Universal Salvific Will

The gratuity of grace does not conflict with its universality. Though God distributes His graces freely, He grants them to all men without exception, because He wills all to be saved.

This divine “will to save” (voluntas Dei salvifica) may be regarded in relation either to the wayfaring state or to the status termini. Regarded from the first mentioned point of view it is a merciful will (voluntas misericordiae) and is generally called first or antecedent will (voluntas primas antecedens) or God’s salvific will (voluntas Dei salvifica) in the strict sense of the word. Considered in relation to the status termini, it is a just will, as God rewards or punishes each creature according to its deserts. This second or consequent will (voluntas secundas consequens) is called “predestination” in so far as it rewards the just, and “reprobation” in so far as it punishes the wicked.

God’s “will to save” may therefore be defined as an earnest and sincere desire to justify all men and make them supernaturally happy. As voluntas antecedent it is conditional, depending on the free co-operation of man; as voluntas consequens, on the other hand, it is absolute, because God owes it to His justice to reward or punish every man according to his deserts.

Hence we shall treat in four distinct articles, (1) Of the universality of God’s will to save; (2) Of the divine voluntas salvifica as the will to give sufficient graces to all adult human beings without exception; (3) Of predestination, and (4) Of reprobation.

Although God’s will to save all men is practically identical with His will to redeem all, a formal distinction must be drawn between the two, (a) because there is a difference in the Scriptural proofs by which either is supported, and (b) because the latter involves the fate of the fallen angels, while the former suggests a question peculiar to itself, vis. the fate of unbaptized children.

Thesis I: God sincerely wills the salvation, not only of the predestined, but of all the faithful without exception.

This proposition embodies an article of faith.

Proof. Its chief opponents are the Calvinists and the Jansenists, who heretically maintain that God wills to save none but the predestined. Against Calvin the Tridentine Council defined: “If any one saith that the grace of justification is attained only by those who are predestined unto life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him be anathema.”

The teaching of Jansenius that Christ died exclusively for the predestined, was censured as “heretical” by Pope Innocent X. Hence it is of faith that Christ died for others besides the predestined. Who are these “others”? As the Church obliges all her children to pray: “[Christ] descended from heaven for us men and for our salvation,” it is certain that at least all the faithful are included in the saving will of God. We say, “at least all the faithful,” because in matter of fact the divine voluntas salmfica extends to all the descendants of Adam, as we shall show further on.

a) Holy Scripture positively declares in a number of passages that God wills the salvation of all believers, whether predestined or not. Jesus Himself says in regard to the Jews: Matthew 23:37: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I (volui) have gathered together thy children, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not (noluisti).” Two facts are stated in this text: (1) Our Lord’s earnest desire to save the Jewish people, anciently through the instrumentality of the prophets, and now in His own person; (2) the refusal of the Jews to be saved. Of those who believe in Christ under the New Covenant we read in the Gospel of St. John (3:16): “God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” However, since many who believe in Christ do actually perish, the divine voluntas salvifica, in principle, extends not only to the predestined, but to all the faithful, i. e. to all who have received the sacrament of Baptism.

b) The teaching of the Fathers can be gathered from the quotations given under Thesis II, infra.

c) The theological argument may be briefly summarized as follows: God’s will to save is co-extensive with the grace of adoptive sonship (filiatio adoptiva), which is imparted either by Baptism or by perfect charity. Now, some who were once in the state of grace are eternally lost. Consequently, God also wills the salvation of those among the faithful who do not actually attain to salvation and who are, therefore, not predestined.

Thesis II: God wills to save every human being.

This proposition is fidei proximo, saltern.

Proof. The existence of original sin is no reason why God should exclude some men from the benefits of the atonement, as was alleged by the Calvinistic “Infralapsarians.” Our thesis is so solidly grounded on Scripture and Tradition that some theologians unhesitatingly call it an article of faith.

a) We shall confine the Scriptural demonstration to two classical passages, Wisdom 11:24 sq. and 1 Timothy 2:1 sqq.

a) The Book of Wisdom, after extolling God’s omnipotence, says of His mercy: “But thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things, and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance. For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made. . . . Thou sparest all, because they are thine, O Lord, who lovest souls.”  

