as the successor of St Peter and
the vicar of Christ. The prelates and theologians at Constance were conciliar
in one form or another, mostly moderate conciliansts, but in no sense adherents
of the extreme radical conciliarism of Marsilius of Padua and his anti-papalism,
a school of thought which did not have a decisive influence in the
deliberations of the council. Thus the newly elected Pope Martín V with due
honor and with the agreement of the fathers presided over the final sessions (42-45)
of the council and officially dissolved it on April 22, 1418.
The Council of
Constance opened on November 16, 1414 and closed three and a half years later on
April 22, 1418. In the course of these years it held forty-five public sessions
which handled a wide variety of issues. Only the fifth session on April 6, 1415
in which the decree Haec sancta was promulgated is of direct importance to the
question of conciliarism. Whereas the acceptance of this decree by the council
in which it originated is clear, its relation to the papacy in the person of
Martin V is ambiguous. Before his election Oddo Colonna was a very moderate conciliarist,
more from practical than theoretical considerations. In the atmosphere of the council
it would have been impossible for a papalist pure and simple to have worked
effectively. Though he was not present at the session which approved Haec
sancta (indeed he had fled with John XXIII), he did not oppose the drastic
action that the council took in removing the three principal papal contenders.
At the moment no other course of action seemed possible or feasible, if the
desired papal unity was to be achieved. He would allow for conciliar supremacy,
but only up to a point; the papacy's essential and ordinary function in the
administration of the universal Church must not be in any way diminished or
distorted.19 Later
he spoke in favor of the acceptance of the decree Frequens which implemented
Haec sancta; and later as Martin V he acted in accord with its provisions by summoning
councils to meet at Siena-Pavia (1423-24) and at Basle (1431). Nothing,
however, indicates that Martin V was enthusiastic in his conciliarism.
The questions,
therefore, whether Martin V as pope officially approved the decisions of the Council
of Constance, and whether in consequence Haec sancta enjoys papal confirmation,
have been posed. In the closing session of the council, when the Polish
legation moved the delicate case of the German Dominican Johann von Falkenberg,
the pope replied by way of clarification. The following report of his words is
preserved:20
He wished inviolably to
hold and observe each and every decree in matters of faith (in materiis fidei)
determined and resolved in a conciliar (conciliariter) manner by the present sacred
general council of Constance . . . . And thus the pope approves all that has
been done in a conciliar (conciliariter) manner; and he ratifies all that has
been handled in the council in a conciliar (conciliariter) manner about a matter
of faith. What has been done this way and not in any other way, he approves.
Thus only what
Constance had done conciliariter and in materiis fidei was approved by Martin
V. Traditionally this formula has been used to show that Haec sancta was not
accepted by the Holy See. According to this position Martin V put his approval
only on what was enacted by the council in favor em fidei; but the decree Haec sancta
was not such an enactment; therefore, it was not approved by the pope. It was
further argued. The pope approved what was done conciliariter in the council;
but the decree Haec sancta was not handled conciliariter, because certain
cardinals were absent from the deliberations out of which it grew; and the
violent character of the proceedings of the fifth session shows that it
deliberated tumultuariter, rather than conctliariter. Therefore, it was not
approved by the pope.21 This kind of argumentation which satisfied
generations of theologians has been generally forsaken.
In handling the question
of the binding force of the conciliar decrees Paul DeVooght maintains that
Martin V gave official, though implicit, approbation to the decisions of the
council and, therefore, to Haec sancta.22 Proof of this is the bull Inter cunctas (Feb. 22, 1418)
which contains a questionnaire to determine the orthodoxy of certain suspects,
followers of Wyclif and Hus.23 Here acceptance of the decrees of the Council of Constance
is made a condition for establishing right faith. Among the questions which are
listed in the bull we read:24
Whether he believes
that what the sacred council of Constance, representing the universal Church,
has approved and approves in favor of the faith (in favorem fidei) and for the
salvation of souls, is to be approved and held by all Christians, and that what
it has condemned and condemns as contrary to the faith and to good morals is to
be held, believed and declared condemned.
