Divine Right to Receive the Sacraments

David Michael Coffey, “The Sacrament of Reconciliation,” (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2001), 51.

Reconciliation: Iure Divino    

Thus is raised a further question, which needs to be considered here, and which has a bearing on the possible ways in which the sacrament could develop in the future. (For we have no warrant for thinking that the development process which began at the dawn of the Chrisitan era and has continued to the present is going to stop now.) The question is that of the expression ius divinum. There is no problem about how this expression should be translated: it means "divine right." Something is de iure divinio, or simply iure divino, "of divine right," if it is of divine foundation, that is, founded or instituted by God or by Christ. The importance of the question will now be evident. For when we say that the sacraments, and reconciliation in particular, are iure divino, technically we are saying that they are instituted by Christ. Granted that to be iure divino a thing does not have to come to us directly by the command of God or from the hands of Christ, the problem, and the question, then, is: What are the indispensable requirements for a thing in order that it be rightly characterized in this way? In modern theology the answer that has emerged is that, with the Church's teaching of tradition as well as Scripture as the source of divine revelation, that is, of God's revealed will for the Church, it is enough that there be something positively enjoined by God or founded by Christ, something evidenced in the New Testament, and evidenced, moreover, as central to God's plan, that in the course of history has developed in the Church into the reality thus characterized. Moreover, this process will have taken place through a series of historically contingent authoritative decisions, decisions, that is, that theoretically could have been different from what they actually were. This is the minimum that is both necessary and sufficient.

Session XIV of Trent (25 November 1551)

Canon VI.— If any one denieth, either that sacramental confession was instituted, or is necessary to salvation, of divine right; or saith, that the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Church hath ever observed from the beginning, and doth observe, is alien from the institution and command of Christ, and is a human invention; let him be anathema.

Canon VII.— If any one saith, that, in the sacrament of Penance, it is not necessary, of divine right, for the remission of sins, to confess all and singular the mortal sins which after due and diligent previous meditation are remembered, even those (mortal sins) which are secret, and those which are opposed to the two last commandments of the Decalogtie, as also the circumstances which change the species of a sin; but (saith) that such confession is only useful to instruct and console the penitent, and that it was of old only observed in order to impose a canonical satisfaction; or saith that they, who strive to confess all their sins, wish to leave nothing to the divine mercy to pardon ; or, finally, that it is not lawful to confess venial sins ; let him be anathema.

Charles Augustine, “A Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law,” Book III, Volume IV (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1921), 225.

Commentary on Canon 854:

“Every baptized person is by divine right entitled to receive Holy Communion, because Baptism has bestowed this right upon him. The obligation to receive Holy Communion rests, not on its absolute necessity for salvation (necessitate medii), but on the divine precept contained in the words of our Lord: “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, you shall not have life in you.” This is a general law, which is based on the very end and organization of the Church. It has been modified in the course of centuries by special laws and regulations laid down by the Church for the welfare of the faithful and to safeguard the reverence and devotion due to this august Sacrament. The Church repels no one from the holy Table, even though his condition be humble, his mind weak, whether he lives in a palace or a sordid hut. All are called by Christ to His banquet, and therefore the priests are in duty bound to offer every opportunity to the faithful for receiving Communion and to lay aside unreasonable and Jansenistic scruples. This does not mean that they should indiscriminately admit all, even public sinners, practical pagans, and unworthy Catholics who are a scandal to their community. Certain guiding rules are set forth in the following canons.”

Joseph Pohle, The Sacraments: Extreme Unction, Holy Orders, Matrimony, Volume XI, edited by Arthur Pruss (St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1917), 35-37.

“A Sacrament is necessary for salvation either as a means (necessitate medii) or by way of precept (necessitate praecepti).

1. Extreme Unction is Not Necessary as a Means of Salvation. — This is evident from the fact that the Sacraments of the living presuppose the state of sanctifying grace, and the graces bestowed by Extreme Unction can, in case of necessity, be supplied by extraordinary helps.