In this text the mercy of God is described as universal. Misereris omnium, parcis omnibus. This universality is based (i) on His omnipotence (quia omnia potes), which is unlimited. His mercy, being equally boundless, must therefore include all men without exception. The universality of God’s mercy is based (2) on His universal over-lordship and dominion (quoniam tuasunt; diligis oninia quae fecisti). As there is no creature that does not belong to God, so there is no man whom He does not love and to whom He does not show mercy. The universality of God’s mercy in the passage quoted is based (3) on His love for souls (qui amas animas). Wherever there is an immortal soul (be it in child or adult, Christian, pagan or Jew), God is at work to save it. Consequently the divine voluntas salvifica is universal, not only in a moral, but in the physical sense of the term, that is, it embraces all the descendants of Adam.

b) 1 Timothy 2:2 sqq.: “I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men. . . . For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all.”

The Apostle commands us to pray “for all men,” because this practice is “good and acceptable in the sight of God.” Why is it good and acceptable? Because God “will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” In other words, God’s will to save is universal.

The question arises: Is the universality of the divine voluntas salvifica, as inculcated by St. Paul, merely moral, or is it physical, admitting of no exceptions? The answer may be found in the threefold reason given by the Apostle: the oneness of God, the mediatorship of Christ, and the universality of the Redemption, (1) “For there is [but] one God.” As truly, therefore, as God is the God of all men without exception, is each and every man included in the divine voluntas salmfica. (2) “There is [but] . . . one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.” The human nature which Christ assumed in the Incarnation is common to all men. Hence, whoever is a man, has Jesus Christ for his mediator. (3) Christ “gave himself a redemption [i. e. died] for all.” That is to say, God’s will to save is co-extensive with His will to redeem. The latter is universal, consequently also the former.

b) The Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers were wont to base their teaching in this matter on the above-quoted texts, and clearly intimated that they regarded the truth therein set forth as divinely revealed. Passaglia has worked out the Patristic argument in detail, quoting no less than two hundred authorities.

a) We must limit ourselves to a few specimen citations. St. Ambrose declares that God wills to save all men. “He willed all to be His own whom He mankind is universal has been established and created. O man, do not flee and hide thyself! He wants even those who flee, and does not will that those in hiding should perish.” St. Gregory of Nazianzus holds God’s voluntas salvifica to be co-extensive in scope with original sin and the atonement. “The law, the prophets, and the sufferings of Christ,” he says, “by which we were redeemed, are common property and admit of no exception : but as all [men] are participators in the same Adam, deceived by the serpent and subject to death in consequence of sin, so by the heavenly Adam all are restored to salvation and by the wood of ignominy recalled to the wood of life, from which we had fallen.” St. Prosper concludes that, since all men are in duty bound to pray for their fellowmen, God must needs be willing to save all without exception. “We must sincerely believe,” he says, “that God wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle solicitously prescribes supplication to be made for all.” The question why so many perish, Prosper answers as follows: “[God] wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, ... so that those who are saved, are saved because He wills them to be saved, while those who perish, perish because they deserve to perish.” In his Responsiones ad Capltula Obiectionum Vincentianarum the same writer energetically defends St. Augustine against the accusation that his teaching on predestination is incompatible with the orthodox doc trine of the universality of God’s saving will.