The obvious sense of
the document is "a profession of faith in the Council of Constance
inasmuch as it is a general council, and in the value of its doctrinal
decisions."25 But the context of the dogmatic questionnaire seems
more preoccupied with the errors of John Hus, John Wyclif and Jerome of Prague
than with an explicit and formal and direct confirmation of the council as a
whole. As Walter Brandmüller puts it: "The sense of the passage is
concerned per se with Hus and Wyclif, only per accidens with the council."26 Further proof
of papal confirmation, derived from the words of Martin V apropos of the
Falkenberg case, is contested because a verbal "confirmation" made in
the course of a heated discussion seems to lack the proper legal formality that
confirmation of an ecumenical council would require; moreover the words of
Martin V on this occasion are ambiguous.
Hans Küng, on the other
hand, takes the more direct position, proposed by Karl A. Fink, that the
Council of Constance received no papal confirmation because an express papal
approbation was not deemed necessary.27 Thus Martin V neither approved nor disapproved of the
decisions of the council. In the context papal approval was irrelevant; the
council openly declared that it derived its authority directly from Jesus
Christ and that, in consequence, it was legitimately convoked and gathered in
the Spirit. This way of regarding its credentials coincided with its
conviction, expressed in Haec sancta, that it was superior to the pope who was
obligated to it in obedience. "Approbation was not necessary, neither was
it asked for by the council."28 Nor does Hans Küng find any evidence of support for
papal approbation in the words spoken by Martin V in the last session of the
council, when the case of Falkenberg was under discussion.29 The authority
of the decree Haec sancta, therefore, must stand or fall on the authority of
the council alone.
The meaning of Haec
sancta is to be sought in the historical circumstances in which it emerged. Of fundamental
importance here is the consideration that Constance as a reform council was
summoned to restore unity to the divided Church by restoring unity to the
divided papacy. In the opening months of its deliberations, the most secure
method of achieving its goal appeared to be the removal of the three contenders
to the papacy and the election of a candidate who would be accepted by the
whole Church. This course of action necessarily involved the resignation of
John XXIII whose legitimacy, based on the generally respected Council of Pisa,
was accepted by a number of members of the council. Threatened by the pope's
unfortunate flight from Constance, an act of defiance which imported
dissolution of the council as well as prolongation of the schism, the fathers
had to act rapidly and decisively. The prospect of the continuation of the
divided obediences in the Church was intolerable to all.
In the highly sensitive
matter of the schism, arbitrary and capricious action was out of the question.
There was need for a reasoned plan and a consensus. Five years earlier the
Council of Pisa had moved with radical decision against Gregory XII and Benedict
XIII, removing both of them on its own initiative and proceeding to the
election of Alexander V. Despite the repute in which this council was held at
the time, the necessity of acting with decisive firmness, and the joy with
which its final decision was received, its attempt to secure papal unity
failed. The council did not have a well-defined method, a firm legal basis and
an accepted principle of action. This need was recognized at the time; and it
well may have been one of the factors to which the subsequent failure of the
council was due.30
The fathers of the
Council of Constance, well acquainted with this aspect of Pisa, were resolved to
provide a solid basis for the incisive action which they contemplated. When,
therefore, the flight of John XXIII menaced its existence, the council's answer
was Haec sancta. This decree, drawn up in great haste and under emotional tension,
was not merely a verbal outpouring of frustration. Rather it was the first
stage in a program that culminated in the deposition of Benedict XIII in the
thirty-seventh session on July 26, 1417. Thus the council's immediate and
direct response to John's precipitous act was not summary deposition but the
deliberate preparation of the fundamental legal steps requisite for the
termination of the schism and the reformation of the Church; and while bearing the
signs of the pressure under which the fathers worked, the decree which the
council adopted against John was in perfect conformity with legal procedure.
Accordingly Haec sancta announces to Christendom the competence of the council
to act in a superior way face to face with the rebellious papacy.