It follows that one who is dangerously sick is not obliged to have a desire for Extreme Unction (votwn sacramenti) if he cannot actually receive it. However, if his conscience is burdened with mortal sin, for which he has only imperfect contrition, and he finds himself unable to go to confession, Extreme Unction may be for him the only, and therefore a necessary, means of salvation.

2. Whether Extreme Unction is Necessary by Way of Precept. — Theologians are not agreed as to whether or not a person who is seriously ill is per se under a grave obligation of seeking this Sacrament.

a) St. Thomas, Suarez, Gotti, Billuart, and the majority of modern authors hold that no such obligation exists. Billuart points out that the phrases “inducat presbyter os” and “ungi debent” in the Epistle of St. James have been interpreted by various synods as embodying merely a counsel, not a command. The Council of Trent speaks of Extreme Unction as a “sacramentum fidelibus commendatum” which it would be a crime to contemn. Now mere neglect or refusal to receive a Sacrament is not contempt. Billuart adds that if Extreme Unction were absolutely necessary for salvation, the Church could not suspend the ad- ministration of this Sacrament, as she sometimes does during an interdict, because a divine law is always binding.

b) Peter Lombard, St. Bona venture, Peter Soto, and Tournely, on the other hand, interpret the “inducat presbyter os” of the Jacobean Epistle as a divine command and the “ungi debent” as an ecclesiastical precept.

Billuart's appeal to the Tridentine Council is not convincing, for that Council interprets the words of St. James as follows: “This unction must be applied to the sick,” and rejects the assertion that Extreme Unction “is a human figment or a rite received from the Fathers, which neither has a command from God, nor a promise of grace.” Moreover, thoughtless neglect or obstinate refusal to receive the Sacrament undoubtedly verges on that “contempt” of which the Council says that it involves “a heinous crime and an injury to the Holy Ghost Himself.”

Be this as it may, no one who values his salvation will neglect or refuse to receive this comforting and soul- strengthening Sacrament. Those who have charge of the sick (physicians, nurses, relatives, etc.) are bound in charity to enable them to receive Extreme Unction when there is danger of death. Christ would not have instituted a special Sacrament for the dying if it were merely useful. Extreme Unction is necessary. Only on this assumption is there any force in the well-known argument that congruity demands a Sacrament of the nature of Extreme Unction in the septenary number of the Sacraments. Justly, therefore, does Dr. Schell observe: “The necessity and obligation of Extreme Unction is of divine right and follows from the simple fact that this Sacrament was instituted by Christ. ... In sickness and danger of death the duty of properly providing for body and soul is self-evident; there is no need of an express law.”

Joseph Pohle, The Sacraments: Penance, Volume X, edited by Arthur Pruss (St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1917), 195—197.

“From the days of primitive Christianity the Church has insisted that the faithful are by divine right obliged to confess their sins in order to obtain forgiveness. Such belief and practice indicate that confession cannot be of purely ecclesiastical origin, but must be a divine institution.

The argument from prescription is all the more compelling in this case, as it deals not with a theoretical truth, as e. g. the Divine Trinity, or with a duty easy of performance, as the hearing of Mass or receiving Communion, but imposes a burden irksome to the pride and the passions of man. Had a pope or an ecumenical council ventured to impose such a distasteful duty on the faithful, the innovation would certainly have caused a tremendous upheaval and left deep traces in the history of the Church. But the records of the past tell us nothing of such an upheaval. On the contrary, they assure us that auricular confession was practiced at all times and from the very beginning. Consequently confession is not a human invention, nor a mere ecclesiastical precept, but a divine law.

In tracing the facts, we shall begin with the present time and gradually work our way through the Middle Ages back to the early days of Christianity.

I. The Present Time. — The opponents of confession cannot and do not deny that confession is now observed as a divine law in the Catholic Church and has been so observed since the close of the Middle Ages.

For four centuries, from 1500 to date, the faithful have uncomplainingly confessed their sins in the firm conviction that without this remedy they would be lost. No calumny and no attack (and God knows there have been many), has shaken their faith in confession. When the Calvinists inveighed against auricular confession, it was not the latter but the attack made upon it that was felt to be an in-tolerable innovation. 2 This proves that confession must have existed in the Church long before the dawn of the so-called Reformation.