b) St. Augustine aroused suspicion in the camp of the Semipelagians by his general teaching on predestination and more particularly by his interpretation of 1 Timoth 2:4. The great Bishop of Hippo interprets this Pauline text in no less than four different ways. In his treatise De Spiritu et Litera he describes the divine vohmtas salvifica as strictly universal in the physical sense. In his Enchiridion he restricts it to the predestined. In his Contra lulianum he says: “No one is saved unless God so wills.” In his work De Correptione et Gratia: “God wills all men to be saved, because He makes us to will this, just as He sent the spirit of His Son [into our hearts], crying: Abba, Father, that is, making us to cry, Abba, Father.” How did St. Augustine come to interpret this simple text in so many different ways? Some think he chose this method to overwhelm the Pelagians and Semipelagians with Scriptural proofs. But this polemical motive can hardly have induced him to becloud an obvious text and invent interpretations which never occurred to any other ecclesiastical writer before or after his time. The conundrum can only be solved by the assumption that Augustine believed in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible and held that over and above (or notwithstanding) the sensus obvius every exegete is free to read as much truth into any given passage as possible, and that such interpretation lay within the scope of the inspiration of the Holy Ghost quite as much as the sensus obvius. In his Confessions he actually argues in favor of a pluralitas sensuutn. He was keen enough to perceive, however, that if a Scriptural text is interpreted in different ways, the several constructions put upon it must not be contradictory. As he was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between voluntas antecedent and consequens, his different interpretations of 1 Timothy 2:4 can be reconciled by assuming that he conceived God’s voluntas salvifica as antecedent in so far as it is universal, and as consequent in so far as it is particular. St. Thomas solves the difficulty in a similar manner: “The words of the Apostle, God will have all men to be saved, etc.,” can be understood in three ways: First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says, God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom he does not wish to be saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will. Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not of every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to the Damascene, they are understood of the antecedent will of God, not of the consequent will. The distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent or consequent; but to the things willed. To understand which we must consider that everything, so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its strict sense, and considered absolutely, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstance is taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into its contrary. Thus, that men should live is good; and that men should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. If in a particular case it happens that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him becomes good, to let him live an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he wills all men to live, but consequently he wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply in as much as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.”

Thesis III: The lot of unbaptized infants, though difficult to reconcile with the universality of God’s saving will, furnishes no argument against it.

Proof. The most difficult problem concerning the divine voluntas salvifica a real crux theologorum is the fate of unbaptized children. The Church has never uttered a dogmatic definition on this head, and theologians hold widely divergent opinions.

Bellarmine teaches that infants who die without being baptized, are excluded from the divine voluntas salvifica, because, while the non-reception of Baptism is the proximate reason of their damnation, its ultimate reason must be the will of God.

a) This rather incautious assertion needs to be carefully restricted. It is an article of faith that God has instituted the sacrament of Baptism as the ordinary means of salvation for all men. On the other hand, it is certain that He expects parents, priests, and relatives, as his representatives, to provide conscientiously for its proper and timely administration. Sinful negligence on the part of these responsible agents cannot, therefore, be charged to Divine Providence, but must be laid at the door of those human agents who fail to do their duty. In exceptional cases infants can be saved even by means of the so-called Baptism of blood (baptismus sanguinis), i. e. death for Christ’s sake. On the whole it may be said that God has, in principle, provided for the salvation of little children by the institution of infant Baptism.

b) But there are many cases in which either invincible ignorance or the order of nature precludes the administration of Baptism. The well-meant opinion of some theologians that the responsibility in all such cases lies not with God, but with men, lacks probability. Does God, then, really will the damnation of these innocents? Some modern writers hold that the physical order of nature is responsible for the misfortune of so many innocent infants; but this hypothesis contributes nothing towards clearing up the awful mystery. For God is the author of the natural as well as of the supernatural order. To say that He is obliged to remove existing obstacles by means of a miracle would disparage His ordinary providence. Klee’s assumption that dying children become conscious long enough to enable them to receive the Baptism of desire (baptismus flaminis), is scarcely compatible with the definition of the Council of Florence that “the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or only in original sin, forthwith descend to hell.” A still more unsatisfactory supposition is that the prayer of Christian parents acts like a baptism of desire and saves their children from hell. This theory, espoused by Cardinal Cajetan, was rejected by the Fathers of Trent, and Pope Pius V ordered it to be expunged from the Roman edition of Cajetan’s works.