There was no question
of establishing the ecumenical council as the organ of an ecclesiastical parliamentarianism;
the council was not asserting itself as an instrument which would displace the
papacy and the Roman court in the ordinary administration of the Church. Apart
from the fact that such an agreement would have been totally out of harmony
with Catholic tradition, its maintenance would have constituted an impossible
burden; and the constant pressure of conciliar business would have seriously
distracted the bishops from the cura animarum. But further, and more decisive,
is the consideration that the decree Frequens in providing for the future prescribed
the convocation of a council only once in every ten years. This arrangement
would sharply restrict its area of competence, reserving to it the right to
supervise, direct and oversee the general policy of the Church and to take
necessary measures against crisis in the papacy, but in no sense allowing it a
parliamentarian role or function in the ordinary sense of that expression.31
The decree Haec sancta
insists that its authority is immediately from Jesus Christ and that it is
lawfully gathered in the Holy Spirit. Since no earthly power constituted it, no
earthly power can liquidate it. In fact, every one in the Church is obligated
to it and to its decisions, since every person in the Church is obligated to Jesus
Christ whose authority appointed the council to act on behalf of his Church.
The obligation of obedience extends to the faith, to the extirpation of the
schism and to the general reformation of the Church in head and members. What
the council decrees in these areas (especially in the matter of the termination
of the schism) binds everyone in the Church including the pope himself. Any
other way of formulating the competence of the council would have left it
powerless to act under the de facto circumstances of the spring of 1415.
Further the decree in
speaking of the concilium and its superiority in the Church is ambiguous. In
its technical sense concilium includes within its comprehension the pope as
bishop of Rome as well as the entire Catholic episcopacy. Thus concilium
properly denotes the ecumenical council as the supreme magisterial and
legislative body in the Church. To its teaching all are subject, because as representative
of the universal Church it speaks with the authority of Jesus Christ. Haec
sancta, therefore, cannot be said simply to contrast pope and council as two
separate, independent, opposed and opposing parties. In the circumstances,
however, out of which this decree grew, pope and council were de facto at
variance with one another. On April 6, 1415 (at the time of its promulgation) John
XXIII by his flight from Constance had placed the future of the council in
peril. In this historical situation Haec sancta demanded the obedience of a
doubtful pope to the legitimate council from which he had alienated himself.
The demand rested on the credentials of the council as a Church assembly, convoked
in the Spirit and deriving its authority from Christ.32
Recent (1962-70)
theological and historical research of the problems raised by the Council of Constance
has given a variety of interpretations to the decree Haec sancta. In what
concerns the interests of historical theology the problematic of this decree
can be reduced to two moments: 1) Is Haec sancta a decree of dogmatic quality?
2) Does it have universal binding force?
Paul DeVooght and Hans
Kung interpreted Haec sancta as a dogmatic decree. The former epitomizes its
import this way: "In a matter of faith and Church government the last word
belongs not to the pope but to the Church and to the general council."33 The decree,
however, is not binding with the force of a solemn dogmatic definition because,
lacking explicit papal confirmation, it lacked the qualities which Vatican I
specified as inherent in infallible definitions.34 Hans Kung interprets the decree as a solemn
definition binding once and for all by virtue not of papal but of conciliar authority.
By intent the decree provides "a definite conciliar control," while
leaving papal supremacy intact.35 For the Church historian Hubert Jedin Haec sancta is
nothing more than an emergency decree, promulgated by the council to handle the
de facto crisis that the flight of John XXIII had created. Passed for an
emergency, the decree lost its binding force when the emergency passed.36 Probably the
most conservative approach to the interpretation of Haec sancta is taken by
Joseph Gill. By simply denying the legitimacy of the fifth session, which
passed the decree without papal confirmation, he undercuts the problem in
radice.37
Most of the earlier
studies of Haec sancta started out from the presupposition that the decree was
of dogmatic import because it was promulgated as an authentic conciliar
definition. The dogmatic character of Haec sancta is now questioned. Primarily
and directly the decree is concerned with the power and function of an
ecumenical council within the whole structure of the Church; secondarily and only
indirectly it deals with the papacy, and here only from the point of view of
orderly control in time of Church crisis. The magisterial authority of the Church
is indeed a matter of divine revelation; but it is not fully clear that all the
concrete institutions in which this magisterium has been historically embodied,
and that all the modes in which it has manifested itself, are also matters of revelation.