2. The Middle Ages. — Calvin and Dallaeus testify that confession was practiced in the Catholic Church since 12 15, for it was in that year, they claim, that Innocent III introduced the practice through the Fourth Council of the Lateran. The reference is, of course, to the famous canon “Omnis utriusque sexus” by which all the faithful who have arrived at the age of discretion are commanded to confess their sins at least once a year to their parish priest under pain of exclusion from the Church. 8 Would the faithful of the thirteenth century have acquiesced in such a radical and onerous measure if auricular confession and the duty of confessing to the priests had not previously existed in the Church?

Even from the purely historical standpoint the Tridentine Council must be admitted to be right when it characterizes Calvin's contention as a “ vain calumny,” and remarks: “The Church did not, through the Council of the Lateran, ordain that the faithful of Christ should confess, — a thing which it knew to be necessary and instituted of divine right, — but that the precept of confession should be complied with at least once a year. ...”

James Lanigan, “Catechetical Conferences on Penance,” (Printed by John Coyne, 24, Cooke St, 1 January 1830), 143.

Hence, no superior can ever dispense, in things of divine right, without a just, sufficient, and well founded reason for doing so. For instance, a man makes a lawful, vow, such a vow becomes of divine right, and no superior can dispense in that vow, without a just and sufficient reason. In like manner, temporal punishment is due to every sin, by divine right, and to relax this punishment, without a sufficient cause, would be acting directly against a divine right. It would be squandering prodigally, and not prudently distributing, things entrusted to our care and management.

J. Michael Miller, “The divine right of the papacy in recent ecumenical theology,” Analecta Gregoriana, Vol. 218. Facultatis Tehologiae: Sectio B, n. 70 (Rome: Universita Gregoriana Editrice, 1980), 25

At session 14 in 1551 the Council Fathers taught that the practice of integral confession was of divine right. The need to confess one's sins unambiguously to a priest was not a matter of purely ecclesiastical legislation. After considerable debate, however, the council made no statement on whether the confession of mortal sins prior to the reception of the Eucharist was required by divine law. The reasons for the distinction between the two cases reveal how ius divinum was understood in the sixteenth century.”

Synod of Diamper, Session VI, Decree 1 (1599)