A way out of the difficulty is suggested by Gutberlet and others, who, holding with St. Thomas that infants that die without Baptism will enjoy a kind of natural beatitude, think it possible that God, in view of their sufferings, may mercifully cleanse them from original sin and thereby place them in a state of innocence. This theory is based on the assumption that the ultimate fate of unbaptized children is deprivation of the beatific vision of God and therefore a state of real damnation (poena damni, infernum), and that the remission of original sin has for its object merely to enable these unfortunate infants to enjoy a perfect natural beatitude, which they could not otherwise attain. It is reasonable to argue that, as these infants are deprived of celestial happiness through no guilt of their own, the Creator can hardly deny them some sort of natural beatitude, to which their very nature seems to entitle them. “ Hell” for them probably consists in being deprived of the beatific vision of God, which is a supernatural grace and as such lies outside the sphere of those prerogatives to which human nature has a claim by the fact of creation. This theory would seem to establish at least some manner of salvation for the infants in question, and consequently, to vindicate the divine voluntas salvifica in the same measure. Needless to say, it can claim no more than probability, and we find ourselves constrained to admit, at the conclusion of our survey, that there is no sure and perfect solution of the difficulty, and theologians therefore do well to confess their ignorance.

c) The difficulty of which we have spoken does not, of course, in any way impair the certainty of the dogma. The Scriptural passages cited above 36 clearly prove that God wills to save all men without exception. In basing the universality of God’s mercy on His omnipotence, His universal dominion, and His love of souls, the Book of Wisdom evidently implies that the unbaptized infants participate in that mercy in all three of these respects. How indeed could Divine Omnipotence exert itself more effectively than by conferring grace on those who are inevitably and without any fault of their own deprived of Baptism? Who would deny that little children, as creatures, are subject to God’s universal dominion in precisely the same manner as adults? Again, if God loves the souls of men, must He not also love the souls of infants?

1 Timoth 2:4 applies primarily to adults, because strictly speaking only adults can “come to the knowledge of the truth. But St. Paul employs certain middle terms which undoubtedly comprise children as well. Thus, if all men have but “one God,” this God must be the God of infants no less than of adults, and His mercy and goodness must include them also. And if Jesus Christ as God-man is the “one mediator of God and men. He must also have assumed the human nature of children, in order to redeem them from original sin. Again, if Christ “gave himself a redemption for all it is impossible to assume that millions of infants should be directly excluded from the benefits of the atonement.

ARTICLE 2

GOD’S WILL TO GIVE SUFFICIENT GRACE TO ALL ADULT HUMAN BEINGS IN PARTICULAR

In relation to adults, God manifests His saving will by the bestowal of sufficient grace upon all. The bestowal of sufficient grace being evidently an effluence of the universal voluntas salvifica, the granting of such grace to all who have attained the use of reason furnishes another proof for the universality of grace.

God gives all men sufficient graces. But He is not obliged to give to each efficacious graces, because all that is required to enable man to reach his supernatural destiny is cooperation with sufficient grace, especially with the gratia prima vocans, which is the beginning of all salutary operation.

To prove that God gives sufficient grace to all adult human beings without exception, we must show that He gives sufficient grace (1) to the just, (2) to the sinner, and (3) to the heathen. This we shall do in three distinct theses.

Thesis I: God gives to all just men sufficient grace to keep His commandments.

This is de fide.

Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches: “If anyone saith that the commandments of God are, even for one that is justified and constituted in grace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema.”

A contrary proposition in the writings of Jansenius was censured by Pope Innocent the Tenth as “foolhardy, impious, blasphemous, and heretical.”

The Church does not assert that God gives to the just sufficient grace at all times. She merely declares that sufficient grace is at their disposal whenever they are called upon to obey the law (itrgente praecepto). Nor need God always bestow a gratia proxime sufficient; in many instances the grace of prayer (gratia remote sufficient) fully serves the purpose.

This dogma is clearly contained in Holy Scripture. We shall quote the most important texts.

a) 1 John 5:3 sq.: “For this is the charity of God, that we keep his commandments, and his commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world.” According to this text the “charity of God” manifests itself in “keeping his commandments” and

“overcoming the world.” This is declared to be an easy task. Our Lord Himself says: “My yoke is sweet and my burden light.” Hence it must be possible to keep His commandments, and therefore God does not withhold the absolutely necessary graces from the just.