With reference to the binding force of Haec sancta the questions might well be
posed, whether the ecumenical council as a Church institution is the object of
revelation; and whether, if it is not a revealed truth, it can be the subject
of dogmatic definition.
In no true sense does
Haec sancta formulate a solemn dogmatic teaching, a pronouncement obliging once
and for all, irreversible because of its origin in divine revelation. Looked at
in the context in which it emerged and in the language in which it is
expressed, it is a legal enactment, the embodiment of centuries of canonical thought
about the relation of council to Church and to papacy.38 In the fifth
session of Constance the fathers were not directly interested in teaching a
dogmatic truth about the nature of ecumenical councils. Their interest centered
in the provision of a sound legal basis on which a council might act not only
in the crisis which John XXIII had created but also in all future crises that
may disturb the peace of the universal Church by disrupting the unity of the
papacy. In this sense, then, the decree has solid permanence and universal validity.
In essence it claims that the common good of the universal Church is above the
private good of any individual member to the extent that in and through the
council she has the power to defend and to protect herself against the hurt and
injury that anyone, no matter what his dignity, may inflict upon her. After
forty years of a schism largely inspired and maintained by egotistical considerations,
the fathers of Constance proposed the via concilli as the ultimate method of
securing unity in the Church. Aware that the unique situation then existing in
the papacy required decisive measures, they prepared a firm legal basis, Haec
sancta, to guarantee the success of the drastic course of action on which they
were entering, and to restore normalcy to the Church long tortured by schism.
By this right the council claimed to bind all members of the Church to the
observance of its decisions; and it intended that this right and its exercise
be an ultimate control and safeguard.
1 Cf. for a general survey of the Council of
Constance, A. Franzen, "Das Konzil der Einheit," Das KonzU von
Konstanx, ed., A. Franzen and W. Miiller (Freiburg, 1964), pp. 69-112.
2 Recent literature on all aspects of the Council of
Constance is voluminous. Cf. R. Bäumer, "Die Reformkonzilien des IS.
Jahrhunderts in der neueren Forschung," Annuarium Historiae ConciUorum 1
(1969) 153-64; and A. Franzen, "The Council of Constance: Present State of
the Problem," Concilium 7 (1965), 29-63.
3 Cf. L. Salembier, The Great Schism of the West
(London, 1907), and W. Ullmann, The Origins of the Great Schism (London, 1948).
These are the two standard treatments of the beginnings of the schism.
4 K. Fink, "Zur Beurteilung des Großen Abendländischen
Schismas," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 73 (1962), 338: "We can
only say, that the election of Urban VI was neither absolutely valid nor
absolutely invalid, and that the contemporaries, including those most closely
involved in the events, were in a state of invincibilis ignorantia."
5 Cf. W. Ullmann, op. cit., p. 48.
6 Cf. on the origins and development of the conciliar
theory from the late twelfth century B. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar
Theory (Cambridge, 1955). Conciliarism had more distant and respectable ancestors
than Marsilius of Padua (d. 1342).
7 Cf. E. Delaruelle, E. Labande and P. Ourliac,
L'Église au temps du Grand Schisme et de la crise conciliaire (1378-1449),
L'Histoire de l'Église 14 (Paris, 1964), 83-146.
8 Cf. on the legitimacy of Pisa as an ecumenical
council A. Franzen, Concilium 7 (1965), 42, and Â. Fink, op. cit., p. 339.
9 In answer to Pisa, Benedict XIII held his own
council at Perpignan (1408-09); Gregory held his at Cividale del Friuli (1409).
Thus three "ecumenical" councils were held almost simultaneously 1
10 Cf. J. Lenzenweger, "Von Pisa nach Konstanz,"
Das KonzU von Konstanz, ed., A. Franzen and W. Miiller (Freiburg, 1964), pp.
36-54.
11 Cf. O. De la Brosse, Le Pape et le Concile (Paris,
1965), pp. 144-5; 168-9.
12 In a sense Pisa was a model for Constance. Both
councils set aside the de facto contenders despite their claims to legitimacy,
and sought a new generally accepted papal candidate as a principle of unity.
Pisa failed because it lacked legal method, historical circumstances and dominant
personalities.