Whereas an entire sacramental confession is of Divine right, and necessary to all those who after baptism fall into any mortal sin, and holy mother church doth command all faithful Christians who are come to the use of reason, upon pain of mortal sin, to confess at least once a year in the time of Lent, or at Easter, when all that are capable are bound likewise to receive the most holy sacrament of the altar, declaring all that neglect to do it, to be excommunicate; and notwithstanding, this precept has not hitherto been in use in this bishopric, in which no Christian has ever confessed upon obligation, and a great many not at all, which was occasioned through their ignorance of this healthful precept, and of the necessity of this Divine sacrament, this church having been governed by schismatical Chaldaens and Nestorian heretics, the particular enemies of this sacrament, being the cause of their being totally unacquainted with the virtue, efficacy, and necessity thereof. Some not using it all, others being persuaded by the devil into a vain and superstitious opinion, that if they should con fess themselves, they should die immediately, all which having been made known to the most illustrious Metropolitan in his first visitation of these churches, he at that time persuaded a great many that had never done it before to confess themselves, having undeceived them as to the unreasonable and pernicious mistakes which they lay under, therefore the Synod the more to further this, doth declare that it is the duty of every faithful Christian, upon penalty of mortal sin, to observe the precept of the church concerning confession, at the time by her determined and founded on the Divine precept of confession, for all such as are fallen from grace, by the commission of any mortal sin, and doth command all faithful Christians, men and women, that are arrived at the years of discretion, to confess themselves to their own vicar, or to such priests as are licensed by the prelate to hear confessions, at the time of Lent, or against Easter, and that whosoever shall not have complied with this precept, or is not confessed sometime betwixt the beginning of Lent, and the second Sunday after Easter, shall be in the church declared excommunicate by the vicar without waiting for any order from the prelate to do it, until he has effectually confessed himself, and has undergone the punishment due to his rebellion; and if the vicar shall for some just reason think fit to wait any longer, for some that have been negligent, and who being busy have desired to be dispensed with till Whitsuntide, it shall be in their power to bear with them, according to what is determined in the second Decree of the fifth Session, of the sacrament of the eucharist, having first admonished those that live in the heaths, or are at sea, or engaged in business in such places where there are no churches to confess in, that when they return home, they are bound to do it within a month. And that the whole of this may be executed, with the more ease, and be performed as is reasonable, the vicars of the churches shall be obliged a month or more before Lent, if it be necessary, to go to all the houses of their parishes belonging to Christians, however remote in the heaths, either in person, or by some other clergyman, whom in conscience they can trust with such a business, and taking the names of all the Christians even to the very slaves in every family that are nine years old and upward, and of those too that are abroad, observing whether they do return home after the time of the obligation, and having made a roll of parchment of all that are of age to confess themselves, they shall afterwards make a mark at their names as they come to confession, that so they may know certainly who have, and who have not complied, that the disobedient may be excommunicated, which we declare to be the precise obligation of their office, the pastor being bound to know his sheep, that he may give them food, and so far as he is able, supply all their necessities, temporal as well as spiritual, and to have their number, that he may know when any are lost ; and for the perfecting of such a roll the vicars may take the advantage of the Monoibo, at which time all Christians do flock to the churches, at which time likewise they may hear of many that live in the heaths. And as to those that have confessed themselves to some other approved confessors, they shall bring a note signed by them of their having been confessed, which they shall deliver to their vicar, who shall thereupon mark them in his roll ; but though it is lawful for them to confess themselves to confessors that are strangers, yet they cannot receive the most holy sacrament, nor the communion upon obligation in Lent anywhere, but in their own parish churches, and the prelates in their visitations shall call for those rolls, in order to inform themselves how this Decree is observed. 

James Hough, “The History of Christianity in India from the commencement of the Christian Era,” Volume 2 (R.B. Seeley & W. Burnside, 1 January 1839), 601-602.

////

Caspar Erich Schieler, “Theory and Practice of the Confessional: A Guide in the Administration of the Sacrament of Penance,” (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905), 154-157

With respect to the obligation of the integrity of confession we may lay down the following propositions: 

I. It is of divine precept to confess all mortal sins committed after Baptism. This follows from the words by which Christ instituted the Sacrament; by them He gave the Sacrament a judicial character. So teaches the Council of Trent. From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance “the universal Church has always recognized that the complete confession of sins was also instituted by Our Lord, and is necessary jure divino for all who have sinned after Baptism. For Our Lord Jesus Christ when about to ascend into heaven left the priests as His vicars and judges, by whom all mortal sins into which the faithful had fallen were to be judged, that in virtue of the power of the keys they might pronounce sentence of forgiveness or retention.” The priest is therefore a judge, and as judge should pronounce the absolution. But the sentence of a judge is valid only when it turns on the facts of the case; hence a knowledge of the latter is required on the part of the judge. In consequence the confessor, in order to pronounce a valid sentence, must know intimately the facts of the case, the state of the sinner. Now the facts of the case are the mortal sins of the penitent; hence the confessor must be made acquainted with these; and as he can only learn them from the penitent himself, the latter is bound to make a complete statement of them. 

2. The essential object of this Sacrament is the forgiveness of sins that have been confessed. But one mortal sin cannot be forgiven apart from the rest, since forgiveness is the result of the influx of sanctifying grace, which does not remove sin as stains might be rubbed from a metal surface, but at once raises man from a state of sin to a state of grace, from being an enemy of God to being His friend. Moreover, sanctifying grace and mor tal sin cannot exist together in the soul. From this it follows that all sins must be told without exception, in order that they may all be remitted. 