St. Paul consoles the Corinthians by telling them that God will not suffer them to be tempted beyond their strength, but will help them to a happy issue, provided they faithfully cooperate with His grace, 1 Corinthians 10:13: “God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it.” As it is impossible even for the just to overcome grievous temptations without supernatural aid, 8 and as God Himself tells us that we are able to overcome them, it is a necessary inference that He bestows sufficient grace. The context hardly leaves a doubt that St. Paul has in mind the just, for a few lines further up he says: “Therefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.” But there is no exegetical objection to applying the text to all the faithful without exception.

b) This dogma is clearly set forth in the writings of the Fathers. Some of them, it is true, when combating the Pelagians and Semipelagians, defended the proposition that “grace is not given to all men,” n but they meant efficacious grace.

a) A typical representative of this group of ecclesiastical writers is the anonymous author of the work De Vocatione Omnium Gentium, whom Pope Gelasius praised as “probatus Ecclesiae magister.” This fifth-century writer, who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries, discusses the question whether and in what sense all men are called, and why some are not saved. He begins by drawing a distinction between God’s general and His special providence. “ It so pleased God,” he says, “to give His efficacious grace to many, and to withhold His sufficient grace from none, in order that it might appear from both [actions] that what is conferred upon a portion is not denied to the entire race.”

b) The Jansenists appealed in favor of their teaching to such Patristic passages as the following: “After the withdrawal of the divine assistance he [St. Peter] was unable to stand;” and: “He had undertaken more than he was able to do.” But the two Fathers from whose writings these passages are taken (Ss. Chrysostom and Augustine) speak, as the context evinces, of the withdrawal of efficacious and proximately sufficient grace in punishment of Peter’s presumption. Had St. Peter followed our Lord’s advice and prayed instead of relying on his own strength, he would not have fallen. That this was the mind of St. Augustine clearly appears from the following sentence in his work De Unitate Ecclesiae: “Who shall doubt that Judas, had he willed, would not have betrayed Christ, and that Peter, had he willed, would not have thrice denied his Master?”

c) The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows: Since the state of grace confers a claim to supernatural happiness, it must also confer a claim to those graces which are necessary to attain it.

To assert that God denies the just sufficient grace to observe His commandments, to avoid mortal sin, and to persevere in the state of grace, would be to gainsay His solemn promise to His adopted children: “This is the will of my Father that sent me: that everyone who seeth the Son and believeth in him, may have life everlasting, and I will raise him up in the last day.” Consequently, God owes it to His own fidelity to bestow sufficient graces upon the just.

Again, according to the plain teaching of Revelation, the just are obliged, under pain of sin, to observe the commandments of God and the precepts of His Church. But this is impossible without the aid of grace. Consequently, God grants at least sufficient grace to his servants, for ad impossibile nemo tenetur.

Thesis II: In regard to Christians guilty of mortal sin we must hold: (i) that ordinary sinners always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance; (2) that God never entirely withdraws His grace even from the obdurate.

The first part of this thesis embodies a theological conclusion; the second states the common teaching of Catholic theologians.

I. Proof of the First Part. The distinction here drawn between “ordinary” and “obdurate” sinners has its basis in revelation and is clearly demanded by the different degrees of certainty attaching to the two parts of our thesis.

An “ordinary” sinner is a Christian who has lost sanctifying grace by a grievous sin. An “obdurate” sinner is one who, by repeatedly and maliciously transgressing the laws of God, has dulled his intellect and hardened his will against salutary inspirations. A man may be a habitual sinner (consuetudinarius) and a backslider, without being obdurate, or, which comes to the same, impenitent. Weakness is not malice, though sinful habits often beget impenitence, which is one of the sins against the Holy Ghost and the most formidable obstacle in the way of conversion.

With regard to ordinary sinners, our thesis asserts that they always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance.

a) Experience teaches that a man falls deeper and deeper if he does not hasten to do penance after committing a mortal sin. But this is not the fault of Almighty God, who never withholds His grace; it is wholly the fault of the sinner who fails to cooperate with the proffered supernatural assistance.

a) A sufficient Scriptural argument for this part of our thesis is contained in the texts cited in support of Thesis I. If it is true that God suffers no one to be tempted beyond his strength, this must surely apply to Christians who have had the misfortune of committing mortal sin. St. John says that the commandments of God “are not heavy” and that faith is “the victory which overcometh the world.” Faith in Christ remains in the Christian, even though he be guilty of mortal sin, and consequently if he wills, he is able, by the aid of sufficient grace, to overcome the “world” i. e. the temptations arising from concupiscence, and thus to cease committing mortal sins.

b) As for the teaching of Tradition, St. Augustine lays down two theological principles which apply to saint and sinner alike.