13 Cf. J. Alberigo, et al., ConcUiorum Oecumenicorum
Decreta (Freiburg, 1962), p. 383.
14 Cf. ibid., pp. 385-6.
15 Cf. ibid., pp. 414-6.
16 Cf. A. Franzen, "Das Konzil von Einheit,"
ed., A. Franzen and W. Müller, Das Konzil von Konstant (Freiburg, 1964), pp.
77ff.
17 Cf. H. Zimmermann, "Die Absetzung der Päpste
auf dem Konstanzer Konzil," ed., A. Franzen and W. Müller, Das Konzil von
Konstanz (Freiburg, 1964), pp. 113-37.
18 Cf. K. A. Fink, "Die Wahl Martins V," ed.,
A. Franzen and W. Müller, Das Konzil von Konstanz (Freiburg, 1964), pp. 138-51.
19 H. Kung, Structures of the Church (New York, 1964),
p. 277: "But Martin in no way denied the conciliar ideas, as they had been
defined. Indeed an absolute superiority of the Council over the pope is one
thing—and the rights that appertain to the pope in the exercise of his function
are something else."
20 Cf. W. Brandmiffler, "Besitzt das Konstanzer
Dekret Haec Sancta dogmatische Verbindlichkeit?" Annuarium Historiae
Conciliorum 1 (1969), 112.
21 Conctliariter is used in opposition not to tumultuariter
but to nationaler. The pope approved of the enactments of the council as a
whole rather than of the Nations individually. Cf. R. Bäumer, "Konstanzer
Dekrete," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 6, 504.
22 P. DeVooght, "Le Conciliarisme aux conciles de
Constance et de Bäle," Le Concile et les Conciles, ed., B. Botte, et al.
(Paris, I960), pp. 155-62.
23 Cf. I. H. Pichler, "Die Verbindlichkeit der
Konstanzer Dekrete," Wiener Beiträge zur Theologie 16 (Vienna, 1967),
78-79, 85, who holds that Martin V did not approve the Superioritätsdekrete of
the third to the fifth sessions, and that Inter cunctas affirms "the voice
of the occupant of the cathedra Petri as the decisive factor for the validity
(Rechtswirksamkeit) of a conciliar decision.”
24 Cf. P. DeVooght, op. at., p. 159.
25 Cf. ibid., p. 160.
26 Cf. W. Brandmüller, op. cit., p. 1X1.
27 Cf. K. A. Fink, "Konstanz, Konzil von,"
Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 6, S03; "Am 22. 4. 1418 schloß Martin V.
die Synode. Eine gesonderte päpstliche Bestätigung kam nicht in Frage."
28 Cf. H. Küng, op. dt., p. 272.
29 Cf. ibid., pp. 274-6.
30 The delegates of the king of the Romans, Johann von
Krakau, Ulrich von Albeck and Conrad von Soest, contended that the council was
virtually acting on the principle that the end justifies the means. Cf. E. Delaruelle, et al., op. cit., p. 150.
31 Cf. H. Kiing, op. at., p. 284.
32 Cf. B. Tierney, "Hermeneutics and History: The
Problem of Haec Sancta," in Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie
Wilkinson, ed., T. A. Sanquist and M. R. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), pp. 357 ff.
33 Cf. P. DeVooght, op. at., p. 1S3.
34 Cf. ibid., pp. 180-81. At this point De Vooght's
thought becomes ambiguous.
35 Cf. H. Kiing, op. cit., p. 285.
36 Cf. H. Jedin, Bischöfliches Konzil oder
Kirchenparlament. Ein Beitrag zur Ekklesiologie der Konzilien von Konstanz und
Basel (Basel and Stuttgart, 1963).
37 Cf. J. Gill, "The Fifth Session of the Council
of Constance," Heythrop Journal 5 (1964), 131-43, and B. Tiemey's perceptive
critique in "Hermeneutics and History: The Problem of Haec Sancta,"
pp. 3S7 ff.
38 Cf. B. Tierney, "Hermeneutics and History: The
Problem of Haec Sancta," p. 367: "The decrees of future councils,
which were to be binding on the pope, would, in normal times, be decrees of pope-and-council
acting jointly, not decrees of the members acting against the head."
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