3. Add to this the essential connection between the judicial power of the priest in the Sacrament and his power of punishing sin or imposing a penance for it; but since the penance must be proportioned to the misdeeds, the priest cannot exercise his powers properly unless, at least, the mortal sins have been fully confessed. If, as must happen at times, it is inopportune or, in fact, quite impossible to assign a penance bearing any proportion to the number and magnitude of the sins, that is quite per accidens and the decision of the question is the affair of the judge, not of the penitent. That Christ gave His Church the power of punishing sin is abundantly proved by the practice of so many centuries during which definite penances were assigned to certain sins. Since, therefore, the Church of divine right can mete out just punishment for sin, the penitent is bound by divine precept to submit himself to the Church by an entire confession of all mortal sins. From the fact that the confessor must pronounce sentence and impose a suitable penance, the Council of Trent concludes “ that all mortal sins of which the penitent is conscious after diligent search must be confessed, even though they be quite secret sins and only against the last two commandments of the Decalogue.” 

4. Finally, the Sacrament of Penance has of its very nature another end in view, that of preventing relapse. Thus the confessor is at the same time the physician of the soul, empowered and obliged to prescribe the means of reform. This duty can be effectually carried out only when he knows intimately the penitent's state of soul, so that the latter is obliged to submit to his healing art all the mortal wounds of the soul. 

Hence the Council of Trent anathematizes all who teach “that for remission of sins in the Sacrament of Penance it is not necessary jure divino that all and every mortal sin be confessed of which a man is conscious after faithful and diligent search.”

 The material integrity, however, is not always necessary for the validity of confession and for obtaining its benefits. At times it is morally and even physically impossible, either through inculpable forgetfulness or for other reasons. Now God does not command impossibilities. Hence the Council of Trent teaches: “The remaining sins which escape the diligent inquiry of the penitent are considered as included in the same accusation,” and so arc forgiven, as though they had been confessed. Hence it is abundantly clear that the material integrity of the confession is not always necessary. 

III. The formal integrity is, on the other hand, always necessary for the validity of the Sacrament, and belongs to its essence. A penitent, for instance, who out of shame conceals a mortal sin, transgresses Christ's command which obliges us to submit all mortal sins by a sincere confession to the power of the keys, incurring at the same time a mortal sin by his bad confession; such a confession cannot be valid nor have any good effect. This is also taught by the Council of Trent in the following words: “While the faithful earnestly endeavor to confess all the sins of which they are conscious, they present them to the Divine Mercy that they may all be forgiven; those, however; who do otherwise and knowingly conceal sins, present nothing to God's goodness to be forgiven through the priest. If the sick man is ashamed to show his wounds to the physician, the latter cannot cure what is unknown to him.” 

To have a perfect understanding of the preceding, we must distinguish between what is of the essence of the Sacrament and that which flows as a consequence of the divine command. When anything is wanting to the essence of the Sacrament, though the defect may be due to no fault on the part of the per son, the Sacrament is invalid; if, on the contrary, there be wanting some requirement of divine precept, making the defect culpable, the Sacrament is indirectly invalid because contrition is wanting, since contrition cannot exist in any one who is in the very act of sin ; if, however, the defect be inculpable, the result of forgetfulness or ignorance, the Sacrament is valid ; the sins which were omitted through no fault of the penitent are in directly forgiven by the infusion of sanctifying grace. There remains, however, the obligation of making good the defect afterwards, as we shall see later. 

William W. Bassett, “The determination of rite, an historical and jurical study,” Analecta Gregoriana, Vol 157, Series Facultatis Iuris Canonici: sectio B, n. 21 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1967), 159-163.