“God does not enjoin impossibilities,” he says, “but in His injunctions counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do.” It follows that the sinner always receives at least the grace of prayer, which Augustine therefore calls gratia initialis sive parva, and of which he says that its right use ensures the gratia magna.

The second principle is this: “Cum lege coniuncta est gratia, qua lex observari possit.” That is, every divine law, by special ordinance, carries with it the grace by which it may be observed. In other words, the laws of God can always be obeyed because the lawgiver never fails to grant sufficient grace to keep them.

b) That the sinner always receives sufficient grace to be converted, follows from the Scriptural injunction of conversion. If conversion to God is a duty, and to comply with this duty is impossible without the aid of grace, the divine command obviously implies the bestowal of sufficient grace.

That conversion is a duty follows from such Scriptural texts as these: “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways!” “The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance.”

This teaching is faithfully echoed by Tradition.

2. Proof of the Second Part. Obduracy is a serious obstacle to conversion because the obdurate sinner has confirmed his will in malice and by systematic resistance diminished the influence of grace. The question here is whether or not God in such cases eventually withdraws His grace altogether.

Some rigorists hold that He does so, with the purpose of sparing the sinner greater tortures in hell. Though this assertion cannot be said to contravene the dogma of the universality of God’s salvific will, (its defenders do not deny that He faithfully does His share to save these unfortunate reprobates), we prefer to adopt the sententia communis, that God grants even the most obdurate sinner at least now and then, e. g. during a mission or on the occasion of some terrible catastrophe sufficient grace to be converted. The theological reasons for this opinion, which we hold to be the true one, coincide in their last analysis with those set forth in the first part of our thesis.

a) Sacred Scripture, in speaking of the duty of repentance, makes no distinction between ordinary and obdurate sinners. On the contrary, the Book of Wisdom points to one of the most wicked and impenitent of nations, the Canaanites, as a shining object of divine mercy and patience. According to St. Paul, God calls especially upon hardened and impenitent sinners to do penance. Romans 2:4 sq.: “Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and patience, and long suffering? Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance? But according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath, against the day of wrath, and revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his works.

There are some Scriptural passages which seem to imply that God withdraws His grace from those who are obdurate, nay, that He Himself hardens their hearts in punishment of sin. Thus the Lord says of Pharaoh: “I shall harden his heart,” and Moses tells us: “The Lord hardened Pharaoh’s heart, and he harkened not unto them.” But it would be wrong to assume that this denotes a positive action on the part of God. Pharaoh, as we are told further on, “hardened his own heart” (in gravavit cor suum). The fault in all cases lies with the sinner, who obstinately resists the call of grace. God’s co-operation in the matter is merely indirect. The greater and stronger graces which He grants to ordinary sinners, He withholds from the obdurate in punishment of their malice. This is, however, by no means tantamount to a withdrawal of sufficient grace.

b) The Fathers speak of God’s way of dealing with obdurate sinners in a manner which clearly shows their belief that He never entirely with draws His mercy. They insist that the light of grace is never extinguished in the present life. “God gave them over to a reprobate mind,” says St. Augustine, “for such is the blindness of the mind. Whosoever is given over thereunto, is shut out from the interior light of God: but not wholly as yet, whilst he is in this life. For there is outer darkness/ which is understood to belong rather to the day of judgment; that he should rather be wholly without God, whosoever, whilst there is time, refuses correction.”

It follows that no sinner, how desperate soever his case may appear, need be despaired of. As long as there is life there is hope. The Fathers consistently teach that the reason why reprobates are lost is not lack of grace but their own malice. Thus St. Chrysostom comments on

Isaiah prophecy regarding the impenitence of the Jews: “The reason they did not believe was not that Isaiah had predicted their unbelief, but his prediction was based on the fact that they would not believe. They were unable to believe, i. e. they had not the will to believe.”