2. The canonical structure of Ritual determination

Membership in any one of the actually existing rites is a juridical correlative to the incorporation of the faithful into the Mystical Body, which is the Church. The relationship to the Church established by valid Baptism posits a corresponding complex of rights and duties both of divine and ecclesiastical law, which when translated into the present organizational framework of the Church, are expressed and fulfilled in necessary aggregation, not only to the Mystical Body as a whole, but also to a minor particular community within it. No one is simply baptized in abstraction from the concrete reality of the visible Church in its multiple human dimension, just as no one is born in the natural order unrelated to human society or within it to the minor civil and familial societies which in order of subsidiarity are the ontological coefficient of his being. The intimate and essential connection between Baptism, incorporate into the Church and ritual determination suggests that as a prelude to the solution of the intricate problems involved therein the fundamental ecclesiological structure of the primary relationship be first examined and its canonical implications basically detailed.

a. Baptism and the Acquisition of Personality in the Supernatural Order.    

The first necessary condition for belonging in any way to the church is the reception of the sacrament of baptism. It is the beginning of salvation and the door through which a person enters the Church. (Third council of Valence 855, can. 5; Denz. 632; Florence, Denz. 1314; Trent Denz. 1671; 1626; Constituio de Ecclesia Vatican I). No jurisdiction whatsoever is directly exercised by the ecclesiastical authority over the non-baptized. By baptism a man is constituted a person in the Church.   

The acquisition of personality in the Church by Baptism forms the radical foundation whereby man is incorporated into the Mystical Body of Christ. Elevated to a specific capacity in the supernatural order of salvation merited by Christ and by that very reason proper to Him as Lord and Source of Redemption the faithful become part of the visible and invisible structure of the Church as it is both a juridically organized society and through the Spirit a communion of the supernatural life. In the divine dispensation the act whereby union with Christ is initially effected, its free acceptance in the order of intentionality manifesting an efficacious desire to be one with the Savior, is also the vicarious action of Christ Himself conferring upon the faithful supernatural faculties and personality within the Church.   

The first essential effect of Baptism is that by reason of which the soul is configured to Christ, subjugated to Him, incorporated into Him by the indelible sacramental character. Man is not merely extrinsically ordered to Christ.  He is ontologically, intrinsically consecrated, in so far as the baptismal character is a supernatural quality inhering in the soul, rendering him capable of receiving the supernatural life, and thus by his own free activity using and perfecting it, so intending his own personal supernatural end in the beatific vision of God.

  Hence by Baptism, in relation to his natural and subsistent human personality, man is accidentally perfected by being elevated to a supernatural sphere of existence and act. By virtue of the sacramental character human perfection, which in the intrinsic finality of the concrete order consists in the immediate intuition of God, becomes capable of intention and attainment. But grace builds upon nature. The baptized remains essentially what he is as a metaphysical totality. Hence, the intentional dominion of those acts which belong to man as such is now secured in order to this supernatural end. Thus, the actuation of human spirituality, of mind and will, is infinitely increased, not destroyed, by being ordered to an end qualitatively superior to itself, to an order proper to the Triune God.    

Every validly baptized individual has, therefore, as a supernatural end to possess God. This is a personal goal to be achieved by the cooperation of divine grace and personal free activity. In this sense Baptism is said to confer a specific liberty, a freedom to seek and pursue a purpose beyond the limitations of human capability, a freedom from the law of fallen nature, a freedom from the impediments which prevent the attainment of man's perfection in God.

The only limitation placed upon the freedom of the sons of God is that imposed by the unique necessity of a single end and the exigent and sole avenue to its attainment. The activity to be exercised in liberty is itself specified by its purpose or goal. Thus, acts of faith, hope and charity, of worship, the exercise of the moral virtues, etc., are both possible and exigent in view of the end to be achieved and congruous to the elevation of man to the order of supernatural intentionality. The liberty given in Baptism and ontologically ordered to the end is determined within the scope of the means necessary to attain this end. Beyond this narrow confined, however, the free choice of means is a discretionary privilege of the baptized.   

Freedom of conscience, freedom of choice of a state of life, freedom of exercising charity and the moral virtues, freedom of communication and free association with others of the faithful constitute the basic inviolable divine rights of the baptized. Taken together as the freedom to acquire supernatural goods, these inalienable constituents of personal liberty from the dynamic of the redeemed and supernaturally elevated human personality.    But the very existence and actuation of human, personal liberty, and thus responsibility and merit, postulate furthermore that there be some sphere of external activity to which belongs by Baptism the inviolable faculty of freely acting in regard to concrete objects. 

b. The Relationship of the Acquired Supernatural Personality to the Church.   