c) The theological argument for our thesis is well stated by St. Thomas. He distinguishes between obstinatio perfecta and obstinatio imperfecta and says: Perfect obstinacy exists only in hell. Imperfect obstinacy is that of a sinner who has his will so firmly set on evil that he is incapable of any but the faintest impulses towards virtue, though even these are sufficient to prepare the way for grace. “If any one falls into sin after having received Baptism,” says the Fourth Lateran Council, “ he can always be restored by sincere penance.” As the power of the keys comprises all sins, even those against the Holy Ghost, so divine grace is held out to all sinners. The Montanistic doctrine of the unforgivableness of the “three capital sins” (apostasy, murder, and adultery) was already condemned as heretical during the life-time of Tertullian. The sinner can obtain forgiveness only by receiving the sacrament of Penance or making an act of perfect contrition. Justly, therefore, does the Church regard despair of God’s mercy as an additional grievous sin. If the rigorists were right in asserting that God in the end absolutely abandons the sinner, there could be no hope of forgiveness, and despair would be justified.

Thesis III: The heathens, too, receive sufficient graces for salvation.

This proposition may be qualified as certa.

Proof. The “heathens” are those whom the Gospel has not yet reached. They are called infideles negativi in contradistinction to the infideles positivi, i. e. apostates and formal heretics who have fallen away from the faith. We assert that God gives to the heathens sufficient grace to know the truth and be saved. Pope Alexander VIII, on December 7, 1690, condemned Arnauld’s Jansenistic proposition that “pagans, Jews, heretics, and others of the same kind experience no influence whatever from Christ, and it may therefore be rightly inferred that there is in them a nude and helpless will, lacking sufficient grace. A proposition of similar import, set up by Quesnel, was censured by Clement XI Though not formally defined, it is a certain truth deducible from the infallible teaching of the Church that God does not permit any one to perish for want of grace.

a) The Biblical argument for our thesis is based on the dogma that God wills all men to be saved, 1 Timothy 2:4: “[God] will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth [i. e. the -true faith]/ In speaking of the “day of wrath,” St. Paul emphasizes the fact that the Almighty Judge “will render to every man according to his works/ eternal life to the good, wrath and damnation to the wicked. And he continues: “But glory, and honor, and peace to everyone that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek; for there is no respect of persons with God.” “Greek” is here evidently synonymous with gentile or heathen. It follows that the heathens are able to perform supernatural salutary acts with the aid of grace, and that they will receive the reward of eternal beatitude if they lead a good life.

In another passage (1 Timothy 4:10) the Apostle calls Christ “the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful.” Consequently, Christ is the Saviour also of unbelievers and heathens.

b) St. Paul’s teaching is faithfully echoed by the Fathers. Thus St. Clement of Rome, in commenting on the penitential sermons of Noe and the prophet Jonas, says: “We may roam through all the ages of history and learn that the Lord in all generations gave opportunity for penance to all who wished to be converted, . . . even though they were strangers to him.”

St. Chrysostom says in explanation of John 1:9: “If He enlightens every man that comes into this world, how is it that so many are without light? For not all know Christ. Most assuredly He illumines, so far as He is concerned. . . . For grace is poured out over all. It flees or despises no one, be he Jew, Greek, barbarian or Scythian, freedman or slave, man or woman, old or young. It is the same for all, easily attainable by all, it calls upon all with equal regard. As for those who neglect to make use of this gift, they should ascribe their blindness to themselves.”

Similar expressions can be culled from the anonymous work De Vocatione Omnium Gentium and from the writings of SS. Prosper and Fulgentius, and especially from those of Orosius, who says that grace is given to all men, including the heathen, without exception and at all times.

c) Catholic theologians have devoted consider able thought to the question how God provides for the salvation of the heathen.

To the uncivilized tribes may be applied what has been said regarding the fate of unbaptized infants. The real problem is: How does the merciful Creator provide for those who are sufficiently intelligent to be able to speculate on God, the soul, the future destiny of man, etc.? Holy Scripture teaches: “Without faith it is impossible to please God, for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.” Faith here means, not any kind of religious belief, but that theological faith which the Tridentine Council calls “the beginning, the foundation, and the root of all justification.” Mere intellectual assent to the existence of God, immortality, and retribution would not be sufficient for salvation, even if elevated to the supernatural sphere and transfigured by grace. This is evident from the condemnation, by Pope Innocent XI, of the proposition that “Faith in a wide sense, based on the testimony of the created universe, or some other similar motive, is sufficient unto justification.” The only sort of faith that results in justification, according to the Vatican Council, is “a supernatural virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which He has revealed are true; not because of the intrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself, who reveals them, and who can neither be deceived nor deceive.” Of special importance is the following declaration by the same Council: “Since without faith it is impossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship of His children, therefore without faith no one has ever attained justification. . . .”