The Church is the visible, socially structured communion of men with Christ, the source of sanctifying grace. She is the community which, in its historico-social form, its tangible liturgical actions, its word of truth and its life, is the continuation of the historically tangible reality of Christ. And hence she is the community which continues to exercise the function of this historical tangibility, rendering that freedom effectible and actually present in the world and signifying the fact.   

Therefore, in the supernatural order there exists a right of the baptized that can only be met in the faculty of free activity within the Church. Baptism gives the right to demand those....   

Baptism is a supernatural sign in the human order, just as its character is in the divine. Baptism validly conferred infallibly imprints a sacramental character and thus infallibly produces an aggregation of the faithful to the Church.  

In analyzing the structure of baptismal incorporation into the Church it is apparent that in order of priority union with Christ is logically antecedent to that with His Mystical Body. Consequent upon personal union with Christ is the baptized incorporated into the Church as an external and juridical society. Just as at birth man is aggregated as a person to the state, so the baptized is aggregated to the Church having a personality in the supernatural order. The state does not create personality. It merely recognized it and provides the conditions necessary for its fulfillment. So also the Church cannot create the supernatural personality, but only recognize and respond to it as created by the vicarious action of Christ in valid baptism.   

It is true, therefore, that personality and consequently a radical juridical capacity as a subject of rights and duties in the supernatural order are conferred by Baptism logically antecedent to the union of the baptized with the Church. Union with the Church supposes the existence of an already constituted supernatural personality.   It is Christ who constitutes in the baptized the fundamental rights and duties of the order of grace. Though the sacraments have been entrusted to the Church by God, the causal efficacy of the Church in relationship to those effects which are substantially spiritual is instrumental, these same effects infinitely exceeding the capacity of a human society. In relation to those effects which are substantially supernatural the role of the Church is to render humanly possible their equitable realization. The fundamental rights and duties of the faithful are the direct coefficient of the internal structure and finality of the Church. Its powers are circumscribed, nevertheless, by the very fact that the supernatural goods entrusted to her as such are substantially transcendent to her natura and being.   

If Baptism is conferred validly even outside the visible membership of the Church, Christ is still its principal agent. The instrumental causality of the Church is exercised by the very fact that at least implicitly there is required for validity the intention to do what the Church does. In any valid Baptism, therefore, the inviolable rights and duties constituting supernatural personality are created through the instrumentality of the Church by the principal efficient causality of Christ, the Lord.    

Considering now the relationship between Baptism and ecclesiastical jurisdiction two principal conclusions can be drawn from the aforesaid premises. The first is that the jurisdiction of the Church per se does not extend directly to the fundamental and inviolable natural or supernatural rights of the human person. Thus, the proper competency of ecclesiastical authority is in the direction of the exercise of these rights in the ecclesiastical order for the attainment of the supernatural end of the individuals and the common good of the Church. Consequently, in  ascribing the limitation of power in the Church the metaphysical and theological basis involved necessitates going beyond a type of ecclesiological juridical positivism to postulate a relationship in principle ontologically prior to the intervention of any positive law.

The deposit of faith, the Eucharistic sacrifice, the sacraments, the precepts and evangelical counsels can neither be suppressed nor substantially altered by the Church, as can neither the rights of the faithful to them. Indeed, as much as the free exercise of rights in the supernatural order constitutes a sphere substantially exceeding the direct power of ecclesiastical authority, such activity cannot be impeded. The baptized, acting in good intention and correct disposition, can acquire and perfect the internal supernatural life of his soul. The Church, as instrumental cause, cannot abridge the efficacy of the principal cause of grace, which is Christ.