           

The Catechism demands of everyone who desires to be saved that he have a supernatural belief in six distinct truths: the existence of God, retribution in the next world, the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The first two are certainly necessary for salvation, both fide explicita and necessitate medii. With regard to the other four there is a difference of opinion among theologians. We base our argumentation on the stricter, though not absolutely certain view, that all six articles must be believed necessitate medii. On this basis God’s method of providing sufficient graces for the heathen may be explained in one of two ways, according as a fides explicita is demanded from them with regard to all the above mentioned dogmas, or a fides implidta is deemed sufficient in regard to all but the first two. By fides explicita we understand the express and fully developed faith of devout Christians; by fides implidta, an undeveloped belief of desire or, in other words, general readiness to believe whatever God has revealed.

a) The defenders of the fides explicit a theory are compelled to assume that God must somehow reveal to each individual heathen who lives according to the dictates of his conscience, the six truths necessary for salvation. “Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ.”

But how can the gentiles believe in a revelation that has never been preached to them? Here is an undeniable difficulty. Some theologians say: God enlightens them interiorly about the truths necessary for salvation; or He miraculously sends them an apostle, as He sent St. Peter to Cornelius; or He instructs them through the agency of an angel. None of these hypotheses can be accepted as satisfactory. “Interior illumination” of the kind postulated would practically amount to private revelation. That God should grant a special private revelation to every conscientious pagan is highly improbable. Again, an angel can no more be the ordinary means of conversion than the miraculous apparition of a missionary. Nevertheless, these three hypotheses admirably illustrate the firm belief of the Church in the universality of God’s saving will, inasmuch as they express the conviction of her theologians that He would work a miracle rather than deny His grace to the poor benighted heathen. The difficulties to which we have adverted constitute a strong argument in favor of another theological theory which regards explicit belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation merely as a necessitas praecepti, from which one may be dispensed.

b) The fides implicit a theory is far more plausible, for it postulates no miracles, implicit faith (or fides in voto) being independent of the external preaching of the Gospel, just as the baptism of desire (baptismus in voto) is independent of the use of water.

Cardinal Gotti regards the first-mentioned of the two theories as safer (tutior), but admits that the other is highly probable, because it has the support of St. Thomas. However, a great difficulty remains. Though it may suffice to hold the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and a fortiori those of the immortality of the soul and the necessity of grace, with an implicit faith, it is the consentient teaching of Revelation, the Church, and Catholic divines that the two principal truths of religion, viz.: the existence of God and retribution, must be held fide explicita and necessitate medii, because a man cannot be converted to God unless He knows Him. But how is he to acquire a knowledge of God? Does this not also necessitate a miracle (e. g. the sending of an angel or of a missionary, which we have rejected as improbable)? There can be but one answer to this question. Unaided reason may convince a thoughtful pagan of the existence of God and of divine retribution, and as these two fundamental truths have no doubt penetrated to the farthest corners of the earth also as remnants of primitive revelation, their promulgation may be said to be contained in the traditional instruction which the heathen receive from their forebears. This external factor of Divine Revelation, assisted by interior grace, may engender a supernatural act of faith, which implicitly includes belief in Christ, Baptism, etc., and through which the heathen are eventually cleansed from sin and attain to justification.

Some theologians hold that those to whom the Gospel has never been preached, may be saved by a quasi-faith based on purely natural motives.

For the rest, no one will presume to dictate to Almighty God how and by what means He shall communicate His grace to the heathen. It is enough, and very consoling, too, to know that all men receive sufficient grace to save their souls, and no one is eternally damned except through his own fault.

Joseph Pohle, Grace: Actual and Habitual, Volume VII, edited by Arthur Pruss (St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1914), 152 – 187.