On the other hand, however, the Church is a human, as well as a divine society, and cognizant of man's present condition, a visibly, socially and juridicallly organized society. The internal structure of the Church necessitates an external structure. The very necessity of protecting and assuring the free fulfillment of the fundamental rights of the faithful postulates that the Church be an organized society. Thus, in so far as the supernatural goal of mankind makes imperative, it belongs to the Church, to whom Christ has entrusted the means of salvation, to moderate the exercise of the basic personal rights of the baptized.    

The power of jurisdiction is the public power of ruling or authoritatively directing persons subject to the Church and ecclesiastical affairs or concerns in order to efficaciously attain the social end proper to the Church, which is the sanctification and supernatural salvation of the faithful. Subordinate to this jurisdiction by virtue of its essential relation to the common good is the exercise of the rights of the baptized, not the essential constitution of these rights themselves.   

It belongs to the Church, therefore, by reason of its supernatural end to create an objective, social order in which the exercise of rights can conveniently be realized. Thus providing for the common good of all the baptized, the Church exercises jurisdiction within her divinely-instituted competency. Hence in restricting and moderating the free exercise of right in subjection to a universal or particularized canonical system ecclesiastical authority is competent by divine juridical title.   

Thus, in virtue of the general principle that each and every validly baptized individual is by that very fact constituted a person in the Church, the subject of rights and duties, canons 87 (CIC) and 16 of the MP (Cleri sanctitati) determine more precisely the canonical structure and limitation of this juridical personality.    

A distinction is called for by the canons themselves between the radical capacity of an individual to acquire or recover rights in the Church, if he has lost them, and the effective or efficacious capacity to acquire and retain rights.   

It is undeniable that once the complete cause of Baptism has been placed there necessarily follows an effect proper to that cause. Thus, in Baptism there is always and indelibly conferred a radical juridical personality, a basic juridical capacity to acquire specific Christian rights. This always occurs because Baptism is the radical element of the juridical personality, constituting the foundation or the substratum of that personality. On its absence there is simply no capacity at all. This occurs indelibly, since the indelible character of Baptism has an indelible connatural effect.    

Furthermore, by Baptism are acquired effectively all the rights of Christians pertaining to jurdicial personality in the Church, and once acquired, remain integral, unless to the acquisition and retention of these rights "there is placed some obstacle impeding the bond of ecclesiastical communion," "such as heresy, which destroys the bond of faith, or schism, separating the individuals from the bond of government. Moreover, the effective exercise of these rights can be lost by an ecclesiastical censure, an ecclesiastical penalty whereby a man who is delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods which belong either to all or to one particular group of the faithful.   

Therefore, in canons 87 (CIC and 16 of the MP there is distinguished a triple cause, heresy, schism and censure, by which a baptized individual, who is and remains radically and indestructibly a person in the Church, in fact effectively does not acquire all the rights of Christians or, having acquired them, may lose their use and so diminish his juridical capacity as a person in the Church. 

The obstacle impeding the bond of ecclesiastical communion is verified certainly in adults who externally and formally, or in bad faith, profess heresy, or are in schism or apostasy. According to the more commonly held and traditional doctrine, it is also verified in those who externally, but materially, or in good faith, profess heresy or are in schism or apostasy, e.g., those who belong to a non-Catholic sect or denomination. It is certainly not verified in infants, at least until they reach a sufficient use of reason to be able to freely and knowingly ascribe themselves to the heretical or schismatic community in which they were baptized.  

The role of the Church, therefore, in the basic acquisition and retention of Christian rights is essential to the extent that communion with the Church is essential for their effective realization. In the exercise of these rights, in their external structure or fully-constituted and complete reality, the Church is a necessary cause. By full communion with the Church only are the Christian rights entirely and effectively realized. In communion with the Church may they be exercised to produce those juridical effects to which they are essentially ordered. Thus, and obstacle to ecclesiastical communion produces a real diminution of juridical capacity, a destruction of the effective external structure of the fundamental rights of Baptism. Thus constituted in Baptism, the basic rights of the faithful must be juridically incorporated into the communion of the Church for their effective realization.  

Juridical personality must not be confused then with membership in the Church, for which is required not only Baptism, but also the bonds of faith and communion.